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Modeling Narrowest Grounds
Maxwell Stearns*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s doctrinal statements governing nonmajority opinions demonstrate inconsistencies and confusion belied by the Justices’ behaviors modeling the narrowest grounds doctrine. And yet, lower courts are
bound by stated doctrine, beginning with Marks v. United States, not rules of
construction inferred from judicial conduct. This Article simplifies the narrowest grounds rule, reconciling doctrinal formulations with observed behaviors, avoiding the implicit command: “Watch what we do, not what we say.”
The two most recent cases considering Marks, Ramos v. Louisiana and
Hughes v. United States, obfuscate three central features: (1) when the doctrine does or does not apply; (2) how it applies in proper cases; and (3) the
precedential status of narrowest grounds opinions in the Supreme Court. Individual Supreme Court Justices capture discrete doctrinal elements; none convey a general theoretical understanding of the rule’s scope and meaning. In
Ramos, the more recent of the two cases, six Justices invite lower courts to
treat fractured Supreme Court cases as overruling past majority opinions.
Three Justices convey that a single Justice cannot control on narrowest
grounds. Two Justices treat narrowest grounds opinions as precedent in the
Supreme Court. Each proposition is in tension with observed behaviors in
other cases even in the Ramos term.
In June Medical Services v. Russo, Chief Justice Roberts alone issued a
controlling narrowest grounds opinion, with none of the Justices raising a
fuss. By declining to join Roberts’s opinion, the four liberal Justices ensured a
fractured ruling, thereby preserving a broader 2016 abortion precedent. In
Bostock v. Clayton County, the same cohort joined Justice Gorsuch’s strained
textualist construction of Title VII, forging a majority embracing sexual orientation and transgender status within the meaning of sex. These rulings convey
that a single Justice can control under Marks and that majority opinions hold
precedential status beyond narrowest grounds decisions in the Supreme Court.
* Venable, Baetjer & Howard Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King
Carey School of Law. B.A., University of Pennsylvania, J.D., University of Virginia School of
Law. The author thanks Michael Abramowicz, Richard Boldt, David S. Cohen, Renée Lerner,
Alan Miller, and Nina Varsava for extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts; William Casto,
Jonathan Gienapp, Edward Hartnett, Maeva Marcus, and Christian Burset for indulging in fascinating conversations into how early lawyers and judges identified holdings in the era of seriatim
opinions; Rachael Morrissey and Chantae Simms for excellent research assistance, and Jennifer
Chapman and Sue McCarty for outstanding library support. The author greatly benefited from
comments at the Virtual Constitutional Law and Economics Workshop, the Maryland Carey
Law Legal Theory Workshop, the George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School Levy
Workshop, and the Midwest Political Science Association Roundtable “Narrowing in on Narrowest Grounds,” featuring this and related articles by Professors Richard Re and Ryan Williams. Special thanks to the University of Maryland Carey School of Law for generous funding.
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This Article models narrowest grounds, introducing the essential doctrinal element of dimensionality. A simple model, comporting with behavioral
modeling by the Justices themselves, reveals that fractured cases with opinions
aligned along one relevant dimension necessarily yield a narrowest grounds
opinion, and fractured cases implicating more than one relevant dimension do
not. The analysis unlocks each of the preceding questions and resolves several
additional puzzles. Modeling narrowest grounds provides clarity for lawyers,
scholars, and jurists, off and on the Supreme Court.
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INTRODUCTION
Under Marks v. United States,1 lower courts are instructed that
when the Supreme Court decides a case in which no opinion captures
a majority of votes, the opinion consistent with the judgment that resolves the case on narrowest grounds states the holding.2 The Supreme
Court’s doctrinal statements seeking to clarify the construction of
nonmajority opinions demonstrate inconsistencies, even confusion.3
By contrast, individual Justices exhibit a greater understanding when
modeling their behavior in Marks’s shadow.4 And yet lower courts are
bound by stated doctrine, not rules of construction inferred from judicial conduct. This Article simplifies the narrowest grounds rule, reconciling doctrinal formulations with observed behaviors, thereby
avoiding the implicit command: “Watch what we do, not what we say.”
The confusion surrounding Marks was most evident in two recent
cases.5 The first, Hughes v. United States,6 ultimately avoided applying
430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
See id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (expressing the narrowest grounds doctrine)).
3 See infra Part I (discussing Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018), and Ramos v.
Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020)).
4 See infra Section II.A (discussing judicial strategies in several high-profile cases, including two cases issued in the most recent Supreme Court term: June Medical Services L.L.C. v.
Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020), and Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020)).
5 As explained below, June Medical Services further implicated Marks, suggesting Justice
Thomas was potentially open to Justice Gorsuch’s construction set forth in Ramos, which called
1
2

R
R
R
R
R
R

R
R
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Marks, and the second, Ramos v. Louisiana,7 makes ongoing challenges related to Marks inevitable, emphasizing the need for a broad
understanding of this important doctrine. Although Hughes was ultimately resolved on statutory grounds, the oral argument revealed conflicting claims concerning the scope of the narrowest grounds rule.8
Ramos took on Marks directly, revealing no fewer than three camps,
each taking a different view with none commanding a majority, concerning how the narrowest grounds rule applies to Apodaca v.
Oregon.9
Justice Alito, dissenting in Ramos, noted that by avoiding the issue, the Hughes Court had left Marks intact, at least for now.10 None
of the Ramos Justices expressed an intent to displace the narrowest
grounds rule, notwithstanding substantial academic criticism.11 Alito
further noted the irony that although struggling to construe Marks,
for disallowing the narrowest grounds rule when the Court splits 4-1-4 and a single Justice issues
the narrowest grounds opinion. See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2148 n.4 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
6 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018). The author submitted an amicus brief in Hughes, joined by several leading law professors with wide-ranging expertise in Supreme Court doctrines and decision-making processes. See Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief and Brief of Law
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (No. 17-155),
2018 WL 637338 [hereinafter Hughes Amicus Brief].
7 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
8 As one example, Justice Gorsuch, who delivered the Ramos judgment, inquired at the
Hughes oral argument whether the problem implicated in construing Freeman v. United States,
564 U.S. 522 (2011), the fractured case at issue in Hughes, was sufficiently limited that resolving
that case on separate grounds would avoid future Marks problems. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (No. 17-155). Justice Ginsburg responded that counsel and
two unnamed amici briefs, most likely those submitted by Professor Richard Re and this author,
provide “lots of examples,” implying a broader scope. See id. at 49. Justice Breyer best captured
Marks’s inevitable limitations, observing that along with Justice Powell, who authored the Marks
opinion, he likely could not come up with something better. See id. at 33. Even so, Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice Gorsuch’s limiting construction of Marks set out in the Ramos plurality, claiming the doctrine does not apply when a single Justice issues a narrowest
grounds opinion. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion).
9 406 U.S. 404 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390.
10 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1425–40 (Alito, J., dissenting).
11 See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1947 (2019)
(advocating absence of precedential value and encouraging compromise rulings based on Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)); Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions
and Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 838–39 (2017) (proposing “shared agreement” rule through which lower courts would determine whether the judgment-supporting rationales in a fractured Supreme Court case produce the same judgment as applied to newly
presented case facts). This Article’s author has been described as a rare Marks apologist. See
Joseph M. Cacace, Note, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 100
(2007). Since then, a group of leading scholars joined his Amicus brief supporting the narrowest
grounds rule in Hughes. See Hughes Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 2.
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the Ramos majority itself fractured, producing uncertainty as to the
holding under the narrowest grounds rule.12 The Ramos majority ultimately abandoned Apodaca, a fractured case permitting
nonunanimous state criminal jury verdicts.13 Ramos specifically split
on how Marks applies to Apodaca.14
Ramos invites a metalevel Marks inquiry: Under Marks, which
Ramos opinion, if any, expresses the holding as to how Marks properly applies? Resolving that convoluted inquiry ultimately proves less
important than directly tackling three fundamental questions:
(1) identifying the category of cases in which the Marks doctrine can,
and cannot, properly be applied; (2) determining how to correctly apply Marks in appropriate cases; and (3) determining the precedential
effect of narrowest grounds opinions, and nonmajority cases more
generally, both horizontally, in the Supreme Court, and vertically, in
lower federal courts and state courts.15
Supreme Court Justices are not alone in struggling formally to
express the narrowest grounds doctrine. Several lower court opinions
have made a hash of Marks,16 and thoughtful legal scholars, frustrated
by Marks, have not made the task easier.17 The Justices exhibit greater
clarity by modeling their conduct, which, even during the Ramos term,
was in tension with how they framed the doctrine in their opinions.
In June Medical Services v. Russo,18 Chief Justice Roberts alone
issued a controlling narrowest grounds opinion, with none of the Justices raising a fuss.19 By declining to join Roberts’s opinion, the four
liberal Justices, Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, ensured a
fractured ruling, preventing June Medical Services from displacing
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,20 a broader 2016 abortion ruling, as precedent on the Court itself.21 In Bostock v. Clayton County,22
12 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1432 n.17 (Alito, J., dissenting). For an account as to why the
approaches taken in separate concurrences by Justices Kavanaugh and Sotomayor represent the
narrowest grounds holding in Ramos, see infra Part II.
13 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1402–04 (plurality opinion).
14 See id.
15 This Article resolves several puzzles related to these fundamental inquiries. See infra
Part III (evaluating various doctrinal Marks formulations, issue voting rule and vote switching,
and whether Marks should be construed as a predictive or bargaining rule).
16 See infra Section III.A.
17 See, e.g., Re, supra note 11; Williams, supra note 11.
18 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
19 See id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
20 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
21 Although one might claim no practical difference between a fractured ruling striking
down the challenged Louisiana abortion statute and a narrowing majority opinion, failing to give
Roberts’s narrower concurrence in the judgment majority status had the practical effect of pre-

R
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the same cohort joined Justice Gorsuch’s narrow textualist construction of Title VII, without so much as a simple concurrence.23 Doing so
forged a majority opinion embracing sexual orientation and transgender status within the meaning of “because of sex.”24 These rulings
imply that, despite contrary assertions in Ramos,25 a single Justice can
control under Marks, and that majority decisions generally hold
greater precedential status than narrowest grounds opinions in the Supreme Court.
Properly expressing the narrowest grounds rule poses conceptual
challenges because it requires a theoretical foundation extending beyond Marks. The missing element informing when Marks can and cannot be applied, and how it properly applies, is dimensionality.26
The narrowest grounds rule is no ordinary statement of judicial
doctrine. The rule did not arise from construing an open-ended constitutional provision or from filling an interstitial statutory gap. Instead,
the doctrine is a necessary, albeit partial, solution to an inevitable
problem associated with decision making in an en banc court. Rather
than expressing a new rule, Marks recognized an existing judicial
norm or practice.27 Although that norm fits broadly within the rubric
of general federal common law, there are sightings in other pyramidal
serving Whole Woman’s Health. Overturning Whole Woman’s Health would have required a
majority opinion that engaged in two separate inquiries––one on the decision’s precedential status and another on its merits. The fractured ruling in June Medical Services produced no majority
opinion on either of these necessary inquiries. This generally aligns with the modeled behavior of
Supreme Court Justices subject to one notable exception. See infra Section II.A.2.C (explaining
that the narrowest grounds plurality in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46, 858 (1992) (joint opinion), while declining to overturn Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), nonetheless overturned two other Supreme Court abortion cases).
22 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
23 In contrast with a concurrence in the judgment, a simple concurrence means the author
has joined the majority opinion but wishes to provide additional analysis. See BARRY FRIEDMAN,
MARGARET H. LEMOS, ANDREW D. MARTIN, TOM S. CLARK, ALLISON ORR LARSEN & ANNA
HARVEY, JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 561–62 (2020) (describing general concurrences as those
that offer “supplemental analysis or explanation from a judge who joined the majority opinion,
agreeing not only with the majority’s judgment but also its reasoning,” and describing a concurrence in the judgment as one produced by a judge who “agree[s] with the majority on the ultimate outcome or judgment but disagree[s] on the underlying reasons”).
24 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747.
25 See infra Section II.A.
26 See infra Section II.B; see also Maxwell L. Stearns, Obergefell, Fisher, and the Inversion
of Tiers, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1043, 1067–92 (2017) (introducing dimensionality analysis).
27 For an example in English practice, see Gold v. Essex CC (1942) 2 KB 293 at 298 (Eng.)
(Lord Greene MR) (“[W]here two members of the court base their judgments, the one on a
narrow ground . . . and the other on wide propositions . . . , and the third member of the court
expresses his concurrence in the reasoning of both, I think it right to treat the narrower ground
as the real ratio decidendi.”).
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judicial hierarchies. For example, although not constitutionally required to do so, several state judicial systems embrace the rule in construing their own fractured highest court rulings. In Appendix A, this
Article provides the first comprehensive state-by-state data set showing which states embrace, reject, or have yet to decide whether to apply the narrowest grounds rule to their own highest courts.28
Writing for a unanimous Court on the issue, Justice Powell recognized a practice that the Supreme Court and lower federal courts had
already observed. Construing Memoirs v. Massachusetts,29 Justice
Powell chided the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for
standing alone among lower courts in failing to treat the narrowest
grounds plurality opinion as controlling.30 Justice Powell stated:
“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the
28 See infra Appendix A (listing state-by-state authorities). Appendix A provides helpful
data related to two separate questions arising from this Article: first, whether appointed or
elected state judiciaries are more likely to apply the narrowest grounds doctrine to their own
highest court, and second, whether, more generally, state courts perceive institutional benefits in
applying the doctrine to their own highest court decisions.

On the first question, the author’s initial hypothesis was that appointed judiciaries are more
apt to apply the rule than elected judiciaries. The author reasoned that appointed jurists are
likely more concerned about ensuring doctrinal consistency and predictability as a means of
enhancing the prestige of the state judiciary as a whole, whereas elected jurists are likely more
concerned with being unconstrained in their individual rulings, unless specifically bound by state
highest court majority opinions. The data, while supportive, are inconclusive. Among elected
judiciaries, five apply the rule, two do not apply the rule, and fourteen remain undecided.
Among appointed judiciaries, eight apply the rule, one does not apply the rule, and twenty remain undecided. A higher percentage of states with appointed judiciaries than states with
elected judiciaries apply the narrowest grounds rule to their state highest court decisions, 88.8%
versus 71.4%, and a slightly higher percentage of states with elected judiciaries have resolved the
question, 33.3% versus 31%. Among the states making the choice, the data are consistent with
the hypothesis, but the data are insufficient at this point to draw a definitive conclusion.
On the second, more general question, the author’s hypothesis was that state court systems,
like the federal judiciary, would find the doctrine helpful in furthering predictability and thus the
rule of law. This is consistent with viewing the narrowest grounds doctrine at the federal level as
a feature of general federal common law rather than as one created from whole cloth in Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), or Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). With respect to this question, the data are more broadly supportive. Among state judiciaries that have decided whether or not to apply the narrowest
grounds rule to their state highest court decisions, both appointed and elected, an overwhelming
majority, 81.25%, have chosen to apply it. Although only 32% of states thus far have resolved
the question, the datum remains consistent with the Article’s larger thesis that jurists, either
implicitly or explicitly, perceive benefits to applying the narrowest grounds rule that seem often
to have eluded the rule’s critics.
29

383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion).

30

See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-3\GWN301.txt

468

unknown

Seq: 8

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

14-MAY-21

9:08

[Vol. 89:461

Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’ ”31
This statement of the narrowest grounds rule is in one respect
imperfect and in another respect incomplete. Although the imperfection is easily remedied, even a perfectly expressed narrowest grounds
rule cannot be successfully applied to all nonmajority opinions. The
absence of a theoretical grounding concerning Marks has produced
confusion in seeking to formalize the narrowest grounds rule in published opinions even as the Justices reveal a better understanding
through their modeled behaviors.
Remedying Justice Powell’s slight misstatement is easy, but inconsequential.32 Identifying the rule’s incompleteness, which implicates
dimensionality, although critically important, requires a bit more effort.33 Justice Powell hints at dimensionality, but the intervening decades have not produced a firmer theoretical foundation. In some
respects, time has eroded core intuitions manifested through contemporaneous judicial behaviors in the period of Marks itself.34 Providing
this theoretical underpinning is essential to unpacking ongoing judicial
and scholarly confusion and to reconciling how Marks is articulated
on one side and modeled on the other.
The confusion respecting Marks primarily arises from failing to
identify and distinguish structural characteristics of cases in which the
narrowest grounds rule can, and cannot, properly be applied. The central characteristic is dimensionality. Dimensions are scales or mea31 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
32 The formally articulated rule fails to recognize that in a 4-1-1 opinion, with 3 in dissent,
and in which the listed opinions align from broad to narrow, the bolded 1 satisfies the stated rule
but the italicized 1 expresses the Court’s median position. The case of Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980), provides a rare illustration. For an analysis, see infra Section II.B.1.a. For data
on how lower courts have treated Fullilove under the narrowest grounds rule, see infra Appendix B. The data support the intuition that lower courts generally infer that the narrowest grounds
rule is intended to capture the median position in a nonmajority Supreme Court case resting
along a single dimension, even if the case also includes a narrower concurrence in the judgment.
Of twenty-four lower court opinions interpreting Fullilove, twenty-one sought to identify one or
more opinions as controlling. Of that subset of twenty-one, nine identified the Burger opinion as
controlling, five sought to reconcile Burger’s opinion with Justice Powell’s, and five sought to
reconcile Burger’s opinion with both Justice Powell’s and Justice Marshall’s. Only two lower
court opinions out of those twenty-one treated Justice Powell’s opinion as controlling.
33 The Marks doctrine’s incompleteness relates to Arrow’s Incompleteness Theorem, although understanding the theorem is not necessary to grasping the doctrinal incompleteness. For
a general exposition relating Arrow’s Theorem to Supreme Court decision making, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME
COURT DECISION MAKING 41–97 (2002).
34 See infra Section II.B (discussing related cases).
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sures along which virtually anything can meaningfully be expressed
and compared.35 Some comparisons can be assessed along a single dimension—large to small, tall to short, heavy to light, or broad to narrow. Other comparisons require more than one dimension. When
assessing multiple means of transportation—a bicycle, car, and train—
both size and weight positively correlate, with smaller modes of transportation weighing less and larger ones weighing more. Now add an
aloft hot air balloon, larger than a car, yet lighter than a bicycle, or air
itself, thus thwarting the prior assumption positively correlating size
and weight. Adding the balloon requires that each dimension—size
and weight—be separately assessed. Supreme Court cases likewise occasionally force more than one dimension. Relating Marks to dimensionality is essential in determining the rule’s proper scope.
The underlying difficulty in ascertaining when and how Marks applies involves failing to distinguish two sets of nonmajority opinions.
In the first set, when opinions implicate one relevant dimension, the
narrowest grounds rule applies in a straightforward manner.36 In the
second set, when opinions implicate more than one relevant dimension,37 the doctrine cannot be applied because the rule’s underlying
premise fails to hold. Failing to appreciate how Marks implicates dimensionality has invited creative judicial framings, or metaphors, designed to determine the rule’s scope. These include: (1) least impact
analysis; (2) lowest common denominator; (3) logical subset analysis;
and, yes, even (4) Matryoshka, or Russian nested, dolls.38 Such creativity should not obscure the inherent limitations of metaphors in
place of essential analytical tools. With the proper toolkit these devices prove unnecessary, collapsing into a singular, comprehensive
inquiry.39
35 For a more detailed discussion and analysis of dimensionality and relating the concept
to tiers of scrutiny, see Stearns, supra note 26.
36 Although identifying the narrowest grounds opinion in single dimension cases is
straightforward, construing such opinions can be challenging for various reasons, including assessing holding and dictum, as also occurs with majority opinions. See infra Section III.A.
37 As explained infra Section II.A., for purposes of Marks, a dimension is not relevant if it
results from an opinion that can be excluded, with the remaining opinions, including a group that
forms a majority on the judgment, aligning on a single dimension. More simply, a dimension is
irrelevant if the Justice forcing it is unnecessary to a majority on the judgment.
38 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit employed a ranking-over-opinions
analysis closely corresponding with this Article’s dimensionality analysis and the concept of a
Condorcet winner. See United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006)
(per curiam) (“When a majority of the Supreme Court agrees only on the outcome of a case and
not on the ground for that outcome, lower-court judges are to follow the narrowest ground to
which a majority of the Justices would have assented if forced to choose.”).
39 See infra Section III.A.
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Understanding the role of dimensionality in applying the narrowest grounds rule makes applications both in Apodaca and Ramos
straightforward. The analysis refutes Justice Alito’s implicit claim that,
as applied to Ramos, the rule is uncertain;40 Justice Kavanaugh’s claim
that, as applied to Apodaca, it is difficult;41 or Justice Gorsuch’s more
extreme claim that, as applied to Apodaca, it is impossible.42 Dimensionality distinguishes when the narrowest grounds rule can and cannot be applied, avoiding judicial and scholarly confusion in claiming a
general inability to apply Marks even in such straightforward cases.
With one dimension, despite fractured majorities, there is inevitably
and inexorably a narrowest grounds opinion.43 With equal certainty, in
cases implicating more than one relevant dimension, there is not.
Ascertaining when fractured cases implicate single or multiple
dimensions requires nuance and skill. That is generally true when construing complex Supreme Court opinions and more so when reading
several opinions to determine which, if any, controls. The task becomes simpler with the necessary tools. This Article provides those
tools, offering a comprehensive exposition of the narrowest grounds
rule that reconciles the behavior of Supreme Court Justices operating
in Marks’s shadow.44
Applying the narrowest grounds rule to Apodaca and Ramos becomes intuitive once we recognize that Marks rests on a singular premise: the narrowest grounds doctrine applies when fractured Supreme
Court cases implicate a single relevant dimension. The initial task
when confronting a fractured case is determining whether that premise is, or is not, met. As demonstrated in Appendix A, a majority of
state judiciaries that have considered the question also employ the
narrowest grounds rule for their own state highest court nonmajority
rulings.45 As a result, the guidance offered here equally applies in state
judicial contexts.
40 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1432 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“With no
apparent appreciation of the irony, today’s majority, which is divided into four separate camps,
criticizes the Apodaca majority as ‘badly fractured.’ ” (footnote omitted)).
41 See id. at 1416–17, 1416 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
42 See id. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion); id. at 1432 n.17 (Alito, J. dissenting).
43 As used here, separate opinions imply at least one concurrence in the judgment that
avoids a majority expressing the holding. For an analysis of the potential implications under
Marks when a Justice joining a majority opinion also writes a narrowing simple concurrence, see
infra Part III.
44 See infra Part II. This alternative statement of the narrowest grounds rule is a modification of the version proffered in the author’s amicus brief. See Hughes Amicus Brief, supra note 6,
at 25–26.
45 See infra Appendix A (collecting state-by-state data); supra note 28 (reviewing data to
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Although this Article is about the narrowest grounds rule, its implications are broad, affecting salient doctrines including affirmative
action, the individual mandate, abortion, and more. This Article resolves several specific questions implicated in Ramos, along with additional open questions concerning the narrowest grounds rule.46
Modeling narrowest grounds promises clarity for lawyers, scholars,
and jurists, off and on the Supreme Court.
Part I reviews two cases implicating both the incorporation doctrine and the narrowest grounds rule: Ramos, resting on a single relevant dimension, and McDonald v. City of Chicago,47 resting on two
relevant dimensions. The analysis demonstrates the importance of dimensionality in applying the narrowest grounds rule and exposes
problematic understandings expressed in the separate Ramos opinions. Part II contrasts the formal articulation of the narrowest grounds
rule with judicial behaviors modeling narrowest grounds. This Part
provides a theoretical account of Marks grounded in dimensionality,
integrating stated doctrine with observed judicial behaviors. This Part
also provides a comprehensive statement of the narrowest grounds
rule that reconciles stated doctrine with observed judicial behaviors.
Part III considers several remaining puzzles associated with Marks,
including assessing lower court doctrinal framings, issue voting and
vote switching, and whether to treat the narrowest grounds rule as
predictive or a bargaining rule.
I.

INCORPORATING DIMENSIONALITY, AND JUSTICE THOMAS’S
“ONE LESS TRAVELED BY”
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
—Robert Frost48

This Part focuses on two cases, Ramos and McDonald. Each case
resolved an important question arising under the incorporation doctrine.49 Through that doctrine, the Supreme Court applies specified
provisions of the Bill of Rights, which otherwise apply only to the fedtest two hypotheses: first, whether appointed or elected state judiciaries are apt to apply the
narrowest grounds rule to state highest court decisions, and, second, whether state courts more
generally apply the narrowest grounds rule in that context).
46 See infra Part III.
47 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
48 ROBERT FROST, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN (1916), reprinted in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 1099 (Nina Baym et al. eds., 3d ed. 1989).
49 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020) (incorporating the Sixth Amend-
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eral government, to states and localities.50 Although the incorporation
controversy, as it was sometimes called, dates back to the BlackFrankfurter debates, even today open questions remain.51
Ramos held that states must require unanimous jury verdicts to
support criminal convictions,52 abandoning the rule of Apodaca.53 McDonald held that states and municipalities are subject to Second
Amendment protections announced in District of Columbia v. Heller.54 The Ramos and McDonald Courts fractured, preventing a majority opinion in each case from expressing the Court’s holding. These
cases implicate both incorporation and Marks.
In both Ramos and McDonald, Justice Thomas played a unique
role, albeit with different consequences. Thomas disagreed in each
case with the eight remaining Justices as to the textual hook upon
which to hang the incorporation doctrine, even as he helped form a
majority respecting the judgment that the claimed rights warranted
incorporation.55 Despite his concurring in the judgment in each case,
the implications of Thomas’s approach differed significantly across
these cases under the narrowest grounds rule.
As shown below, the Ramos opinions implicate a single relevant
dimension, and the two additional concurrences in the judgment by
Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh express the Ramos Court’s holding on narrowest grounds.56 These opinions establish that although
Justice Powell’s Apodaca concurrence stated the narrowest grounds
holding under Marks, and has the status of precedent, Apodaca is
ment’s jury unanimity requirement); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (incorporating the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms).
50 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (“[I]ncorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights bear the
same content when asserted against States as they do when asserted against the federal
government.”).
51 See WALLACE MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE
COURT (2d ed. 1966); Sylvia Snowiss, The Legacy of Justice Black, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 187, 206;
Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 483, 548–49 (1997).
52

Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397.

53

See id. at 1404 (plurality opinion).

54

554 U.S. 570 (2008).

See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1420–21 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 805–06 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
55

56 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1408–10 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A); id.
at 1410–20 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (joining Justice Gorsuch’s opinion as to Parts I,
II–A, III, and IV–B–1). Although identified as partial concurrences, each opinion operates as a
concurrence in the judgment given that Justice Gorsuch writes Part IV–A for a plurality.
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overruled.57 Although Justice Thomas resolved Ramos on alternative
grounds, thus implicating a second dimension, that added dimension
proved irrelevant to the judgment and to the application of Marks.
Excluding Thomas, the four remaining opinions, capturing eight Justices, align along a single dimension, and five of those eight Justices
resolved the case in the same manner, favoring incorporation.58 Three
of those five, joining Gorsuch’s plurality opinion, did so on broader
grounds than the two narrower controlling concurrences in the judgment issued by Justices Kavanaugh and Sotomayor.
In contrast with Ramos, where Thomas provided an optional
sixth vote supporting the judgment, his vote in McDonald was the decisive fifth on the nine-member Court. Consequently, Justice
Thomas’s added dimension mattered in McDonald, undermining the
narrowest grounds rule.59 The added dimension is analogous to adding
an aloft hot air balloon when ranking modes of transportation otherwise aligning on a single dimension capturing both size and weight.
The resulting McDonald opinions likewise could not be captured from
broad to narrow, thus preventing the application of Marks to
McDonald.
The lesson is clear: in Supreme Court decision making, taking the
“one less traveled by” makes “all the difference” only when doing so
disallows a majority of five to reach a common destination.
A complete analysis extends beyond counting votes.60 The question, for purposes of the narrowest grounds rule, is precisely when to
count which votes. In Ramos, the Gorsuch plurality and the Kavanaugh concurrence in the judgment claimed that applying the narrowest grounds rule in Apodaca, permitting nonunanimous state criminal
jury verdicts, was challenging, even impossible. These claims are mistaken. Marks applies straightforwardly in both Ramos and Apodaca,
distinguishing those cases from McDonald.
After a brief introduction to the Incorporation Controversy, this
Part reviews the separate Ramos and McDonald opinions. The analysis demonstrates how, despite Thomas’s common role in each case, he
thwarted the narrowest grounds rule only in McDonald.
57 Although this is the Ramos holding, it rests upon a mistaken premise that narrowest
grounds opinions are binding precedent in the Supreme Court. See infra Section II.A.2.
58 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (majority opinion); id. at 1432 n.17 (Alito, J., dissenting).
59 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
60 See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political
Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849 (2001) (demonstrating that a variation on
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam), risked operating in two dimensions).
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A. Incorporation in Context
The Bill of Rights was, in an important respect, part of the Constitutional Convention’s unfinished business.61 Specifically, the Bill of
Rights stands as a rejection of the view, most prominently associated
with Alexander Hamilton, that listing rights risked implying general
federal regulatory powers extending beyond those expressly, or impliedly, delegated.62
As early as Barron v. Baltimore,63 the Supreme Court made plain
that the listed Bill of Rights protections applied only against federal
regulatory powers, not those of states or localities.64 States, by contrast, held plenary regulatory powers, also called police powers, for
which the most vital checks in late-eighteenth century jurisprudence
were limited to the political realm.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Reconstruction Amendments recognized a shift in the presumption that states remained primary protectors of individual liberties, with federal courts more
generally limited to checking against federal regulatory excesses in
light of the latter’s limited delegated functions.65 The radical constitutional transformation following the Civil War included embedding
within section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment three substantive
guarantees: protecting persons against state deprivations of due process; equal protection; and, by virtue of national citizenship, state infringements against privileges or immunities.66 The specific scope of
each clause was subject to future clarification—politically, pursuant to
section 5, which provided for congressional enforcement authority,67
and judicially, through substantive constructions of the relevant section 1 clauses.
61 The compromise of approving for ratification and leaving the Bill of Rights as part of
the First Congress’s initial business is well documented. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, James
Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 301–02. Other
unfinished work includes the obvious compromise disallowing challenges to chattel slavery for a
full twenty years and otherwise recognizing the institution of slavery, albeit without mentioning
it by name, through the three-fifths and rendition clauses. See, e.g., DANIEL FARBER & NEIL S.
SIEGEL, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 279–346 (2019).
62

See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513–14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961).
63

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).

64

See id. at 247–50.

65

See FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 61, at 231–54.

66

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

67

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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One overriding question involved whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause68 would ensure that following the Thirteenth Amendment, which had formally ended slavery, states were required to
provide former slaves the same protections in the marketplace, voting,
travel, and other domains as were provided to whites by virtue of
freedmen’s new status as U.S. citizens.69
A few additional observations will help before presenting Ramos
and McDonald. In the Slaughter-House Cases,70 the Supreme Court so
narrowed the reach of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that jurists
and legal scholars customarily declare the clause a virtual nullity.71
The Slaughter-House Cases held that the Clause did not protect
against the invasion of rights originating from states, rendering protection against a slaughter-house monopoly beyond the Clause’s reach.72
The Slaughter-House Cases holds a special place in constitutional
jurisprudence. Writing in dissent, Justices Field, Bradley, and Swayne
derided Justice Miller’s analysis in part for having the curious effect of
rendering an operative provision in a recently enacted amendment a
dead letter.73 All rights claiming their origin in the Constitution or
federal law were independently protected against state or local encroachment by virtue of the Supremacy Clause in Article VI.74 Such
rights did not include protection against a state-conferred monopoly.
The Supreme Court has certainly issued its fair share of erroneous
opinions,75 and that alone would not give the Slaughter-House Cases
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
See FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 61, at 231–54, 427–54. In overruling Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (enslaved party), the first sentence of section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment ensured state and federal citizenship to freedmen. See U.S. CONST.
amend XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”).
70 See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
71 See FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 61, at 231–54, 347–76. This is slightly overstated as
indicated by Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), which relied on privileges or immunities to
protect the right to travel, id. at 501–04, and by McDonald itself, which depended for its judgment on one Justice invoking the Privileges or Immunities Clause, see McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For a more detailed discussion of McDonald, see infra Section I.C.
72 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
73 See id. at 83–111 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111–24 (Bradley, J., dissenting); id. at
124–30 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
74 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
75 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011) (including
within the anticanon of constitutional jurisprudence Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857) (enslaved party), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
68
69
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special status. What makes the case special is that although the case is
widely regarded as mistaken, so few seek to discard it.
Save a singular member—Clarence Thomas—the Supreme Court
has been consistently unwilling to revisit the Slaughter-House Cases.
Justice Hugo Black, often regarded as the Supreme Court’s strongest
advocate of incorporation,76 originally sought to deploy the Privileges
or Immunities Clause in a manner that would revive it, arguably without undoing Justice Miller’s slaughtering. Although Miller made plain
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected only federal
rights,77 Black claimed the substantive protections the Clause embraced were fully captured in the Bill of Rights, thereby applying
those nationally derived rights to the states.78
Justice Black famously debated Justice Frankfurter, who rejected
the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to
the states, and further rejected the notion that the substantive protections in the Bill of Rights constituted a listing of privileges or immunities.79 Over several intervening decades, the incorporation debate
shifted its focus to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
This created its own problems, including the anomaly that two clauses
with nearly identical wording, as set out in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, expressed entirely different meanings.80 In addition, as
Justice Thomas has observed, it is arguably anomalous to rely upon a
Clause that speaks to due process as a font of substantive rights.81
As Ramos and McDonald demonstrate, longstanding debates
concerning the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and
the scope of the Due Process Clause continue even today. As these
cases further demonstrate, so too does the commitment among members of the present Supreme Court, except Justice Thomas, to retain(1963); and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392 (2018)).
76 See Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Justice Black, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Incorporation,
30 U. MIA. L. REV. 231, 238–40 (1976).
77 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78–79.
78 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74–75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
79 See Yarbrough, supra note 76, at 231, 239; Richard Boldt & Dan Friedman, Constitutional Incorporation: A Consideration of the Judicial Function in State and Federal Constitutional
Interpretation, 76 MD. L. REV. 309, 319–20, 328–31, 358 (2017); see also Hugo L. Black, In
Memoriam, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1965) (noting his disagreements
with Justice Frankfurter).
80 See Yarbrough, supra note 76, at 234–35.
81 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of words.”).
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ing the Slaughter-House Cases as precedent despite ongoing doubts
concerning its original merits.
B.

Ramos v. Louisiana

Ramos v. Louisiana invites a meta-analysis of Marks. The case
produced a total of four opinions consistent with the outcome in the
case, either displacing or overturning Apodaca v. Oregon.82 Apodaca
had permitted convictions in state criminal trials based on
nonunanimous jury verdicts.83 The Ramos judgment demanded incorporating the full scope of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury,
including unanimity, for state criminal trials.84 Three Justices dissented, without claiming Apodaca was rightly decided, but concluding
it should not be overturned.85
The Ramos lineup thwarted conventional ideological suppositions. Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion in part for a majority and in
part for a plurality of three.86 The majority opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kavanaugh, with the latter
two splitting off most notably from Part IV–A.87 That part assessed
the implications both of the narrowest grounds rule and of stare decisis in construing Apodaca.88 Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh each
also separately concurred in the judgment, and Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment without joining any part of the Gorsuch opinion.89 Justice Alito’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Kagan.90 Each camp—the plurality, concurrences in the judgment, and dissent—had members associated with the Supreme
Court’s liberal and conservative wings.91
82 One disagreement between the plurality and concurrences in the judgment concerned
whether Apodaca is not precedent, and thus simply requires displacement, or is precedent, requiring overruling. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1402–04 (2020) (plurality opinion)
(Part IV–A); id. at 1408–10 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A); id. at 1410–20
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
83 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 405–06 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct.
1390.
84 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1402–04 (plurality opinion).
85 See id. at 1425–40 (Alito, J., dissenting).
86 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1393.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1402–04 (plurality opinion).
89 See id. at 1408 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A); id. at 1410 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part); id. at 1420–21 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1432
n.17 (Alito, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting).
91 The three three-member camps, with bold representing Justices generally regarded as
conservative and italics representing Justices generally regarded as liberal, are as follows: plural-

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-3\GWN301.txt

478

unknown

Seq: 18

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

14-MAY-21

9:08

[Vol. 89:461

Discerning the Ramos holding under Marks requires assessing
how the various camps assess Apodaca under Marks. That task demands careful reading across opinions, including drawing the most
plausible inferences when confronting inevitably incomplete text. Although this process risks implying speculation, as demonstrated below, a careful analysis cabins, rather than expands, speculative
inferences.92 The soundness of inferential reasoning when construing
fractured opinions is a function of having identified the most plausible
dimension or dimensions along which relevant opinions are expressed.
We begin with Apodaca, which, along with its companion case,
Johnson v. Louisiana,93 revealed several voting blocs. The Ramos
Court assessed the Apodaca opinions to resolve three questions:
(1) does Marks apply to Apodaca?; (2) if so, which opinion controls
on narrowest grounds?; and (3) assuming Marks applies and yields a
controlling opinion, what is Apodaca’s precedential status in the Supreme Court?94 Although together Apodaca and Johnson produced
several opinions, as suggested by Justice Gorsuch, we can simplify
them into three blocs.
Writing for a plurality of four in Apodaca, Justice White applied a
functionalist analysis of the jury right.95 White argued that the historical justification for interposing the jury as a filter between a potentially overreaching prosecutor and criminal defendant is not
meaningfully undermined by supermajority verdicts of ten-to-two or
eleven-to-one as opposed to unanimous verdicts of twelve.96 White
balanced the claimed benefit of unanimity against the risk of hung
juries, which sometimes produce problematic dismissals and other
times result in costly retrials.97 The plurality sustained the
nonunanimous jury verdicts, implying that nonunanimity is permissible under the Sixth Amendment based on functional considerations.98
Justice Stewart’s Apodaca dissent, for three, is sufficiently brief
that the relevant part warrants quoting in full:
In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court squarely held that the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in a federal criminal
ity (Gorsuch, Ginsburg, Breyer); concurrences in the judgment (Thomas, Kavanaugh,
Sotomayor); dissent (Roberts, Alito, Kagan).
92 See infra Part II.
93 406 U.S. 356 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390.
94 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion).
95 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390.
96 See id. at 407–10.
97 See id. at 410–11.
98 See id. at 407–14.
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case is made wholly applicable to state criminal trials by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Unless Duncan is to be overruled,
therefore, the only relevant question here is whether the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury embraces a
guarantee that the verdict of the jury must be unanimous.
The answer to that question is clearly “yes,” as my Brother
Powell has cogently demonstrated in that part of his concurring opinion that reviews almost a century of Sixth Amendment adjudication.99
Because they construed the Sixth Amendment unanimity requirement both legally sound and as subject to incorporation based on
Duncan v. Louisiana,100 the four dissenters voted to overturn the
nonunanimous conviction.101
As Justice Marshall observed in dissent, Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment and providing the fifth vote to sustain the conviction, reviewed the detailed history of the requirement of jury
unanimity.102 Powell determined that the Sixth Amendment was intended to embrace unanimity, but then set out his theory, now known
as dual track incorporation.103 That theory held that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, through which substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights applied to the states, did not demand incorporation jot for jot.104 As Justice Gorsuch noted in Ramos, “Justice
Powell acknowledged that his argument for dual-track incorporation
arrived ‘late in the day.’ ”105
99
100

Id. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
391 U.S. 145 (1968).

See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414–15 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In addition to Justices Brennan and Marshall, who joined Stewart’s dissent, and who wrote separate dissents, Justice Douglas also produced a dissenting opinion, and all of the opinions also accompanied Apodaca’s
companion case Johnson. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 395 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 399 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 380 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
101

102

See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

103

See id. at 372–73 (Powell, J., concurring).

104

Powell stated:
I am not in accord with a major premise upon which that judgment is based. Its
premise is that the concept of jury trial, as applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, must be identical in every detail to the concept required in
federal courts by the Sixth Amendment. I do not think that all of the elements of
jury trial within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment are necessarily embodied in
or incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. at 369 (footnote omitted).
105 Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1398 (2020) (quoting Johnson, 406 U.S. at 375
(Powell, J., concurring) (“Although it is perhaps late in the day for an expression of my
views . . . .”)).
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Until Ramos, and thus for fifty years, Justice Powell’s Apodaca
concurrence in the judgment was almost invariably deemed controlling on the narrowest grounds. That opinion intuitively occupied a
middle ground between relaxing the jury unanimity requirement in
federal and state criminal trials, embraced by Justice White for a plurality of four, and insisting upon jury unanimity in both federal and
state criminal trials, embraced by Justice Stewart and three others in
dissent. The preceding analysis is depicted visually in Table 1.
TABLE 1. APODACA V. OREGON

IN

ONE DIMENSION
Justices Stewart (for 3)
and Douglas (dissenting)

Justice White (for 4)

Justice Powell

Unanimity not required
under Sixth Amendment

Unanimity required under Unanimity required under
Sixth Amendment, with
Sixth Amendment for
jot-for-jot incorporation
federal cases, but not for
state cases

Lax Jury Trial Right

Strict Jury Trial Right

As Table 1 shows, of the two opinions consistent with the judgment sustaining the petitioners’ nonunanimous jury verdicts in
Apodaca, Justice Powell’s dual-track incorporation is narrower. Applying one common methodology to Marks, of the two opinions consistent with the judgment, Powell’s has the “least impact” in terms of
sustaining nonunanimous jury convictions. Whereas the plurality
would allow nonunanimous verdicts in both federal and state criminal
trials, Powell would cabin nonunanimous verdicts to state criminal trials. By contrast, the dissent would disallow them in both federal and
state criminal trials and thus would overturn the petitioners’ convictions in Apodaca along with others resting on less-than-unanimous
jury verdicts.
Writing for the plurality of three in Ramos, Justice Gorsuch rejected the preceding analysis. Gorsuch claimed that no opinion expressed the Apodaca holding on narrowest grounds.106 Justice Alito
rejoined that this striking claim defies a half century of jurisprudence
construing the Powell opinion as expressing the Apodaca holding.107
Alito’s account—along with that of Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh, who likewise regarded Powell’s opinion as controlling—is consistent with the preceding analysis. Despite Gorsuch’s analysis, a
majority of the Ramos Court regarded Powell’s Apodaca opinion as
106
107

See id. at 1403 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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controlling under Marks, even as a separate majority elected to supersede Apodaca in favor of the views of Justice Stewart’s dissent requiring unanimity in both federal and state criminal trials.108
The Ramos opinions prove somewhat more challenging to align
than those in Apodaca, largely as a consequence of Justice Thomas’s
outlier view of incorporation. Unlike the remainder of the Ramos
Court, Thomas claimed the Slaughter-House Cases erred not only in
failing to afford meaningful content to the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges or Immunities Clause but also in failing to recognize that
Clause as the doctrinal source for incorporating the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights and applying them to the states.109 Because
Thomas agreed that incorporation—albeit under a different Clause—
is jot for jot, he helped form the majority on the judgment overturning
Mr. Ramos’s nonunanimous jury conviction. Thomas’s analysis is orthogonal to that of the Court’s remaining members. Identifying the
narrowest grounds opinion in Ramos requires determining whether
Thomas’s alternative analysis prevents aligning the remaining opinions—capturing eight Justices—along a single dimension. The analysis
to follow demonstrates that while Thomas’s analysis does not undermine applying Marks to Ramos, it does undermine applying Marks to
McDonald v. City of Chicago.
The Ramos opinions comprise four camps. Justice Gorsuch wrote
in part for a majority of five, including Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kavanaugh, and in part for a plurality of three, joined
only by Breyer and Ginsburg.110 Part IV–A, for a plurality, assessed
the implications of the narrowest grounds rule in construing Apodaca
and in considering that case’s precedential status.111 Justices
Sotomayor and Kavanaugh produced individual concurrences in the
judgment, most notably parting company respecting Part IV–A.112 Despite their differing approaches, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh each implicitly agreed on the implications of Marks for Apodaca and on
Apodaca’s precedential status. By contrast, Justice Thomas, who also
concurred in the judgment, took an altogether different view of incorSee id. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 1424 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
110 See id. at 1393 (majority opinion).
111 See id. at 1402–04 (plurality opinion). Justice Sotomayor joined Part IV–B of the Gorsuch opinion, which determined that reliance interests did not warrant failing to abandon the
Apodaca judgment. See id. at 1404–07 (majority opinion); id. at 1407–08 (plurality opinion); id.
at 1408–10 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A).
112 See id. at 1408 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A); id. at 1410 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
108
109
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poration from the Court’s remaining eight members.113 Finally, Justice
Alito produced a dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kagan.114
The Ramos Court fractured on how to apply Marks to Apodaca
and on identifying the textual foundation for incorporation. Although
the latter split implicated two nominal dimensions, the resulting opinions can be cast along one relevant dimension, with Justices
Sotomayor and Kavanaugh expressing the Ramos holding on narrowest grounds. To be clear, expressing the narrowest grounds holding is
separate from the underlying merits. The analysis that follows reveals
that although not entirely without precedent,115 the controlling opinions misconstrue an important feature associated with a proper construction of the narrowest grounds rule.
1.

Hughes, Freeman, & Shifting Views on Narrowest Grounds

The positions the Ramos Justices embraced concerning Marks
have shifted over time. Before Ramos, the Supreme Court had last
squarely addressed Marks in Hughes v. United States.116 The Hughes
Court confronted lower court disagreements in construing Freeman v.
United States.117 Freeman and Hughes presented questions of statutory
interpretation involving when an offender who pled guilty in a Type C
plea—involving an agreed-upon sentencing recommendation—could
petition for sentencing reconsideration following a statutory diminution in sentencing for a relevant part of the offending activity. Hughes
implicated Marks because the Freeman Court fractured into three relevant camps.
Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality of four in Freeman, presumed that because plea bargains were informed by the sentencing
guidelines, they were generally based on the guidelines for purposes
of permissible sentencing reconsideration, rendering Mr. Freeman eligible.118 In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that, in general,
sentencing pursuant to a plea agreement is based not on the guidelines, but on the plea, thus making Freeman ineligible.119 Justice
See id. at 1420–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 1425–40 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan declined to join Part III–D of
Justice Alito’s dissent. Id. at 1425.
115 See infra Section II.A.2.c (discussing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46, 858 (1992) (joint opinion)).
116 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018).
117 564 U.S. 522 (2011).
118 See id. at 534 (plurality opinion).
119 See id. at 544–51 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
113
114
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Sotomayor, who had been a prosecutor,120 concurred in the judgment,
reasoning that, in general, sentencing pursuant to a plea agreement is
based on the plea agreement not the guidelines, but also identifying
specific circumstances in which the agreement itself provided objective evidence that it was based on the guidelines.121 This included
wording referring to or incorporating the sentencing guidelines. As
applied to petitioner Freeman, her conditions were met, rendering
him eligible.122
Most lower federal courts addressing the question determined
that Sotomayor’s Freeman concurrence in the judgment controlled on
narrowest grounds.123 Her approach, identifying specific conditions for
when pleas were eligible, intuitively fell between presuming that virtually all pleas were eligible (Kennedy) and presuming that virtually
none were eligible (Roberts).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit likewise identified Sotomayor’s opinion as controlling in Hughes. In doing so, it
denied relief to Hughes, whose plea agreement, it determined, failed
to satisfy her specified eligibility requirements.124 Applying
Sotomayor’s analysis, the court determined that Hughes’s case differed from Freeman’s in two respects.125 First, Hughes’s recommended
sentence fell below the low end of the guidelines’ sentencing range.126
Second, the sentencing recommendation did not incorporate any of
the criteria that Sotomayor had identified in her Freeman concurrence
to refute the claim that the sentence was based on the plea, not the
guidelines.127 By contrast, under Kennedy’s approach, the guidelines
are presumed to have influenced Hughes’s sentence, and thus to have
provided the requisite statutory basis for resentencing. Whereas Kennedy would find Freeman and Hughes eligible for sentencing reconsideration, and Roberts would find neither eligible, Sotomayor would
find Freeman eligible, but Hughes ineligible. Hughes appealed, claiming that the Eleventh Circuit had wrongly applied Marks to Freeman
120 Benjamin Weiser & William K. Rashbaum, Sotomayor Is Recalled as a Driven Rookie
Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009, at A13.
121

See Freeman, 564 U.S. at 534–44 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment).

122

See id. at 535–36.

123

See Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771 (2018).

124

See id. at 1774.

United States v. Hughes, 849 F.3d 1008, 1015–16 (11th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded,
138 S. Ct. 1765.
125

126

See id.

127

See id.
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and further claiming that Marks should not be relied upon as a rule of
construction in fractured cases.128
As Justice Alito observed in his Ramos dissent, Hughes was resolved on separate statutory grounds,129 thereby leaving the narrowest
grounds rule intact, at least for now. Rather than have the Hughes
Court resolve whether her Freeman opinion controlled under Marks,
Justice Sotomayor joined a majority embracing Justice Kennedy’s
broader basis for presuming eligibility for sentencing relief.130 She explained in a separate concurrence that although she continued to embrace the merits of the view she expressed in her Freeman
concurrence in the judgment, her opinion had fractured the Court
and, in doing so, compromised guidance to lower courts on an important issue of criminal sentencing.131
During the Hughes oral argument, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg
expressed an understanding of Marks in some tension with their later
decision to join Justice Gorsuch’s Ramos opinion, including the part
comprising a plurality of three. In the Hughes oral argument, Justice
Gorsuch raised the possibility that the problems in construing Freeman under Marks were sufficiently uncommon that resolving Hughes
on alternative grounds might avoid future difficulties.132 Justice Ginsburg responded that the problem was more common, referring to
cases cited in two amicus briefs.133 Justice Breyer separately observed
that despite its imperfections, the narrowest grounds rule is likely the
best the Court can do in setting out helpful guiding principles.134 Despite this, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice Gorsuch’s entire Ramos opinion, which expressed a very different conception of
Marks.135
a. Justice Gorsuch’s Marks Deconstruction in Ramos
In Ramos, Justice Gorsuch advanced three propositions implicating Marks.136 First, he contended that Apodaca failed to provide an
128 See Brief of Petitioner at 37, 55, Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (No. 17-155), 2018 WL 565327,
at *37, *55.
129 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1430 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
130 See Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1778–80 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
131 See id.
132 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 46–49.
133 See id. at 49–50. Most likely this referred to the commentary of Professor Re and this
Article’s author.
134 See id. at 53.
135 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1393–94 (majority opinion); id. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion).
136 See id. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion).

R
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opinion resolving the case on narrowest grounds.137 Second, he maintained that, as a result, Apodaca lacks precedential status.138 Third, he
concluded that Apodaca was mistaken and should be superseded, as
opposed to overruled, thereby demanding unanimous jury verdicts
both in federal and state criminal proceedings.139
Justice Gorsuch’s determination that Apodaca lacked a controlling narrowest grounds opinion rested on two arguments. First, Justice
Gorsuch effectively endorsed the part of Justice Powell’s opinion construing the Sixth Amendment jury right to require unanimity as a matter of constitutional history, early English practice, and constitutional
expectation notwithstanding that England itself later abandoned the
unanimity requirement.140 Second, Justice Gorsuch observed that for
nearly one hundred years prior to Apodaca, the Court had recognized
the unanimity requirement, eschewing an inquiry into a functionalist,
or cost-benefit, analysis of the sort Justice White’s plurality embraced.141 Instead, Justice Gorsuch claimed that the Framers undertook whatever balancing was appropriate, and the modern Court’s
task was limited to honoring, not reassessing, that balance.142
Justice Gorsuch surveyed the law on incorporation, ultimately
embracing the Apodaca dissent. Gorsuch maintained that the proper
doctrinal approach had long been jot for jot, rendering Justice Powell’s dual-track analysis not merely mistaken, but legally unavailable.143 Justice Gorsuch determined that neither Justice Powell’s dualtrack analysis nor White’s functionalist analysis could express the
Apodaca Court’s holding on narrowest grounds.144 With respect to
Justice Powell, Justice Gorsuch posited one more claim: a single Justice, whose view was rejected by eight out of nine members of the
Court, cannot control under Marks.145
There are two important points to make regarding these claims.
First, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion does not represent the narrowest
grounds position in Ramos. Second, on the merits, two centerpieces of
See id.
See id.
139 See id. at 1404.
140 See id. at 1395–97 (majority opinion).
141 See id. at 1396, 1398.
142 See id. at 1402 (plurality opinion).
143 See id. at 1405 (majority opinion). For a similar claim in a fractured 4–1–4 context, with
Justice Scalia claiming that the narrowest grounds position taken by Justice Kennedy was legally
unavailable, see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 301 (2004); and infra Section II.A.1 (reviewing
Justice Scalia’s analysis).
144 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1405 (majority opinion).
145 See id. at 1403–04 (plurality opinion); id. at 1404–05 (majority opinion).
137
138
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the analysis are notably flawed whereas a third, although rejected by a
majority of the Court, is sound. Before evaluating the Ramos concurrences in the judgment, it is helpful to consider Justice Alito’s dissent.
Justice Alito clarifies some aspects of the narrowest grounds rule
while complicating others in an opinion that contains an apparent internal inconsistency.146
b. Justice Alito’s Ramos Dissent
Contrary to Justice Gorsuch, Justice Alito recognized that a single Justice can control on narrowest grounds:
An initial question is whether, in a case where there is no
opinion of the Court, the position taken by a single Justice in
the majority can constitute the binding rule for which the decision stands. Under Marks, the clear answer to this question
is yes. The logic of Marks applies equally no matter what the
division of the Justices in the majority, and I am aware of no
case holding that the Marks rule is inapplicable when the
narrowest ground is supported by only one Justice. Certainly
the lower courts have understood [Marks to] apply in that
situation.147
Justice Alito recognized Apodaca as precedent, including in the
Supreme Court.148 And yet, despite recognizing that even one Justice
can control under Marks, Justice Alito qualified his conclusion, stating
no one ever imagined that Justice Powell’s solo opinion was binding
on the Court.149 This might imply that although Justice Alito regards
fractured rulings as binding precedent on the Supreme Court, thereby
requiring an overruling to displace, such rulings do not obligate the
Court to embrace the rationale in any nonmajority opinion, including
the narrowest grounds opinion.
The author has alerted the Clerk of the Court as to the seeming inconsistency.
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1431 (Alito, J., dissenting).
148 See id. at 1427–28 (“Consider what it would mean if Apodaca was never a precedent. It
would mean that the entire legal profession was fooled for the past 48 years.”); id. at 1429 (“The
idea that Apodaca was a phantom precedent defies belief.”).
149 Justice Alito stated:
The final question is whether Justice Powell’s reasoning in Apodaca—namely, his
view that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate every aspect of the Sixth
Amendment jury-trial right—is a binding precedent, and the answer to that question is no. When, in the years after Apodaca, new questions arose about the scope
of the jury-trial right in state court—as they did in cases like Apprendi v. New
Jersey and Blakely v. Washington—nobody thought for a second that Apodaca
committed the Court to Justice Powell’s view . . . .
Id. at 1431 (citations omitted) (first citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); and then
citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)).
146
147
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Setting aside the claimed obligation to formally overrule
nonmajority Supreme Court cases, this reading largely comports with
the analysis that follows. That analysis demonstrates that the precedential status of a narrowest grounds opinion differs in lower courts as
compared with the Supreme Court, binding the former not the latter.
The difficulty is that Justice Alito then introduces uncertainty with an
admittedly ambiguous passage that appears to contain an internal
inconsistency:
The next question is whether the Marks rule applies any differently when the precedent that would be established by a
fractured decision would overrule a prior precedent. Again,
the logic of Marks dictates an affirmative answer, and I am
aware of no case holding that the Marks rule applies any differently in this situation. But as far as the present case is concerned, this question is academic because Apodaca did not
overrule any prior decision of this Court.150
This passage makes the most sense if we assume the italicized
“affirmative” was intended as “negative.” It is problematic to claim no
case holds that Marks applies differently when “a fractured decision
would overrule a prior” Supreme Court precedent, or to state that the
resolution is academic because Apodaca did not purport to overturn a
prior ruling, unless a nonmajority case has the potential to overturn a
past majority ruling.151 Although not without exception, this reading
of the narrowest grounds rule is in tension with the history of Marks
itself and with how Justices have generally operated in Marks’s
shadow.152
c. The Sotomayor & Kavanaugh Partial Concurrences in the
Ramos Judgment
Of the three Ramos concurrences in the judgment, Kavanaugh
and Sotomayor can be grouped together, whereas Thomas requires
separate consideration. Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh rejected
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
152 See infra Section II.A.2.a (discussing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Justice
Scalia’s voting strategy in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); and the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(joint opinion)). Justice Alito further rejected Justice Sotomayor’s claim that nonunanimous juries were a relic of Jim Crow, given their more modern reenactments, Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at
1426–27 (Alito, J., dissenting), and Justice Kavanaugh’s claim that the Court’s holding created
potentially onerous administrative burdens, responding that Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)
(plurality opinion), limits the retroactivity of nonwatershed rules, Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1437
(Alito, J., dissenting).
150
151
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Justice Gorsuch’s analysis claiming that a single Justice cannot create
binding precedent under the narrowest grounds rule and that
Apodaca lacks precedential status. For Sotomayor and Kavanaugh,
Apodaca is precedent that each concludes should be overruled.153
Justice Sotomayor also reviews the racial history of
nonunanimous jury verdict laws, describing them as a relic of Jim
Crow.154 Nonmajority jury verdicts let a majority suppress a minority—historically a racial minority—of jurors who exhibit a visceral distrust of police and prosecutorial behaviors respecting members of
their community.155 In Sotomayor’s view, laws whose origins are associated with a motivation to suppress the voices of African Americans
must be assessed in light of that history and deserve no lawful place in
our jurisprudence.156
Justice Kavanaugh devoted much of his opinion to reconceptualizing the criteria for evaluating when Supreme Court precedents warrant overruling.157 This has been a focal point of landmark Supreme
Court cases, including the narrowest ground plurality in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,158 which declined
to overturn Roe v. Wade,159 and Lawrence v. Texas,160 which overturned Bowers v. Hardwick.161
Kavanaugh tackled Marks in a detailed footnote, stating that
when the Court fractures, its rulings bind state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court.162 As shown below, this is in tension with
how Justices have modeled their behavior in the shadow of Marks and
with the position taken by Justice Gorsuch for a plurality of three.163
Kavanaugh further noted that although Marks generally applies in a
straightforward manner, that is not always the case. He explained:
“On very rare occasions, as in Apodaca, it can be difficult to discern
which opinion’s reasoning has precedential effect under Marks.”164
Kavanaugh further observed: “As I read the Court’s various opinions
153 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1409–10 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A); id.
at 1410 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
154 See id. at 1410 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A).
155 See id. at 1394 (majority opinion).
156 See id. at 1410 (Sotomayor, J., concurring as to all but Part IV–A).
157 See id. at 1411–16 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
158 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion).
159 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
160 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
161 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
162 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1416 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
163 See infra Section II.A.
164 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1417 n.6 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
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today, six Justices treat the result in Apodaca as a precedent for purposes of stare decisis analysis. A different group of six Justices concludes that Apodaca should be and is overruled.”165
Justice Kavanaugh’s characterization is largely sound, yet it requires slight amending. Justice Gorsuch, writing for a plurality of
three, did not treat Apodaca as binding precedent. As a result, although he concluded the case should be superseded, he did not determine that this required the case to be overruled. Modifying
Kavanaugh’s statement to assert that six Justices regard Apodaca as
precedent, and another six Justices believe Apodaca should either be
superseded or overruled, better captures the opinions.
2.

Justice Thomas’s Ramos Concurrence in the Judgment

Because Justice Thomas’s concurrence in the judgment did not
focus on the narrowest grounds rule, and because it implicates the earlier discussion as to the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, we can present it fairly briefly.166 Justice Thomas rejected
the premise on which the Court has, now for decades, rested its fundamental rights and incorporation jurisprudence. Although commentators acknowledge the anomaly of relying upon the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause to perform this work, the Court’s
members have long been unwilling to change that approach.167 The
exception is Justice Thomas. Notably Justice Scalia, widely associated
with originalist jurisprudence, was unwilling to revisit the SlaughterHouse Cases as the basis for incorporating the Second Amendment
right to states and municipalities, set out in his earlier majority opinion in Heller168 in his concurring opinion in McDonald.169
Id.
Id. at 1420 (Thomas, J., concurring). In June Medical Services, Justice Thomas observed
that Chief Justice Roberts’s solo opinion in that 4-1-4 case appeared to express the holding on
narrowest grounds, adding in a footnote that based on Justice Gorsuch’s Ramos plurality analysis, Roberts’s opinion might be ineligible for narrowest grounds status. See June Med. Servs.
LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2148 n.4 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also infra Section
II.A.1 (discussing June Medical Services).
167 A turning point for incorporation was Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), with
Justice White reasoning that abstract inquiries into whether the absence of a claimed right is
consistent with an Anglo-American scheme of ordered liberty proves less valuable than specific
inquiries grounded in the Bill of Rights, given that virtually all state criminal law systems have
come close to replicating the federal criminal justice system. See id. at 148–56, 149 n.14 (“Of each
of these determinations that a constitutional provision originally written to bind the Federal
Government should bind the States as well it might be said that the limitation in question is not
necessarily fundamental to fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined but is fundamental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by the American States.”).
168 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 614–20 (2008).
165
166
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Thomas’s revisiting privileges or immunities based on original
meaning runs up against settled precedent affecting a host of doctrinal
domains, including privacy, same sex marriage, the Second Amendment, and the broad swath of incorporation cases. One implication of
reconsidering these cases, as Thomas has observed, is that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects the rights of citizens whereas the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses more broadly protect persons.170 Some rights, such as those associated with the Second Amendment, for example, might make more sense with a citizenship
limitation, and one might advance similar claims respecting certain
procedural rights.171
Whatever the merits of Justice Thomas’s position as an original
matter, or even respecting the balance struck between honoring precedent and correcting past jurisprudential error, it is clear that the
doctrinal implications of Justice Thomas’s view are quite different
from those of Justices Kavanaugh and Sotomayor. For example, if the
Court were to declare that the basis for incorporation rests on privileges or immunities, not due process, the reach of the holding is potentially extremely broad, inviting challenges to any number of past
precedents resting on due process. Alternatively, the effect could be
to narrow the reach of past rights vindicated under due process that fit
less comfortably with privileges or immunities. Simply put, there is no
obvious assessment of Thomas’s approach that aligns along the dimension of breadth versus narrowness as compared with the remaining opinions. Thomas’s view, seeking to upend decades of due process
jurisprudence not necessarily limited to incorporation, is orthogonal
to those of the remaining Justices on the Ramos Court.
3.

Aligning the Remaining Ramos Opinions

Recall that Justice Alito observed the apparent irony of failing to
recognize the effect of the Ramos breakdown in assessing Apodaca.
The meta-analysis entails ascertaining which of the various opinions in
Ramos on the narrowest grounds analysis of Apodaca expresses the
Ramos holding on narrowest grounds. Despite the seeming risk of infinite regress, applying Marks in Ramos, as in Apodaca, is straightforward as the opinions align along a single relevant dimension.
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791–805 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1423–24 (Thomas, J., concurring); McDonald, 561 U.S. at
815–19 (Thomas, J., concurring).
171 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L.J. 2576,
2579–91 (2014).
169
170
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ONE DIMENSION

(A) Justice Gorsuch
(for 3)

(B) Justices Sotomayor
and Kavanaugh

Apodaca not precedential,
no narrowest grounds
opinion, case is superseded
with requirement of jury
unanimity in state criminal
trials

Apodaca is precedential;
Powell’s opinion expresses
holding on narrowest
grounds; case is overruled,
requiring jury unanimity in
state criminal trials

Lax treatment of
Apodaca as precedent

9:08

(C) Justice Alito (for 3)
Apodaca is precedential,
although Powell’s opinion
expresses the holding on
narrowest grounds it does
not bind the Supreme
Court, Apodaca should be
retained as precedent
Strict treatment of
Apodaca as precedent

Although the narrowest grounds analysis of Apodaca implicates
three discrete issues—Apodaca’s precedential status, identifying the
controlling opinion, and deciding whether Apodaca should be superseded or overruled, on one side, or retained, on the other—these issues align along one dimension. That dimension captures how lax or
strictly the Supreme Court treats Apodaca as precedent. The eight
Justices who agreed to this framing expressed or joined opinions aligning consistently along this dimension from left to right for each issue.172 Those who believe that the case is not precedential believe it
should be overruled; those who believe it is precedential split on
whether it should be overruled, with those taking the stricter view of
precedent choosing to retain it. Between these extremes lie the two
concurrences in the judgment. Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh
each regard the case as precedent, treat Powell’s opinion as expressing
the Apodaca holding on narrowest grounds, and conclude Apodaca
warrants overruling. Finding that Apodaca is precedent warranting
overruling (B) fits logically between not finding the case precedential
and allowing it to be superseded with no need to overrule (A) and
finding it as precedent that should be retained (C).
Although Table 2 presents the views of eight of the nine deciding
Justices, the two largely aligned narrowest ground opinions capture
the median members of the Ramos Court. Excluding Thomas yields a
3-2-3 line-up, meaning that the narrowest grounds position coincides
with the median Justice, whether Sotomayor or Kavanaugh.173 That is
172 As explained infra Part II, this is consistent with recognizing that the number of issues
or data bear no correlation to the number of dimensions along which they are assessed. See
Stearns, supra note 26.
173 See supra note 32 (presenting the median position as one way to express the narrowest
grounds rule).

R
R
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because six Justices agree that Apodaca should be superseded or overturned, rendering the sui generis position expressed by Justice Thomas
unnecessary in applying Marks to Ramos. If Thomas’s opinion had
been crucial to forming a majority of the Ramos Court, the analysis
would be more complex, as the following discussion demonstrates.
C. McDonald v. City of Chicago: Incorporation in Two
Dimensions
The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”174 In the 1939 decision,
United States v. Miller,175 the Supreme Court rejected a Second
Amendment defense to a prosecution for possession of a sawed-off
shotgun, declaring that the Amendment does not protect an individual
right.176 The scope of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms has long been a source of contention. In District of Columbia v.
Heller, the Supreme Court, with Justice Scalia writing, abandoned
Miller’s narrow reading, which had construed the protection as inherently tied to state militias based on the prefatory clause.177
Justice Scalia began his analysis with the operative clause, construing “the people” to imply an individual right, and “keep and bear
arms” as not expressing an idiomatic meaning associated with a military context on the ground that when so used, “bear arms” is coupled
with “against” followed by an identified enemy.178 Scalia further construed “arms” to imply weapons commonly in use among the general
population, eliminating any specific military connection.179
Upon revisiting the prefatory clause, Scalia determined that the
framers included it because it conveyed the motivating context, fearing the federal government might aggrandize its power by, among
other means, removing privately held weapons.180 For Scalia, this implied that the prefatory clause signaled a benign check but did not
express a source of limitation on the identified right.
Scalia acknowledged that the Amendment’s framers could not
have imagined certain weaponry that might be used in a modern military setting, rendering such weapons unsuitable for common usage in
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

U.S. CONST. amend II.
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
See id. at 178.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582–83 (2008).
See id. at 576–92.
See id. at 581–92.
See id. at 595–98.
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the modern age.181 He recognized that this analysis allowed some regulation of, including banning, particular weapons that did not correspond to weaponry commonly employed at the time the Second
Amendment was ratified.182 Scalia acknowledged the potentially
ironic effect of disallowing private possession (keep) and use (bear) of
arms suitable to the militia context while protecting access to weaponry (handguns and hunting rifles) with no modern military benefit.183
Despite this irony, Scalia reasoned that the prefatory clause’s disjuncture with the scope of the modern right was not a basis of limitation
on that right.184
Although the path of litigation began in the District of Columbia,
which is subject to federal regulation, the larger stakes were states and
localities, which carry the bulk of gun regulations. McDonald v. City
of Chicago presented the question whether the right announced in
Heller was incorporated, thus applying against a handgun ban in the
City of Chicago.185 The McDonald Court divided into three camps. A
plurality of four determined that the Second Amendment right declared in Heller is incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause.186 Justice Thomas rejected the Due Process
Clause analysis as the basis for incorporation, but reasoned that the
right falls within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
or Immunities Clause, an argument the plurality rejected.187 Justice
Stevens, dissenting for four Justices, rejected both bases for incorporation, finding that the Second Amendment right was neither included
under the Due Process Clause nor protected under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.188
In contrast with the opinions in Apodaca and Ramos, the McDonald opinions cannot be expressed along a single dimension. As
shown in Table 3, assessing these three opinions implicates two separate dimensions.

181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 582.
id. at 627–29.
id. at 627–28.
id.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2010).
id. at 748–49; id. at 758–59 (plurality opinion).
id. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
id. at 858–61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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TWO DIMENSIONS

Do Not Incorporate Under
Privileges or Immunities
Plurality (4)

Thomas (1)

Dissent (4)

The narrowest grounds rule provides that in a nonmajority case,
the opinion consistent with the judgment that resolves the case on the
narrowest grounds expresses the holding.189 Although the Marks formulation does not employ the term “dimension,” the rule’s framing
implies dimensionality. Positing that the opinion consistent with the
outcome decided on narrowest grounds is controlling implies at least
one other opinion consistent with the outcome that would resolve the
case on broader grounds. The framing further implies a dissenting
opinion would resolve the case on grounds so narrow as to produce a
contrary judgment. This framing suggests that in a paradigmatic fractured panel ruling, there would be at least three relevant positions—
broader (not controlling), narrowest consistent with the judgment (controlling), so narrow as to dissent (not controlling)—aligned on a single
dimension of relative breadth. Because a majority is required to issue
a judgment, the narrowest opinion comporting with the judgment
would almost invariably capture the median position of the deciding
Court.
Although Ramos is more complex than Apodaca, the preceding
analysis explains why the doctrine applies in a straightforward manner
there as well. Justice Thomas’s added dimension can be disregarded
while still casting the remaining opinions along one dimension, with
the result that the two median Justices—Sotomayor and Kavanaugh—
express the holding on narrowest grounds. By contrast, the analysis
further demonstrates why Marks is thwarted in McDonald. To see
why, consider what it means for an opinion to be so narrow as not to
support the judgment.
In a case that accepts a constitutional challenge, the opinion consistent with the grant of relief that would allow the fewest challenges
to succeed going forward is the narrowest grounds opinion. By contrast, an opinion that would deny relief is so narrow that it would not
support the judgment. Alternatively, in a case that rejects a constitu189

See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
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tional challenge, the opinion consistent with the denial of relief that
would allow the most challenges going forward to proceed is the narrowest grounds opinion. By contrast, an opinion that would allow the
raised challenge to proceed is so narrow that it would not support the
judgment. Thus, in cases granting relief, the opinion consistent with
the judgment granting the least relief is the narrowest grounds opinion. In cases denying relief, the opinion consistent with the denial that
allows the greatest relief is the narrowest grounds opinion.
In terms of nomenclature, it might seem anomalous to label an
opinion that would grant relief, when the Court has denied it, as narrow. But the dimension of broad to narrow assesses the bases for the
Court’s judgment regardless of what that judgment is. A broad ruling
denying relief would deny relief across the board; a narrow ruling denying relief would allow some other claims beyond the immediate one
for which relief is denied to proceed; and finally, a ruling that would
so narrowly construe the bases for denying relief as to confer relief in
the immediate case emerges as a dissent.
The preceding discussion is suitably captured within the framing
of “least impact analysis.”190 And yet, as explained in the next Part,
once we recognize that the proper construction of the narrowest
grounds rule requires assessing the opinions based on dimensionality,
it is clear that this is merely one of several alternative framings capturing a singular consistent insight.
For now, consider applying least impact analysis to McDonald.
There are two ways to grant relief: (1) find that the Heller Second
Amendment right applies to states via the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, or (2) find that the Heller Second Amendment
right applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Two camps grant relief on each of these alternative bases; the narrower opinion along each dimension would grant
less relief. Along each dimension, one opinion satisfies this test of being narrower, but in each instance that opinion would deny relief altogether, thereby emerging as a dissent. The plurality would grant relief
based on due process, but not privileges or immunities; the concurrence in the judgment would grant relief on privileges or immunities
but not due process. By contrast, the dissent would grant relief on
neither, achieving an opposite judgment. Although the dissent is narrower along each dimension, under Marks, that opinion is ineligible
for holding status because it is opposite the case judgment.
190

See sources cited infra note 342.

R
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This analysis reveals another way to express the McDonald
anomaly. The two opinions consistent with the judgment, each incorporating the Heller Second Amendment right, resolve each of the two
controlling issues in the case in opposite fashion. Neither can be classified as narrower than the other. Thomas is narrower on the question
of whether due process provides a basis for relief, and the plurality is
narrower on the question of whether privileges or immunities provides a basis for relief. These orthogonal opinions cannot be ranked
broad to narrow.
This explains why an impressive group of scholars has advocated,
however problematically, for a variety of proposals allowing separate
counts on each dispositive issue to control the case outcomes, rather
than basing outcomes on a tally of each deciding Justices’ determination concerning the ultimate case disposition in two dimensional
cases.191 As applied to McDonald, this would result in five Justices
rejecting the due process basis for incorporation (Thomas plus the dissenters) and eight Justices rejecting the privileges or immunities basis
for incorporation (the plurality plus the dissenters). With this casedisposition rule, the Heller ruling would not be incorporated against
states and localities, leaving it in place only as applied to federal regulations. This result would lend support to Justice Powell’s now-discredited dual-track approach to incorporation.
D.

Summary

The preceding analysis has demonstrated that the Ramos Justices
each capture a slice of the dynamics associated with the proper application of the narrowest grounds rule announced in Marks. A proper
application of the rule implicates dimensionality. A dimension is a
spectrum along which innumerable criteria can be expressed and compared. Not all dimensions are necessarily relevant in applying the nar191 For proposals to implement issue voting, see, for example, Jonathan Remy Nash, A
Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 78
(2003) (proposing outcome voting for issues of law and issue voting for issues of fact); Lewis A.
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 30 (1993) (proposing a “metavote” to determine whether to employ outcome
or issue voting); David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of
Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743, 745 (1992) (finding outcome voting “deeply
flawed” and proposing tallying results per issue); and David G. Post & Steven C. Salop, Issues
and Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49
VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1069–70 (1996) (refining authors’ original issue voting protocol). For a
critical assessment of issue voting proposals, see STEARNS, supra note 33, at 99–124; and for a
review of the literature, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS, TODD J. ZYWICKI & THOMAS J. MICELI,
LAW AND ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 888–91 (2018).
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rowest grounds rule. Whereas Apodaca and Ramos present
straightforward applications, despite some contrary claims among the
Justices, McDonald thwarts the rule by invoking a second dimension.
This is so even though Justice Thomas introduced a second dimension
in both Ramos and McDonald, resting on privileges or immunities,
and rejecting due process, as the basis for applying substantive protections in the Bill of Rights to states and localities.
Because five Ramos Justices agree on the relevant dimension, despite disagreeing as to where along that dimension the case judgment
is best expressed, Thomas’s added dimension in Ramos proved irrelevant to aligning the remaining opinions on one dimension. By contrast, because Thomas provided the critical fifth vote for the
McDonald judgment, his introduction of a second dimension thwarted
the application of Marks to the resulting McDonald opinions. Unlike
Ramos, McDonald contains no opinion expressing the holding on narrowest grounds.
The next Part provides two complementary means of modeling
the narrowest grounds rule. It will first demonstrate that despite the
stated confusion in the various Ramos opinions, the Court’s members
have better exemplified the meaning of Marks with their conduct. It
then generalizes several of the preceding points, providing a theoretical analysis that recasts the narrowest grounds rule. This avoids a technical defect in the present wording, albeit one with little practical
consequence, and precisely cabins the limited category of cases in
which the rule cannot be applied.
II.

MODELING NARROWEST GROUNDS

This Part provides two complementary analyses, each modeling
narrowest grounds. The first involves specific manifestations of behavior among Supreme Court Justices, including during the Ramos term,
that appear in tension with formal statements in Ramos concerning
Marks. The second more rigorously introduces dimensionality and
provides a basis both for generalizing observed judicial behaviors and
for more precisely expressing the narrowest grounds rule.
A.

Modeling Narrowest Grounds I: Judicial Behavior

The first part of the analysis unpacks the three problematic posits
in Ramos concerning how Marks applies: (1) Does Marks disallow a
single Justice from controlling on narrowest grounds?; (2) Are narrowest grounds opinions precedent in the Supreme Court that can
overturn past majority opinions?; and (3) Does abandoning a narrow-
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est grounds opinion require overruling? Despite the contrary assertions among the Ramos opinions, the conduct of the Justices
contemporaneous with Marks, and even during the Ramos term, generally suggest negative answers to each question. Because the second
and third inquiries are closely related, they are treated together.
1.

Can Solo Opinions Control on Narrowest Grounds?

Beginning with Davis v. Bandemer,192 a divided Supreme Court
considered whether the extreme use of redistricting practices known
as stacking, packing, and cracking might violate equal protection by
providing disproportionate representation to the party in power in
comparison with electoral demographics.193 The phenomenon arises
largely in consequence of winner-take-all districted elections. Through
these combined practices, the controlling party renders the electoral
districts of the out-of-power party unnecessarily dense (packed); divides voters in districts they might otherwise control among other districts, rendering them minority voters (cracked); and consolidates
disconnected voters from racial minority communities with other communities, producing minority-majority districts in which outcomes are
controlled by elites (stacked).194 These practices entrench the party in
power. Despite the troublesome nature of these practices, a conservative bloc of Justices had long taken the view that partisan gerrymandering, as such claims are called, is a nonjusticiable political
question.195 Ultimately, after Justice Kennedy retired and was re192 478 U.S. 109, 116–17 (1986) (plurality opinion), abrogated by Rucho v. Common Cause,
139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019).
193 See id. at 113–18.
194 See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and
the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 849–50 (2015); Russell C. Weaver, Gerrymandering
Politics Out of the Redistricting Process: Toward a Planning Revolution in Redrawing Local Legislative Boundaries, 25 BERKELEY PLAN. J. 98, 101 (2012).
195 See, e.g., Davis, 478 U.S. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“I would hold
that the partisan gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a nonjusticiable political
question that the judiciary should leave to the legislative branch as the Framers of the Constitution unquestionably intended.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(“[W]e must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable . . . .”); id. at 306
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“A decision ordering the correction of all election
district lines drawn for partisan reasons would commit federal and state courts to unprecedented
intervention in the American political process. . . . I would not foreclose all possibility of judicial
relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the
Constitution in some redistricting cases.”); see also Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491 (“This Court has
not previously struck down a districting plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, and
has struggled without success over the past several decades to discern judicially manageable
standards for deciding such claims.”).
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placed by Brett Kavanaugh, the conservatives gained the necessary
five votes to declare this body of law nonjusticiable.196
In the second major Supreme Court decision to address the issue,
Vieth v. Jubelirer,197 Justice Kennedy rejected the immediate partisan
gerrymandering claim, and like Justice White, who wrote the narrowest grounds plurality decision in Davis, Kennedy was also unwilling to
disallow such claims to proceed altogether.198 Unlike Justice White,
however, who had advanced the consistent degradation standard in
assessing future claims,199 Justice Kennedy rejected that standard
along with those advanced by the parties and the dissenters who
would have allowed the immediate case to proceed.200 Instead, Kennedy maintained that a claim might proceed if a future litigant advances a meaningful standard against which such claims might be
assessed.201
Like Justice Powell in Apodaca, Justice Kennedy stood alone, between two groups of four Justices each. The conservatives sought to
jettison partisan gerrymandering claims entirely, declaring them a
nonjusticiable political question, and the liberals wanted to permit
such claims, including granting relief in the immediate case, offering
myriad doctrinal formulations, each of which Kennedy found wanting.202 Justice Scalia, who joined in denying relief and claiming such
claims are nonjusticiable, did not object that Justice Kennedy stood
alone in issuing the narrowest grounds opinion. Instead, Scalia maintained that Justice Kennedy’s position, leaving open a constitutional
claim yet failing to specify how it might be met, was “not legally
available.”203
196 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508 (“[W]e have no commission to allocate political power and
influence in the absence of a constitutional directive or legal standards to guide us in the exercise
of such authority.”). The analysis that follows is not focused on the merits of particular partisan
gerrymandering rulings, but rather with how the Justices have treated the Marks rule as applied
to solo opinions expressing the holding on narrowest grounds.
197

541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).

198

See id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

See Davis, 478 U.S. at 132 (“Rather, unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when
the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of
voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.”).
199

200

See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

See id. at 311–317 (“That no such standard has emerged in this case should not be taken
to prove that none will emerge in the future. . . . If workable standards do emerge to measure
these burdens, however, courts should be prepared to order relief.”).
201

202 See id. at 305 (plurality opinion); id. at 323–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 346–47
(Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 309–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
203

Id. at 301 (plurality opinion).
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Although taking somewhat differing approaches, both Justice
Gorsuch in Ramos and Justice Scalia in Vieth conflate the legal soundness of an opinion with whether that opinion is controlling under
Marks. Justice Gorsuch took the analysis one step further, claiming a
categorical ban if the apparent narrowest grounds opinion is expressed by a single Justice.
Supreme Court Justices routinely dispute the merits of each
other’s opinions. Fractured rulings appear especially prone to such critiques. Even so, determining which opinion controls is necessarily distinct from assessing an opinion’s merits. Poorly reasoned opinions,
arguably including those rejecting longstanding historical norms or
that leave open a governing legal standard, can control on narrowest
grounds if they otherwise satisfy Marks.
Justice Gorsuch’s blanket rule prohibiting solo narrowest grounds
concurrences in the judgment from controlling is analytically problematic. When the underlying opinions align on a single dimension with a
4-1-4 breakdown, although eight Justices disagree with the solo concurrence in the judgment, the four Justices occupying either side disagree with the solo opinion for opposing reasons. One side contends
the median position goes too far (or is too broad); the other side contends the median position does not go far enough (or is too narrow).
Rather than explaining that Marks fails to apply, this is why the Justices routinely treat such opinions as controlling, even including Justice Gorsuch.
During the very term in which Justice Gorsuch proposed that the
narrowest grounds rule does not apply in the 4-1-4 context, the Court
issued June Medical Services v. Russo, a major abortion ruling.204 The
case produced a 4-1-4 split, like Apodaca, with Chief Justice Roberts
producing the narrowest grounds concurrence in the judgment.205
None of the three Justices who joined the plurality, including Justice
Gorsuch himself, raised the possibility that the Chief Justice’s narrowest grounds opinion might not control.
June Medical Services presented a challenge to a Louisiana abortion statute that the majority of the deciding Court regarded as materially indistinguishable from a Texas statute invalidated in the 2016
decision, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.206 Both statutes demanded that abortions be performed only by a physician with admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of where the procedure
204
205
206

See June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (plurality opinion).
See id. at 2133–42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 2112–13 (plurality opinion).
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is to be performed.207 The effect in each case was to markedly diminish access to qualified physicians performing such procedures for women of childbearing age throughout the two states.208
Justice Breyer, who had written for the Whole Woman’s Health
majority in striking down the Texas statute,209 wrote for a plurality of
four in June Medical Services.210 In the latter case, Breyer reiterated
the Whole Woman’s Health rationale on its merits.211 In dissent, Justice Alito, also writing for four, claimed that the two cases were distinguishable, and that the Louisiana law should be sustained.212 Chief
Justice Roberts, alone concurring in the judgment, concluded that the
two cases were indistinguishable and that based strictly on stare decisis, Whole Woman’s Health controlled the outcome in June Medical
Services, requiring that the challenged Louisiana statute be struck
down.213 Roberts further sought to narrow the reach of Whole Woman’s Health and the earlier abortion ruling, Planned Parenthood of
207 See id. at 2112 (stating that the Louisiana statute in question was “almost word-for-word
identical to Texas’ admitting-privileges law” in Whole Woman’s Health). Compare TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (West 2019) (requiring facilities meet “minimum standards . . . equivalent to the minimum standards . . . for ambulatory surgical centers”), and TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (West 2019) (requiring that physicians “have active admitting privileges at a hospital . . . not further than 30 miles from the” facility), with LA.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (2020) (requiring a “physician performing or inducing an
abortion” to “[h]ave active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than
thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced and that provides
obstetrical or gynecological health care services,” defining “active admitting privileges” as being
“in good standing of the medical staff of a hospital that is currently licensed by the department,
with the ability to admit a patient and to provide diagnostic and surgical services to such
patient”).
208 In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court cited the lower court’s conclusions that there are
“approximately 5.4 million” women of childbearing age in Texas; that the number of abortion
clinics in Texas “dropped by almost half leading up to and in the wake of enforcement of the
admitting-privileges requirement”; and that “[i]f the surgical-center provision were allowed to
take effect, the number of abortion facilities . . . would be reduced further” to approximately
seven or eight. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v.
Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 680–81 (W.D. Tex. 2014)). In June Medical Services, the Court cited
the lower court’s findings that the statute in question would “result in a drastic reduction in the
number and geographic distribution of abortion providers, reducing the number of clinics to one,
or at most two.” June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2115 (quoting June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert,
250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 87 (M.D. La. 2017)).
209

See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.

210

See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2112 (plurality opinion).

211

See id. at 2120–32.

See id. at 2155, 2157–58 (Alito, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the cases are distinguishable because whereas Whole Woman’s Health presented a pre-enforcement facial challenge, the immediate case was post-enforcement with evidence of the challenged law’s effects).
212

213

See id. at 2133–34 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, by disallowing consideration of
benefits in applying the undue burden test.214
214 See id. at 2135–39. Although this placed Roberts’s legal analysis closer to that of Justice
Alito in dissent, Roberts’s stare decisis analysis aligned him with Justice Breyer on the judgment.
The benefits analysis, because unnecessary to his judgment vote, is arguably dictum. For a general discussion of how to distinguish holding and dictum, see Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005). As explained below, this issue became the
focal point of a split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals respecting the interpretation of June
Medical Services.
Professor Ryan Williams has criticized this author’s earlier works advocating the approach
more fully developed in this Article, which he describes as “the fifth vote approach.” See Williams, supra note 11, at 813–17. Among other arguments, see infra note 290 (discussing role of
dissenting Justices in identifying the narrowest grounds opinion); infra note 357 (discussing implications of incomplete information regarding dimensionality in identifying narrowest grounds
opinion), Williams maintains this framing of the Marks rule requires accepting all propositions
advanced in the opinion designated as controlling on narrowest grounds. See Williams, supra
note 11, at 815 (“Perhaps most controversially, the fifth vote approach treats as binding all aspects of the opinion reflecting the median Justice’s views, including propositions that no other
participating Justice explicitly or implicitly assented to.”). This is mistaken. Applying Marks in a
case in which opinions align along a single dimension requires identifying which opinion occupies the Court’s median position. Once that task is complete, however, those construing the
controlling opinion are expected to undertake the same analysis that they would in construing
any other Supreme Court opinion even if issued by a majority or unanimous Court. This includes
distinguishing holding versus dictum. See David S. Cohen, Why Whole Woman’s Health’s Balancing Test Still Applies After June Medical, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.: NOTICE & COMMENT
(Aug. 24, 2020), https://harvardlpr.com/2020/08/24/why-whole-womans-healths-balancing-teststill-applies-after-june-medical/ [https://perma.cc/9H42-XBDE] (applying this Article’s framework in characterizing as dicta Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion in June Medical Services that the
undue burden test does not allow consideration of the absence of regulatory benefits, and concluding that although Roberts’s opinion concurs in the judgment on the narrowest grounds, that
opinion does not does displace the contrary holding in Whole Women’s Health).
As this Article was going to press, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on
one side, and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, on the other, split
over the very question discussed in the text. The issue involved whether Chief Justice Roberts’s
concurring analysis in June Medical Services, which rejected the application of an absence of
regulatory benefits in applying the undue burden test to an abortion restriction, is binding on
lower courts under the narrowest grounds doctrine. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc.
v. Box, No. 17-2428, 2021 WL 940125, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 12, 2021). In Planned Parenthood of
Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Box, Judge Hamilton, writing for a majority, embraced the position advocated here. See id. By contrast, Judge Kanne, writing in dissent, along with the Sixth
and Eighth Circuits, took a contrary view. See id. at *13–15 (Kanne, J., dissenting); EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 437 (6th Cir. 2020); Little Rock Fam.
Plan. Servs. v. Rutledge, 984 F.3d 682, 687 n.2 (8th Cir. 2021); Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912,
915 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
In a remand from the Supreme Court in light of the June Medical Services ruling, the Seventh Circuit reconsidered this question as applied to an Indiana parental notice requirement for
a minor pursuing a judicial bypass in seeking an abortion, where the notice was independent of a
best interests inquiry. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., 2021 WL 940125, at *1 (majority
opinion). Writing for the Seventh Circuit majority, Judge Hamilton reviewed several leading
articles considering the narrowest grounds rule, including an earlier work by this author. See id.
at *6 n.6 (citing Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon

R
R

R
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Applying Marks to June Medical Services is straightforward. The
opinions align on a single dimension, from broad to narrow protection
of abortion rights. Along that dimension, Justice Breyer embraces
Whole Woman’s Health on its merits and as precedent; Chief Justice
Roberts embraces Whole Woman’s Health only as precedent, without
considering the merits beyond narrowing the undue burden test; and
Justice Alito seeks both to cabin Whole Woman’s Health, and to find
that it does not control the immediate case. Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion controls because it goes less far in the protection of abortion
rights than the plurality, yet farther than the dissent.
The same analysis applies in Vieth. There, the conservatives believed Kennedy went too far in allowing the possibility of a successful
partisan gerrymandering claim, and the liberals believed that Kennedy
did not go far enough by having rejected the immediate claim. The
same analysis holds in Apodaca. Justice Stewart determined Powell
went too far in allowing states to have nonunanimous convictions; Jusof Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321 (2000)). Judge Hamilton reasoned that although Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion expressed the holding on narrowest grounds, Roberts’s
rejection of the benefits inquiry in applying the undue burden test was dictum and thus
nonbinding:
Applying Marks, the best way to understand the two opinions together is that the
plurality’s adoption of Proposition B and the concurrence’s adoption of Proposition
Not-B are both obiter dicta. They were not necessary to the actual judgment striking down the new Louisiana law on stare decisis grounds, Proposition A, for which
there were five votes. There was no majority to overrule Whole Woman’s Health, so
that precedent stands as binding on lower courts unless and until a Court majority
overrules it.
Id. at *8. By contrast, Judge Kanne, writing in dissent, along with the Sixth and Eighth Circuits,
treated this aspect of the Roberts’s June Medical Services concurrence as binding. Judge Kanne
reasoned that to do otherwise fails to provide that case legal effect. See id. at *10–11 (Kanne, J.,
dissenting).
As explained in the body of this Article, this aspect of the Seventh Circuit reading of the
narrowest grounds rule is superior for three reasons: (1) it follows the formally stated doctrine as
expressed in Marks, which ensures that lower courts follow the holding expressed in narrowest
grounds opinions; (2) it is consistent with the weight of historical practice, which generally disallows nonmajority Supreme Court opinions to overturn past majority Supreme Court rulings; and
(3) it encourages Supreme Court Justices to consider relevant tradeoffs in choosing whether to
forge a majority, as required to overturn an earlier precedent, or to express a preferred alternative rule, with more limited effect, in a narrower concurrence in the judgment. The Seventh
Circuit analysis also avoids the ironic consequence of requiring lower courts to give greater doctrinal status to dictum expressed in a narrowest grounds opinion than to dictum in a majority or
even unanimous ruling. The disagreement between Justice Breyer, writing for the June Medical
Services plurality, and the Chief Justice, writing in concurrence, concerning whether the absence
of regulatory benefits is relevant in applying the undue burden test to a challenged abortion
restriction was unnecessary in resolving June Medical Services. As a result, Judge Hamilton correctly determined that this aspect of Roberts’s opinion, which separately rested on stare decisis,
was nonbinding dictum.
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tice White believed Powell did not go far enough in maintaining that
the same balance could not be struck in federal criminal trials.
In Vieth, Apodaca, and June Medical Services, Justice Kennedy,
Justice Powell, and Chief Justice Roberts, each writing alone, nonetheless occupied the Court’s median position, while expressing the holding consistent with the judgment on narrowest grounds. In each
instance, the eight remaining Justices modeled the narrowest grounds
rule by demonstrating that the solo concurrence in the judgment controlled. Capturing the median position, which itself implies a single
dimension along which values are assessed, is one of several means of
expressing the narrowest grounds rule. And as Justice Alito observed
in his Ramos dissent, there are several bodies of precedent in which a
single Justice has expressed the Court’s holding on narrowest
grounds.215
2. Do Narrowest Grounds Opinions Bind the Supreme Court &
Can They Overturn Past Majority Decisions?
On behalf of the Ramos plurality, including Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, Justice Gorsuch claimed that Justice Powell’s narrowest
grounds opinion in Apodaca was not binding precedent in the Supreme Court. The plurality superseded, without overruling, Apodaca.
By contrast, Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh, separately concurring in the Ramos judgment, and Justice Alito, writing in dissent for
three, maintained that Apodaca was precedent, and therefore that
abandoning it required a stare decisis analysis.216 Justice Thomas did
not address this specific issue.
Once more, the behavior of Supreme Court Justices proved more
helpful in modeling this aspect of Marks than the formally expressed
Ramos opinions. The analysis that follows focuses on three lines of
cases. The first, which includes Marks itself, implicates the
prosecutorial standards in obscenity prosecutions.217 The second,
215 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1431 n.14 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (listing
lower court cases assuming a single Justice can control on narrowest grounds).
216 As previously explained, Justice Alito was not altogether consistent in his analysis. See
supra Section I.B.1.b.
217 For a more detailed analysis of this line of cases, see Hughes Amicus Brief, supra note 6;
Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321 (2000). The relevant case analysis demonstrates that the
Marks Court did not anticipate that narrowest grounds opinions would bind the Supreme Court.
At most, the Marks Court anticipated that nonmajority opinions would bind the Supreme Court
as to the judgments, not with respect to the holding as expressed in the narrowest grounds
opinion.

R
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which includes Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,218 involves the
equal protection limits on the benign reliance on race in government
contracting.219 Together these cases support the argument that although narrowest grounds opinions are precedential in lower courts,
in this instance, Justice Gorsuch is correct. Based on how Supreme
Court Justices have modeled Marks with their behavior, narrowest
grounds opinions are not precedential in the Supreme Court itself.
The third, Casey, arises between these two other lines of cases and
presents a very specific instance of a plurality overturning two
post–Roe v. Wade Supreme Court abortion precedents, while retaining and revising Roe itself.220 Although Casey demonstrates that Supreme Court Justices have not been entirely consistent in their
modeled behaviors, the better reading of this larger corpus of case law
treats Casey as an outlier, with the cases arising before and after Casey
better capturing the meaning of the narrowest grounds rule.
a.

Marks v. United States in Doctrinal Context

Marks was decided in the context of three prior Supreme Court
precedents, each centered on the federal prosecutorial standard for
obscenity. The 1957 case, Roth v. United States,221 adopted a relatively
lenient multipart test that devolved to contemporary community standards.222 In the fractured case, Memoirs v. Massachusetts, decided in
1966, a narrowest grounds plurality elevated the standard to “utterly
without redeeming social value,” which most commentators determined was nearly impossible for a prosecutor to satisfy.223 Finally, in
the 1973 case, Miller v. California,224 a majority reverted to a slightly
modified version of the earlier Roth test.225
Marks overturned a conviction based upon conduct that took
place between the issuance of Memoirs and Miller. The underlying
criminal activity occurred shortly before Miller was decided, and the
district court based its jury instruction on that later majority opinion.226 Marks held that the government could not, as a matter of due
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
See id. at 204–05.
220 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870, 881–84 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
221 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
222 See id. at 489, 492.
223 See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion).
224 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
225 See id. at 24–25.
226 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 189–91 (1977).
218
219
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process, retroactively diminish the prosecutorial standard on which a
jury instruction is based even when the earlier claimed standard is the
product of a narrowest grounds opinion in a nonmajority Supreme
Court ruling that was later superseded by a majority Supreme Court
opinion.227
The Marks holding was fairly limited; it established that Mr.
Marks could rely, as a matter of due process, on the Memoirs narrowest grounds holding as the basis for charting his alleged criminal activities.228 As a result, the district court erred in retroactively lowering the
prosecutorial standard from that announced by a narrowest grounds
plurality in Memoirs to that set out by a majority in Miller.229 The
Sixth Circuit decision in Marks, which the Supreme Court reversed,
stood alone among federal circuit courts in failing to recognize the
Memoirs narrowest grounds plurality as controlling precedent.230
Resolving the dispute between Justice Gorsuch’s Ramos plurality,
on one side, and the remaining Justices who addressed the issue, on
the other, as to whether Apodaca is precedent in the Supreme Court
requires careful analysis of what Marks did not say. Although Justice
Powell, for the Marks Court, chided the Sixth Circuit for alone failing
to afford the Memoirs narrowest grounds plurality controlling status,
he nowhere implied that the Miller Court had erred in failing to treat
Memoirs as binding precedent.231 And notably, in Miller, Chief Justice
Burger nowhere stated or implied that Memoirs was a precedent that
required overruling.232
With respect to Memoirs, the Miller Court stated: “Apart from
the initial formulation in the Roth case, no majority of the Court has
at any given time been able to agree on a standard to determine what

227 See id. at 191–97. Marks relied, by analogy, on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964), to hold that due process disallows retroactively lowering the prosecutorial standard as
applied to a criminal statute. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 196. Analogous to a violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1—which prohibit retroactively criminalizing activity—Bouie construes due process to disallow retroactively lowering a prosecutorial standard, with the effect of criminalizing previously noncriminal activity. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 350;
Marks, 430 U.S. at 192. Marks involved an impermissible diminution in the prosecutorial standard based on a retroactively applied change in Supreme Court caselaw from Memoirs to Miller.
See Marks, 430 U.S. at 189–91.
228

See Marks, 430 U.S. at 196.

229

See id.

230

See id. at 189 n.1, 191.

231

See id. at 192–93.

232

See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1973).

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-3\GWN301.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 47

MODELING NARROWEST GROUNDS

14-MAY-21

9:08

507

constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation
under the States’ police power.”233
After observing that Justice Brennan, who authored the Memoirs
plurality, subsequently abandoned the “utterly without redeeming social value” test, Chief Justice Burger noted: “[T]oday, for the first time
since Roth was decided in 1957, a majority of this Court has agreed on
concrete guidelines to isolate ‘hard core’ pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment.”234 Although the Miller Court
observed that the decision represented the first case since Roth in
which a majority agreed upon a governing rationale, it did not see any
need to overrule Memoirs.
The implication of these passages is clear: With respect to the Supreme Court itself, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Miller majority, presumed that only majority opinions, not narrowest grounds
opinions, hold precedential status in the Supreme Court itself. None
of the remaining opinions refuted Miller on this important point.235
And nothing in Marks suggests a change concerning how narrowest
grounds opinions are regarded in terms of precedent in the Supreme
Court, as opposed to in lower courts.
The Miller Court had no need to overrule Memoirs for one reason: although the narrowest grounds rule was already understood to
apply in lower federal courts, even before Marks, which explained the
decision to reverse the Sixth Circuit and to commend the approach of
all other circuits to address the issue, narrowest grounds opinions
were never regarded as precedent in the Supreme Court itself. The
Justices in Miller and in Marks modeled this understanding with their
contemporaneous conduct in the shadow of the narrowest grounds
rule. Although a majority of five took a different view on this issue in
Ramos, Justice Gorsuch was correct that superseding Apodaca did not
require overruling.
b.

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena & Overruling a Supreme
Court Precedent

The 1995 decision Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena236 not only
supports the understanding that narrowest grounds opinions are not
See id. at 22.
See id. at 23 & n.4, 29, 36–37.
235 Neither Justice Douglas nor Justice Brennan discussed the precedential nature of majority versus narrowest grounds opinions in their dissenting opinions. See id. at 37–47 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 47–48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
236 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
233
234
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precedent in the Supreme Court itself, but a critical aspect of the case
would otherwise be nonsensical if narrowest grounds opinions were
precedent. In Adarand, Justice Scalia joined as the critical fifth vote in
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion.237 That opinion overturned the
part of Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC238 that had relied upon intermediate scrutiny to sustain a racial preference for government licensing that benefitted minority business enterprises.239
Although the Court Reporter’s statement of the vote lineup is
not a formal part of the published opinion, this specific passage is important to the analysis that follows: “Justice O’Connor announced the
judgement of the Court and delivered an opinion with respect to Parts
I, II, III–A, III–B, III–D, and IV, which is for the Court except insofar
as it might be inconsistent with the views expressed in Justice Scalia’s
concurrence . . . .”240
In Part III–D, Justice O’Connor reiterated her longstanding refutation of the view that “strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.’”241 Justice Scalia, by contrast, took the view that, with a single
exception not relevant to Adarand,242 strict is invariably fatal.243 Despite joining Part III–D, Justice Scalia’s disagreement with O’Connor
mattered. In the ordinary course, Scalia likely would have issued a
partial concurrence in the judgment, declining to join part of an opinion with which he strongly disagreed. Without Scalia’s joining Part
III–D, O’Connor would have lacked the requisite five votes in
Adarand to overturn Metro Broadcasting, and to declare that contrary
to that earlier case, the relevant equal protection standard for the benign use of race was strict scrutiny, whether the challenged regime is
state or federal.244 Justice Scalia in Adarand, like Chief Justice Burger
See id. at 204.
497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
239 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225–27; Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 564–65.
240 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204.
241 Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
242 Id. at 239. Justice Scalia cites to his earlier concurrence in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co. See id.; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“At least where state or local action is at issue, only a
social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb—for example, a prison
race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates––can justify an exception to the principle
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’ ” (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted))).
243 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
244 The Supreme Court had already insisted upon strict scrutiny in state-based contracting
set-asides in J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493–507.
237
238

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-3\GWN301.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 49

MODELING NARROWEST GROUNDS

14-MAY-21

9:08

509

in Miller, assumed that when the Supreme Court fractures, its rulings
bind lower courts but are not precedential in the Supreme Court.
The dispute over whether strict scrutiny was necessarily fatal
formed the basis for a subsequent, far more significant, ruling squarely
placing these two Justices on opposing sides. Justice O’Connor’s hedging language in Adarand established the foundation for her later majority codification of the Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke245 narrowest grounds ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger.246 Bakke
was another 4-1-4 decision, with Justice Powell controlling on narrowest grounds.247
In the 2003 Grutter decision, Justice O’Connor provided a refined
version of Justice Powell’s Bakke analysis majority status. Although
he invalidated the affirmative action program used by the Medical
School of the University of California at Davis, Justice Powell permitted reliance upon race as one factor among many in a combined admissions regime, subject to strict scrutiny.248 Powell viewed diversity in
higher education as a compelling state interest, provided the school
did not, as U.C. Davis had, employ a quota or racially segregate admissions files.249
In Grutter, Justice O’Connor sustained the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program, which, like the plan
Powell endorsed in Bakke,250 treated race as a plus factor in a combined set of admissions processes.251 She further joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist in striking down the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program in Gratz v. Bollinger.252 The undergraduate
program, in contrast with the law school, had employed a fixed point
system for race, which, the Court determined, too closely resembled a
prohibited quota.253
245

438 U.S. 265 (1978).

246

539 U.S. 306, 322–25 (2003).

See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269–70, 272; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (“Since this Court’s splintered decision in Bakke, Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has
served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.”).
247

248

See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–18.

249

See id. at 314–16.

Powell explained that he favored an integrated approach, with race as a soft variable, as
employed by Harvard University, and he included that plan as an appendix to his opinion. See id.
at 316–17.
250

251

See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.

252

539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003).

253

See id. at 270–72.
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c. An Exception: The Planned Parenthood v. Casey Plurality
There is a notable exception to the preceding analysis. From its
inception, Roe v. Wade, which recognized a fundamental right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, was subject to a campaign to have the
case overruled.254 Although there had been earlier cases that seemed
likely to produce that result,255 Casey presented what many regarded
until then as the very strongest opportunity. The Casey Court included
seven out of nine Justices appointed by Republican Presidents, with
Justice Harry Blackmun, who authored Roe, the sole remaining member of that Court still supporting the result.256 The two other remaining members of the Roe Court—Justice Rehnquist, later elevated to
Chief Justice, and Justice White—had dissented in Roe.257
Casey presented a challenge to a Pennsylvania abortion statute
with five provisions: (1) an informed consent provision requiring that
a pregnant woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy be provided
detailed disclosures twenty-four hours prior to the procedure; (2) a
parental notification provision for minors seeking an abortion, subject
to a “judicial bypass” if the young woman was deemed sufficiently
informed and mature to make her own judgment or if the court determined that the decision was in her best interest; (3) a requirement that
a married woman seeking an abortion notify her husband except in
cases of previously documented abuse; (4) exemptions to the preceding requirements for medical emergencies; and (5) reporting requirements for facilities where abortions were performed.258
The Casey Court divided into three camps. Justices Blackmun
and Stevens sought to retain the original Roe v. Wade formulation and
voted to strike down all the provisions except the exemption for medical emergencies.259 Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia,
and Thomas, would have overturned Roe and sustained all of the challenged provisions.260 The controlling narrowest grounds opinion,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Kathryn Kolbert, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Reproductive Freedom Hanging by a Thread, 11 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 153 (1989).
256 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 923 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
257 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221
(1973) (White, J., dissenting) (applying to both Roe and Doe).
258 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (joint opinion).
259 See id. at 934 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part); id. at 911–14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
260 See id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
254
255
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coauthored by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, declined to
overturn Roe v. Wade, yet revised the Roe opinion in two notable
ways.261 First, the joint authors relaxed Roe’s trimester framework,
considering it inessential to Roe’s central holding, and second, they
maintained that Roe provided insufficient regulatory latitude to states
seeking to demonstrate respect for the potentiality of human life embodied in the fetus.262 This more deferential approach to abortion required reclassifying abortion from a fundamental right to a lesser
protected liberty interest,263 and it entailed replacing strict scrutiny
with the newly minted undue burden test.264 The joint authors defined
undue burden as a shorthand for ensuring the absence of substantial
obstacles placed in the path of a woman seeking to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.265
Applying the revised doctrinal framework, the joint authors,
whose opinion controlled on narrowest grounds,266 sustained all of the
provisions of the Pennsylvania statute, save one. The plurality struck
the spousal notification provision, holding that a husband may not exercise dominion over his wife as parents do over their children.267 In
reaching this judgment, the plurality, while declining to overturn Roe
v. Wade, confronted two earlier Supreme Court abortion rulings that
had struck down similar twenty-four hour disclosure provisions similar
to that which the joint authors sustained.268 Thus, the Casey plurality
announced overturning two preceding abortion rulings269: City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health Inc.,270 and Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.271
This aspect of Casey, with a narrowest grounds opinion announcing the overruling of two Supreme Court precedents, is out of keeping
with Supreme Court practice contemporaneous with Marks, specifi261

See id. at 846 (joint opinion).

262

See id. at 873, 885 (plurality opinion).

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847–50 (joint opinion); id. at 953 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
263

264

See id. at 876 (plurality opinion).

265

Id. at 877.

For a related analysis, see STEARNS ET AL., supra note 191, at 883–87 (reviewing Casey
and providing graphical depiction aligning opinions along one dimension).
266

267

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 898 (joint opinion).

See id. at 881–82 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
268

269

See id. at 870 (plurality opinion).

270

462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 898.

271

476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 898.

R
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cally Miller, which superseded, but did not overrule Memoirs.272 It is
also inconsistent with the later Supreme Court understandings as indicated by Justice Scalia’s decision to join Justice O’Connor in forging a
majority, despite his disagreement on a critical part of her analysis, in
Adarand to overturn Metro Broadcasting.273
A possible account of Casey involves its very specific doctrinal
context. Public attention concerning Casey centered on Roe itself, a
case many treated as having the status of super precedent.274 The
Casey plurality’s overturning of two lesser abortion precedents embedded in a decision formally retaining, yet modifying, Roe might
have been regarded a necessary accommodation. Alternatively, this
aspect of the Casey plurality opinion, and more specifically its implications for Marks, might simply have escaped notice given the importance of the case in other respects, despite the earlier modeled
behavior in Miller, and the later modeled behavior in Adarand. More
generally, Casey does not appear to have affected the understanding
that overturning a Supreme Court majority precedent requires a majority opinion.
3.

Summary

The preceding analyses of Apodaca, Ramos, Adarand, and McDonald help to explain the judicial configurations in nonmajority
cases to which the narrowest grounds rule can or cannot be applied.
The preceding analysis further considered two questions. First,
whether a majority opinion is required to overturn a majority Supreme Court precedent, and second, the converse inquiry, whether
abandoning a nonmajority Supreme Court ruling requires formal
overruling. The analysis reveals that the Justices’ modeled behaviors
generally support requiring a majority opinion to overrule a past precedent and generally do not require that nonmajority rulings be formally overruled to be abandoned.
272

See supra Section II.A.2.a.

273

See supra Section II.A.2.b.

See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in ‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30,
2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/weekinreview/so-do-you-believe-in-superprecedent.html [https://perma.cc/AR3W-JNFF]. The term “super-precedent” has recently been
used during Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for now-Justice Amy Coney Barrett. See
Aaron Blake, Amy Coney Barrett’s Most Telling Exchange on Abortion and Roe v. Wade, WASH.
POST (Oct. 13, 2020, 4:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/13/amy-coneybarretts-most-telling-exchange-abortion-roe-v-wade/ [https://perma.cc/4KCK-C3ZA].
274
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B. Modeling Narrowest Grounds II: Dimensionality
A more formal model of the narrowest grounds rule supports
how individual Justices generally express their understanding through
their observed behaviors operating in Marks’s shadow. The concept of
dimensionality is intuitively familiar. At the same time, its more precise elements find their roots in the study of group decision making.
This Section presents a broader theoretical analysis of dimensionality,
which provides the basis for a clearer articulation of the narrowest
grounds rule.
Dimensionality is a critical concept in assessing and comparing
innumerable data. A single dimension can account for literally infinite
data, even as some small data sets cannot be accommodated along one
dimension. The preceding discussions of Apodaca, Ramos, and McDonald explained this intuitively. This Section provides a more formal
structure, generalizing earlier insights.
The benefit of the theoretical overlay is twofold. First, it demonstrates that the observed phenomena in fractured Supreme Court decision making are part of a more general set of problems associated
with aggregating collective preferences. This implies that legal scholars who perceive inevitable imperfections with the narrowest grounds
rule as a basis for abandonment risk ignoring broader insights from
the study of collective choice that should first be taken into account.
Second, identifying the theoretical underpinnings of the narrowest
grounds rule, including its imperfections, allows for more targeted correction, rather than abandonment. Specifically, it allows for recasting
Marks in a manner that avoids exacerbating the difficulties associated
with Supreme Court decision making, while improving lower court
guidance.
1. From Hot Air Balloons to Learning to Count
The analysis to follow integrates understandings from two related
disciplines, game theory and social choice. These vast literatures offer
fascinating insights that are often expressed with complex mathematics.275 Although the analysis that follows uses numbers, the analysis
requires only distinguishing among three categories of integers (whole
numbers) and counting.
275 The analysis that follows, including Table 4, is adapted from the lengthier discussion and
analysis set out in Stearns, supra note 26, at 1067–68.

R
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CATEGORIZING INTEGERS

Odds

Evens

Primes

3, 5, 7 . . .

2

Non-Primes

9, 15, 21 . . .

4, 6, 8 . . .

Table 4 presents an elementary exercise in counting integers that
possess two sets of dichotomous characteristics: (1) whether integers
are odd or even, and (2) whether integers are prime or nonprime.
Even numbers yield integers when divided by two. Odd numbers are
those, other than one, that do not. A prime number cannot be divided
by any integer other than itself and 1 without yielding a fraction.
Whereas 9, an odd integer, can be divided by 3, yielding 3, 7, also an
odd number, can only be divided by itself or 1 without yielding a
fraction.
Rotating counterclockwise from the upper left of Table 4, and
stopping with the lower right, each box captures an infinite sequence
of integers satisfying the combined criteria. There is an infinite sequence of odd primes, odd nonprimes, and even nonprimes, with the
earliest entries listed and with ellipses signaling an endless sequence.
Notice that each box contains not one, but two characteristic attributes that array endlessly along a single dimension from the left, implying a low number, to the right, implying a high number. The number
of data being sorted bears no correlation to the number of dimensions
along which sorting takes place.
Now try to array a minuscule sequence, three consecutive integers sorted by two dichotomous criteria: (1) prime or nonprime; and
(2) odd or even. This three-digit sequence, depicted in bold, cannot be
assessed along a single dimension because of the anomalous number
2, the sole even-prime. Arraying this sequence implicates two dimensions, not one, forcing the split between the dimensions of prime/nonprime and odd/even.
The number of data and the number of dimensions required to
sort those data are orthogonal, implying no correlation. In some circumstances, comparing large numbers of data implicates one, or more
than one, dimension, and in others, comparing relatively small numbers of data implicate one, or more than one, dimension. The preceding analysis cleanly expresses this, devoid of extraneous detail. Even
so, it is simple enough to express the insight without numbers.
This Article opened with an example that included a hot air balloon. Assume that each of the following means of transit are succes-
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sively larger and heavier: skateboard, bicycle, motorcycle, car, bus,
and airplane. Table 5 depicts these six modes of transportation along a
single dimension, from low to high, capturing both size and weight.
TABLE 5. TRANSIT VEHICLES
Skateboard

Bicycle

Motorcycle

IN

ONE DIMENSION

Car

Bus

Airplane

Low

High

Now interject an aloft hot air balloon, between the size of a car
and a bus. Because the balloon is lighter than air, or even a
skateboard, including it breaks down the single dimension that, in its
absence, succeeded in capturing the size and weight inquiries. To simplify, assume a dividing line that separates transit vehicles along the
size and weight dimensions, with scooter, bicycle, and motorcycle classified as small and light, and with car, bus, and plane classified as large
and heavy.276 Assume the aloft hot air balloon is larger than a car and
smaller than a bus. Because the hot air balloon is both light and large,
it forces a split across the size/weight dimensions, as shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6. TRANSIT VEHICLES
Light
Heavy

IN

TWO DIMENSIONS

Small

Large

scooter, bicycle, motorcycle

hot air balloon
car, bus, airplane

Although these categorical assessments, odd/even, prime/nonprime, large/small, and heavy/light, are simpler than complex legal
line drawing, they are no different in terms of dimensionality. Once
more, incorporation is instructive. Before the Supreme Court largely
settled upon incorporation based on provisions embedded within the
Bill of Rights, the Justices split over two approaches, with Justices
Frankfurter and Cardozo inquiring whether the claimed right was sufficiently fundamental that one could not conceive an Anglo-American
scheme of ordered liberty without it, whether or not the right happened to appear in the Bill of Rights.277 This approach recognized that
276 Although arbitrary, the dividing line is also irrelevant; the analysis holds wherever the
line is drawn.
277 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (“Due process of
law . . . [protects] those personal immunities which . . . are ‘so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,’ or are ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’ ” (citations omitted) (first quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
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not all claimed rights carry equal weight, implying a spectrum, with
some relatively easy and other relatively hard cases. Indeed, even as
the Court increasingly settled upon incorporation as its dominant approach,278 as Ramos and McDonald demonstrate, disputes remained
as to whether, based on the importance of the claimed right, incorporation was jot for jot.
However difficult particular cases might be, assessing claimed
substantive rights along a single dimension capturing importance to
our overall scheme or ordered liberty is intuitive. In Apodaca, for example, Justice White concluded that, on balance, the Sixth Amendment unanimity requirement was not sufficiently important to be
constitutionally mandated, even at the federal level.279 By contrast,
Justice Stewart found the claimed right sufficiently important that it
must be fully afforded at the federal level and incorporated jot for
jot.280 And Justice Powell found that although unanimity warrants inclusion in federal criminal trials, it is insufficiently important to warrant jot for jot incorporation as applied to states.281 Again, these
competing views align along one dimension: lax (White) to strict
(Stewart) protection of the claimed Sixth Amendment right, with Justice Powell assuming an intermediate position between the extremes.
Ramos did not consider the underlying merits of the claimed
unanimous jury right in the first instance. Rather, it construed
Apodaca, including determining which opinion controls, whether the
case is precedential, and whether, if precedential, it should be superseded or overruled.282 These three issues likewise align along a single
dimension, from a strict to lax understanding of the status of Apodaca.
Justice Gorsuch, who rejected Apodaca, took the extreme view that
there is no narrowest grounds opinion, it is not precedent, and it
should be superseded.283 Alito took the opposite extreme view:
Apodaca is precedent, Powell’s opinion states the holding, and the
(1934), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); and then quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969))).
278 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968); see also supra note 167 (quoting
Duncan as focusing identification of incorporated rights on the Bill of Rights given that state
systems of criminal justice largely replicate the federal system).
279 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–11 (1972) (plurality opinion), abrogated by
Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (plurality opinion).
280

See id. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 372–73 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment).
281

282

See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1403–04 (2020) (plurality opinion).

283

See id. at 1403.
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case should be retained.284 Setting aside Justice Thomas, the remaining
concurrences in the judgment, Kavanaugh and Sotomayor, took the
view that Apodaca is precedent, Powell’s opinion controls, and
Apodaca should be overruled.285 Each of the three issues align along
the same dimension, and each bloc votes consistently with a characterization from the far left (Gorsuch for a plurality of 3), to the median
(Sotomayor and Kavanaugh), to the far right (Alito dissenting for 3).
Once more, the number of data or issues do not correlate with the
number of dimensions.
Finally, consider McDonald. Although Thomas took the same approach in Ramos and McDonald, the dimensional split mattered only
in the latter. Because there are two ways to arrive at the result of
incorporating the Heller Second Amendment right, with one group
accepting due process and rejecting privileges or immunities, and with
Justice Thomas doing the opposite, the case presents like sorting the
three integers—2, 3, and 4—along two dimensions: odd/even and
prime/non-prime. Justice Thomas’s position corresponds to the integer
2 in Table 4 and to the hot air balloon in Table 6. Sorting his opinion,
plus the others in McDonald, implicates two dimensions. By contrast,
despite the large number of opinions and issues involved, Ramos implicates only one relevant dimension. Five Justices implicitly agree
concerning how the dimension is defined even as they disagree as to
where along it the case should be resolved. Again, the number of issues, opinions, or data bear no correlation to the number of dimensions along which they are sorted.
The central problem with the scholarly literature on Marks is failing to appreciate the central role of dimensionality in assessing the
narrowest grounds rule.286 As previously noted there are two
problems with the Marks formulation of the narrowest grounds rule,
one that is easily fixed, but unimportant, and one that cannot be fixed
and that matters a lot. Life is like that sometimes. Let us start with the
easy one. Imagine an opinion, similar to Ramos, with a plurality of
three, three separate concurrences in the judgment, and three in dissent. Unlike Ramos, however, imagine that the opinions discretely
align along a single dimension, such that in the 3-1-1-1-3 line-up, the
bolded concurrence in the judgment is the broadest, albeit less broad
than the plurality, and the italicized concurrence in the judgment is
See id. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1410–20 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part); id. at 1402–10 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring as to all but Part IV–A).
286 See infra note 357.
284
285
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the narrowest opinion consistent with the outcome, and thus closest to
the dissent.
In this analysis, the Roman typeface 1 concurring in the judgment
represents the median position in the nine-member Court. In social
choice theory, absent a first-choice majority winner, the option that
would defeat all others in binary comparisons holds special status because it possesses an important attribute corresponding to majority
rule. To illustrate, consider another famous Supreme Court decision,
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, which split 4-1-4.287
Eight out of nine Justices disagreed with two arguments that Powell
presented only for himself—diversity is a compelling government interest in higher education admissions, and while race can be used as a
plus factor, it cannot be used in the form of a quota.288 The two groups
of four Justices who declined to join Powell’s analysis disagreed for
opposing reasons. Those joining Justice Brennan viewed Powell as insufficiently accommodative of racial considerations, and those joining
Justice Stevens viewed Powell as excessively accommodative of racial
considerations.289
The statement that eight Justices rejected Powell’s view is not
merely unhelpful; it is misleading. The better analysis recognizes that
if we align the opinions Brennan (A), Powell (B), and Stevens (C),
along a dimension capturing lax-to-strict permissibility of the use of
race in higher education admissions, the A camp intuitively prefers B
to C and the C camp intuitively prefers B to A.290 Contrary to Justice
287

See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

288

See id. at 314–18 (Powell, J.).

See id. at 324–26 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 408–11 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
289

290 This mechanism was employed in United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723,
724 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). See supra note 38. Professor Ryan Williams, who has criticized
earlier versions of the arguments more fully developed in this Article, see supra note 214 and
sources cited infra note 357, maintains that one troubling feature of this approach is that it
affords the views of dissenting Justices a role in identifying the opinion designated as controlling
on narrowest grounds. See Williams, supra note 11, at 815 (“The fifth vote approach also implicitly accords weight to the views of dissenting Justices by allowing their views to influence the
identification of the median Justice’s opinion.”). Although some jurists or scholars might regard
that feature as problematic, the criticism rests on a misunderstanding. It is true that the Gerke
court considered the implicit consensus of those who take a broader and narrower view of the
possible judgment-supporting rationales, including those in dissent, to identify the controlling
narrowest grounds opinion. But this simply reflects the intuition that in identifying any median,
for example the number five in an integer sequence from one to nine, one can count from one
upwards, or from nine downwards, completing the task upon reaching five, the median, in either
direction. The criticism does not undermine the argument advanced here; rather, it reveals an
underlying confusion concerning an inevitable feature of data arrayed along a single dimension.

R
R
R
R
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Gorsuch’s claim that allowing a single Justice to control thwarts consensus on the Court, the analysis reveals the majoritarian underpinnings of the narrowest grounds rule even as applied in 4-1-4 rulings
implicating a single dimension. In social choice theory, option B is
referred to as a Condorcet winner, and rules producing such an option
when it is available, meaning when options align on a single dimension, are said to satisfy the Condorcet criterion.291
The narrowest grounds rule intuitively embraces the Condorcet
criterion. Consider that on a nine-member Supreme Court, as a general intuition, the median position generally correlates with where the
Court is apt to settle on an upcoming and unresolved doctrinal question. Discerning the median position enhances the stability, and thus
the value, of precedent by rendering future doctrinal outcomes more
predictable based on decisions in the past. This helps to explain why,
contrary to Justice Gorsuch and consistent with Justice Alito, 4-1-4
decisions that implicate one relevant dimension readily satisfy the narrowest grounds rule.
a.

Imperfection

The minor defect in the Marks statement of the narrowest
grounds rule is now apparent. The opinion consistent with the outcome that expresses the holding on narrowest grounds in the hypothetical 3-1-1-1-3 case is the italicized 1 (starting left, position 6),
whereas the Condorcet winner, or median justice, is the Roman typeface 1 (starting left, position 5). In a nine-member Court, position 5,
not 6, is the median. A majority comprising the plurality of 3, the bold
1, and the Roman typeface 1 collectively prefer the position of the
Roman typeface 1 to that of the italicized 1. The formally stated
Marks rule thus fails to capture precisely the intended majoritarian
aspect of the narrowest grounds doctrine by risking vindicating 1 over
1.
Although rare, Fullilove v. Klutznick292 is such a case. Fullilove
concerned a challenge to a race-based set-aside program for federal
291 The Condorcet winner is likewise a partial solution to the problem of collective preference aggregation. With preferences (1: ABC; 2: BCA; 3: CBA), B is a Condorcet winner. By
contrast with preferences (1: ABC; 2: BCA; 3: CAB or 1: CBA, 2: BAC; 3: ACB) unlimited
binary comparisons produce a cycle, ApBpCpA or CpBpApC, for the first and second set of
listed rankings respectively. For a more detailed discussion and analysis, see STEARNS, supra
note 33, at 41–97 (providing overview and collecting authorities); and Maxwell L. Stearns, The
Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994) (reviewing literature).
292 See 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The case is also particularly helpful in providing a limited em-
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government contracting.293 The case was decided two years after the
fractured decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
which itself came one year after Justice Powell’s majority opinion in
Marks.294
Bakke struck down an affirmative action program used by the
Medical School of the University of California at Davis, with Justice
Powell alone expressing the narrowest grounds holding.295 Powell determined that although the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause prohibited the medical school’s selection process, which involved segregating files based on race and which set a specific quota
of sixteen out of one hundred seats for specified minorities, some use
of race was allowed.296 Specifically, Powell determined that although
the state medical school could not rely upon race to remedy the present effects of past discrimination, it could rely on race in a more limited way to promote its compelling interest in diversity in higher
education.297 To further that compelling interest, the admissions office
could not employ a quota, although, as Harvard University had done,
it could employ race as one plus factor among many in an integrated
admissions regime.298
Fullilove presented the related question of how to assess a racial
preference in the federal contracting context, with fifteen percent of
contracts set aside for specified minorities.299 Like the Bakke Court,
the Fullilove Court fractured. In Fullilove, however, Justice Powell occupied the same unusual position as the theoretical italicized Justice in
the preceding hypothetical. To illustrate, consider the breakdown in
Table 7.

pirical survey of the early understanding of Marks. See supra Section II.A.2.a; see also Appendix
B (reviewing cases and law review articles from 1980–1990 assessing Fullilove).
293 See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453 (plurality opinion).
294 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
295 See id. at 269–72 (plurality opinion).
296 See id. at 279 (majority opinion).
297 See id. 269–72 (plurality opinion).
298 See id. at 316–17 (Powell, J.); id. at 321–24 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.).
299 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453–54 (1980).

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-3\GWN301.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 61

14-MAY-21

MODELING NARROWEST GROUNDS

TABLE 7. FULLILOVE V. KLUTZNICK
Marshall,
Brennan,
Blackmun
(concurrence in
the judgment)

Sustain under
intermediate
scrutiny

Burger, White,
[Powell] (issuing
judgment)
Sustain under fact
specific inquiry
without electing
either intermediate
or strict scrutiny
Narrowest grounds
holding assuming
Marks captures
median voter along
a single dimension

Broad permissible use of race

IN

Powell
(concurrence)
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ONE DIMENSION
Stewart, Rehnquist,
Stevens (dissenting)

Sustain under
strict scrutiny

Strike under fatal strict
scrutiny (Stewart and
Rehnquist) or based on
Narrowest
inadequate
grounds holding
congressional
under the literal
wording of Marks deliberation (Stevens)

Narrow permissible use of race

For purposes of this presentation, it is easiest to divide Fullilove
into four camps. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, reiterated the view that Justice Brennan had expressed in
Bakke. Specifically, this group of Justices reasoned that in the context
of a benign race-based classification, operating in this case at the federal level, the appropriate standard of review was intermediate scrutiny.300 Under that test, this group of Justices voted to sustain the
program against the equal protection challenge.301 At the opposite
end, Justice Stewart, joined by Rehnquist, in dissent, applied strict
scrutiny, voting to strike down the racial set-aside program.302 Justice
Stevens, in a sole-authored dissent, voted to strike down the set-aside
program based upon concerns involving congressional deliberations.303 In his sole-authored concurrence, Justice Powell reiterated his
view in Bakke that the appropriate test for a benign race-based program was strict scrutiny, and because he determined federal policy
met the test, he voted to sustain the program.304 Finally, Chief Justice
Burger authored a plurality opinion, which Powell also joined, issuing
the Court’s judgment.305 Burger’s fact-driven opinion, while sustaining
See id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 519–21.
302 See id. at 522–27 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
303 See id. at 532–36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). To simplify the presentation, without changing
the analysis, the discussion will treat the dissent as a bloc of three voters: Stewart, Rehnquist,
and Stevens.
304 See id. at 495–517 (Powell, J., concurring).
305 See id. at 453, 492 (plurality opinion).
300
301
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the race-based set aside, declined to adopt either the intermediate or
strict scrutiny test.306 Removing Powell from the Burger opinion
count, as signaled with bracketing, produces a 3-2-1-3 lineup, with the
Burger opinion occupying the median and the Powell opinion expressing the holding on narrowest grounds.
Fullilove provides a valuable opportunity for assessing early
lower court and scholarly treatment of this unusual voting lineup because of the proximity to when Marks was issued and because the
relevant window is limited to ten years. Nine years after Fullilove, the
Supreme Court disallowed states to mimic the federal set-aside policy,307 and ten years after Fullilove, in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, the
Supreme Court superseded Fullilove, embracing, for another five
years, the intermediate scrutiny test.308
Although a survey of lower federal and state court decisions and
law review articles construing Fullilove in that period does not provide
a definitive answer, the data suggest that, in general, courts and commentators treated Burger’s position as controlling or sought to reconcile outcomes with both the Burger and Powell opinions.309 We have
located only two of seventeen lower court cases that treat the Powell
opinion in Fullilove as controlling.310 Other lower courts generally
treated Burger’s opinion as controlling or sought to reconcile the two
opinions, with a small number claiming to reconcile all three judgment-consistent opinions.311 This general approach was also consistent
with treatment in the Supreme Court itself and in contemporaneous
law review articles, none of which treated Powell’s narrower concurring opinion as controlling.312 Together these data imply that despite
Marks’s phrasing, with respect to Fullilove, lower courts and commentators generally grasped intuitively that in a single dimensional case,
the narrowest grounds rule intends to capture the opinion that is
joined by the Court’s median Justice.

306

See id. at 492 (plurality opinion).

See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476–77 (1989); id. at 511 (plurality opinion).
307

308 See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563–65 (1990). The Supreme Court then
overturned Metro Broadcasting, insisting upon strict scrutiny, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225–27 (1995).
309

Those data are collected and presented infra Appendix B.

310

The data supporting the assertions in this paragraph are summarized in Appendix B.

311

See infra Appendix B.

312

See infra Appendix B.
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b. Incompleteness
The second problem with the Marks rule is incompleteness.313
This problem proves both inevitable and intractable. And unlike the
wording imperfection, which is relatively unimportant and easily remedied, this one cannot be remedied yet matters a lot. Unpacking it,
once more, implicates dimensionality.
Recall that when preferences align along a single dimension this
implies that those embracing one extreme position prefer the median
position to the opposite extreme position. As applied to Bakke, with
Brennan (A); Powell (B); and Stevens (C), it is fair to assume that
Brennan and Stevens (A and C) would prefer Powell’s position (B) to
each other’s positions (C and A).314 More formally, assume Brennan’s
preferences are ABC and Stevens’s preferences are CBA. As Bakke
revealed, no opinion has majority support. Whether Powell’s preference rankings are BAC or BCA, if each participant votes sincerely
when comparing A to B, B to C, or C to A, option B, which defeats A
and C, will emerge the winner in a regime that allows all binary comparisons to be voted. By contrast, changing our assumptions such that
either Brennan preferred C over B or Stevens preferred A over B
thwarts the assumption that the preferences align on a single dimension, generating an outcome that cycles.
To illustrate, we now revisit the earlier table, presenting McDonald v. City of Chicago, reproduced as Table 8:
TABLE 8. MCDONALD V. CITY

OF

CHICAGO REVISITED

Incorporate Under
Privileges or Immunities
Incorporate Under
Due Process
Do Not Incorporate
Under Due Process

Do Not Incorporate Under
Privileges or Immunities
Plurality (A)

Thomas (C)

Dissent (B)

A special feature reveals McDonald as a case implicating two
dimensions. Discerning whether a case implicates two dimensions requires identifying the premise on which all Justices must logically
313 This phrasing is drawn from Arrow’s Incompleteness Theorem, which demonstrates that
any institution that avoids cycling in aggregating group preferences runs afoul of some other
benign attribute that Arrow associated with rational and fair collective decision making. See
STEARNS, supra note 33.
314 This analysis is simplified inasmuch as Justice Stevens rested his analysis on Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act. For a more detailed analysis, see STEARNS, supra note 33, at 130–33.

R
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agree. In McDonald, that premise follows: Striking the Chicago handgun ban requires incorporating the Heller right under either due process or privileges or immunities, whereas sustaining the Chicago
handgun ban requires failing to incorporate the Heller right under either due process or privileges or immunities. Despite their disagreements concerning how to resolve the case, all Justices would logically
embrace this proposition, which is consistent with each McDonald
opinion. The Justices thus agree that there are two controlling issues:
(1) Is the Heller right incorporated via the Due Process Clause?; and
(2) is the Heller right incorporated via the Privileges or Immunities
Clause? Although positions A and C incorporate Heller, they do so by
resolving both questions in opposite fashion. By contrast, position B
resolves one issue in favor of each camp, A and C, yet votes against
incorporating the claimed right.
A Supreme Court opinion has two dimensions when separate
opinions express opposite resolutions of controlling issues yet yield
the Court’s judgment, and a dissenting opinion, expressing a favorable
resolution of a single controlling issue from the perspective of each of
those opinions consistent with the judgment, yields the opposite result. Otherwise, the case implicates one dimension. Unlike a single
dimensional case, when a case presents in two dimensions, there is no
inherent reason to assume any particular ranking over any of the three
expressed combined preferences within the opinions. We cannot know
a priori that either A or C would prefer an opposing resolution of
both underlying issues to a partly favorable resolution of one of the
two issues that nonetheless leads to an opposing judgment. Likewise,
we cannot know whether B would prefer, if forced to choose, yes on 1
and no on 2 or yes on 2 and no on 1.
There are different ways to express the conceivable preference
rankings, and each requires specifying assumptions. If the preferences
are Alito (plurality) (ABC), Stevens (dissent) (BCA), Thomas (concurrence in the judgment) (CAB), and if each camp votes sincerely,
the rankings reveal a cycle, such that ApBpCpA, where p means preferred to by simple majority vote. Conversely if the preferences are
Thomas (CBA), Stevens (dissent) (BAC), and Alito (ACB), on the
same assumptions, the preferences generate the reverse cycle:
CpBpApC. Although none of these rankings are inevitable, each is
plausible. In fact, both presentations, the forward and reverse cycles,
embed each of the two available rankings over the remaining opinions
for each of the judicial camps. The point is not to defend any ranking
about which we lack complete information. Instead, the analysis dem-
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onstrates that unlike the one-dimensional case in which the simplest
assumptions yield an implicit majority winner, or dominant second
choice,315 preferences implicating more than one dimension allow no
such assumption.
Cases forcing a split across two dimensions thwart the premise on
which the narrowest grounds rule rests. Although Marks itself fails to
specify the rule’s limitations, the narrowest grounds rule assumes a
nonmajority case in which opinions align along a single dimension, but
this cannot be guaranteed. The problem is not unique to Supreme
Court decision making. It is endemic to, and thus inevitable in, group
decision making. In the course of collective decision making, opinions
often align along one dimension, but not always, and when they do
not, the possibility of aggregation problems becomes inevitable. This
is the focus of social choice, a major literature that has claimed at least
two Nobel Laureates.316
2. Endogeneity & the Rules of the Game
Part of the problem with the narrowest grounds rule is that those
trained in law are rarely exposed to social choice. And when judges
and legal scholars come up against problems in aligning judicial opinions or aggregating preferences, they sometimes fail to recognize that
the problem they are confronting is not special to the context of judicial decision making. A considerable literature has emerged identifying cases like McDonald and noting the divergence in such cases
between outcomes and the logical progression of issue resolutions using existing protocols (which involve each jurist voting on the outcome and aligning rationales around the resulting opinions) and
proposing various alternative voting protocols (which would instead
base the case outcome on the results of separate tallies over controlling issues).317
315 In social choice theory the option is referred to as a Condorcet winner. See Stearns,
supra note 291, at 1252–57.
316 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); Kenneth J.
Arrow, NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1972/arrow/biographical/ [https://perma.cc/3AA5-2LYF]; Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM.
ECON. REV. 349 (1999); Amartya Sen, NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1998/sen/biographical/ [https://perma.cc/QD6Y-H8QK]; WILLIAM VICKREY,
PUBLIC ECONOMICS (Richard Arnott et al. eds., 1994); William Vickrey, NOBEL PRIZE, https://
www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1996/vickrey/biographical/ [https://perma.cc/
WYD5-3ZWJ]. Although William Vickrey earned his Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on
auction theory, he too contributed substantially to social choice, including providing a simplified
proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. See STEARNS, supra note 33, at 81, 334–35 n.91.
317 See sources cited supra note 191.
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The narrowest grounds doctrine proves central to these debates.
What issue voting proposals miss is that the narrowest grounds rule is
one piece in a larger complex puzzle implicating myriad features of
decision making at the apex of a pyramidal judiciary. As with the
clock that strikes thirteen, issue voting proposals, by ignoring this
piece, raise concerns about what else is missing. Removing one piece
while imagining all the rest will fit perfectly is problematic. Exacerbating the problem is an instinct that all problems are solvable when, in
fact, some are not, at least not without risking other larger
problems.318
The narrowest grounds rule is the flipside of the aggregation coin.
We have two seemingly plausible methods of resolving appellate court
cases: aggregating judicial resolutions per issue, producing a pathway
to the judgment, or, as we actually observe, aggregating judicial resolutions on the judgment and reading across opinions to discern which
opinion resolves the controlling issues. Although several leading
scholars have advocated variations on issue voting, none have identified an appellate court, quite literally anywhere, that employs it.319
This seemingly glaring datum has proved remarkable in its failure to
signal the possibility of a missing piece of the puzzle.
Consider two economics jokes:
Joke one:
Two economists walk down a street. One says to the other,
“There’s a $20 bill. You should pick it up.” The second says,
“There can’t be; if it were there, someone would have picked
it up already.”
Joke two:
An economist watches her lawyer friends playing a game and
asks if it is the same game they played the prior week. One
friend responds: “Same game, different rules.”
The point is not to lament any discipline’s distorted sense of humor. Rather, each joke provides a relevant insight into the problem at
hand. Economists sometimes imagine all valuable opportunities having been taken, which, if true, would leave no space for entrepreneurs.320 Legal scholars tend toward the opposite fallacy, imaging that
an immediate creative spark confronts few, if any, theoretical obsta318 This is perhaps the central insight of the literature on social choice. See supra note 290;
sources cited supra note 316.
319 See sources cited supra note 191.
320 For a paper that explores this puzzle, see Henry G. Manne, Resurrecting the Ghostly
Entrepreneur, 27 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 249 (2014).
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cles, failing to search out that missing piece. The truth, of course, lies
somewhere in between. Creative minds certainly can improve the
state of the world but only after truly grappling with what might be
missing in their proposals. Not all $20 bills have been taken, but as
obvious a proposal as shifting voting protocols to avoid the intractable, if occasional, judicial voting anomaly almost surely would, by
now, have been tried somewhere in the world.321 What appears to be
missing is a problem that economists refer to as endogeneity, or, as
the second joke implies, failing to recognize that changing the rules is
changing the game.322
Advocates of issue voting imagine that the preferences over issues, or even the very statements of issues expressed across opinions,
will remain unaffected by a change in judicial voting protocol. But
changing voting protocols changes the institutional context in which
both aspects of decision making—identification of issues and their resolution—takes place. Judicial opinions are endogenous to, meaning a
function of, the decision making rules used to decide cases. Changing
those rules will affect incentives respecting these vital aspects of issue
identification and resolution. So what is missing?
The present system of voting encourages Justices to produce the
most persuasive opinions they can devise in the hope of forming and
retaining a majority coalition.323 A majority coalition holds particular
value provided majority opinions have greater status than nonmajority
opinions, including narrowest grounds opinions. Historically that has
been well understood.324 Contrary to Justice Alito in Ramos, narrowest grounds opinions have generally not been understood to overturn
past majority decisions.325 Similarly, as previously shown, they have
321 This seems especially likely when we consider that social choice dates at least as far
back as the Constitution itself and likely earlier. See Stearns, supra note 291, at 1221–25. And, of
course, various manifestations of common law decision making likewise have ancient origins. See
generally Ephraim Glatt, The Unanimous Verdict According to the Talmud: Ancient Law Providing Insight into Modern Legal Theory, 3 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION 316 (2013)
(examining Talmud’s unanimous decision rules in evaluating ancient origins of common law decision making); Charles Auerbach, The Talmud—A Gateway to the Common Law, 3 CASE W.
RSRV. L. REV. 5 (1951) (examining parallels among common law and Talmudic jurisprudence).
322 Endogeneity implies that outcomes are a function of the rules generating them. See
STEARNS ET AL., supra note 191, at 895 (defining endogeneity).

See Maxwell L. Stearns, How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identification:
A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1045, 1050 (1996).
323

324 See supra Section II.A.2.b (providing examples illustrating that when the Supreme
Court supersedes a fractured ruling, it does so without the need to overrule).
325 See supra Section I.B.1.b (discussing Justice Alito’s Ramos dissent); see also supra Section II.A.2.a–.c (reviewing three case studies implicating Justice Alito’s analysis: Miller v. Cali-
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not generally been construed to produce binding precedent in the Supreme Court, as opposed to among lower courts.326
Majority opinions are the Supreme Court’s brass ring, the essential means by which Justices can place their imprimaturs on controlling doctrine, at least presumptively. Such opinions force upon future
Supreme Courts seeking to displace the resulting precedent not one
barrier, but two: a stare decisis inquiry and a merits inquiry. An important distinction in Ramos between the Gorsuch approach and
those of Alito, Kavanaugh, and Sotomayor, is that Gorsuch rightly
recognized that, unlike a majority opinion in the Supreme Court, a
narrowest grounds opinion only implicates the merits inquiry as such
opinions bind only lower courts, not the Court itself.
Issue voting would allow Justices to work toward splintering off
colleagues who might otherwise have helped form a contrary majority
coalition. The change would blend the status of an actual majority ruling, earning the twin benefits of having to withstand a stare decisis and
merits analysis to overrule, with happenstances majority agreements
on any controlling issues. In cases where the judgment matters more
than specific issues, the protocol change would encourage Justices to
forge favorable voting paths, cobbling separate issue majorities capable of producing a preferred result. Switching to issue voting risks
such incentives in cases presently implicating a single dimension and
even resolved by majority opinions.327 Justices are highly intelligent
and motivated actors, and changing the rules changes the game. With
a rule change to issue voting, talented Justices will no longer continue
behaving as if operating under outcome voting.
Under the present outcome voting protocol, once the opinions
are aligned, the narrowest grounds doctrine comes into play. Supreme
Court opinions divide into four general categories: (1) unanimous
opinions, (2) majority opinions, (3) fractured opinions, and (4) threejudgment cases. Under outcome voting, Marks only comes into play in
fractured opinion cases, comprising a small subset of the Court’s overall case output. When the Court is unanimous, or when there is a majority opinion, there is no collective preference aggregation
problem.328 The entire Court, or a majority, aligns along one dimenfornia, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey).
326 See supra Section II.A.
327 For a discussion about the resulting risks this protocol change would bring about, see
Stearns, supra note 323, at 1059–61 (illustrating with variation on National Mutual Insurance v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949)).
328 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes?: Miller v. Albright in Social
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sion, expressing the Court’s dominant position in the controlling opinion. As a practical matter, the Court has always resolved threejudgment cases—split over reverse, remand, or affirm—with one or
more Justices changing from their preferred judgment typically toward the remand, providing the lower court with necessary
guidance.329
The combined effect of the above analysis cabins the collective
preference aggregation problem to fractured cases. Within that subset,
we must further subdivide cases implicating one or more than one dimension. The conventional understanding of the narrowest grounds
rule implicitly construes it to resolve fractured cases implicating one
dimension. If lower courts, and the Supreme Court, better understood
how to discern when fractured opinions so align, identifying the
smaller, problematic subset of cases in which Marks fails to apply
would be simplified. When there is one relevant dimension in a fractured case, there is always a narrowest ground opinion. Rather than
speculative, as Professor Re has claimed, this follows axiomatically
from foundational social choice insights.330 By contrast, when there is
more than one relevant dimension in a fractured case, there is never a
narrowest grounds opinion. The same tools also reveal this as nonspeculative and axiomatic.
The question then becomes how to discern when there is one or
more relevant dimensions. The following restatement of the narrowest
grounds rule is consistent with the conventional understanding, yet offers critical guidance in making these assessments:
When the Supreme Court issues a nonmajority decision,
lower courts should presume that the opinions can be expressed along a single dimension. In such circumstances,
when all Justices are participating, lower courts should apply
that opinion representing the deciding Court’s median position. This will generally coincide with the position closest to
dissent for each separate judgment. In the rare circumstance
in which there is an even narrower concurrence in the judgment, placing it closer to the dissent, lower courts should
nonetheless treat the opinion that coincides with the Court’s
median position as controlling. When two or more opinions
consistent with the judgment resolve controlling issues in opChoice Perspective, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 87, 110 (1999) (categorizing Supreme Court opinions
based on degrees of consensus).
329 See STEARNS, supra note 33, at 153–54 (collecting cases).
330 See Re, supra note 11, at 1979 (describing as “worrisomely speculative” and “inefficient” drawing inferences that necessarily correlate to opinions aligning on a single dimension).
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posite fashion, yet reach the same judgment, and when the
dissenting opinion resolves one or more issues favorably to
each opinion consistent with the judgment, yet achieves an
opposite judgment, the premise underlying the narrowest
grounds rule fails to apply. This can also be determined when
separately tallying majority resolutions of controlling issues
supports the dissenting outcome. When making such assessments, lower courts should disregard opinions that, if removed, would not affect the ability to align the remaining
opinions on one dimension, with a controlling narrowest
grounds opinion emerging among the remaining opinions.
Lower courts should not presume that one or more Justices
embracing a broad rule, whether consistent with the judgment, or in dissent, prefers an opposing broad rule to an
opinion consistent with the judgment that decides the case
on narrowest grounds. Lower courts should assume Justices
express their judgment preference through the opinion they
join.331
The preceding analysis sets the foundation for this clarified statement of the narrowest grounds rule. In the single nonmajority Supreme Court case, Fullilove, although the opinions align on a single
dimension, the narrowest grounds opinion is narrower than that embracing the position of the Court’s median Justice. This restatement of
the narrowest grounds rule accounts for that situation, admonishing
lower courts to apply the position of the median Justice in this circumstance, consistent with prevalent lower court practice in construing
Fullilove.332
In a minuscule subset of fractured cases implicating more than
one dimension, one or more Justices has acquiesced to a contrary resolution on one dispositive issue, treating that issue as settled.333 Doing
so allows the Justice(s) to change the judgment vote, and along with it,
the judgment for the Court as a whole. The final sentence acknowledges this rare possibility. More generally, the restatement admonishes lower courts to presume that when opinions resolve controlling
issues in opposite fashion and reach opposing judgments, that suggests
that the opinions align on a single dimension. Most importantly,
avoiding this more plausible reading requires more—not fewer—ambitious leaps in construction, including drawing counterintuitive infer331 This restatement is a refined presentation of that submitted in the author’s Hughes amicus brief. See Hughes Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 25–26.
332 See infra Appendix B (collecting authorities).
333 See infra Part III.B (providing examples).
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ences concerning how Supreme Court Justices would align their
preferences over the remaining opinions.334 This restatement of the
narrowest grounds rule instructs lower courts to avoid unnecessary inferences, demanding that before they draw counterintuitive inferences, they obtain express guidance by the relevant Justice. And when
such guidance is provided, there is no need for tenuous or speculative
constructions. The switched vote will generate a majority opinion, albeit one contrary to the logical progression of that Justice’s internal
resolution of the case based upon her or his independent assessment
of controlling issues.
This restatement of the narrowest grounds rule clarifies, without
changing, the rule’s meaning. It identifies clearly the very limited circumstances in which the premise of the narrowest grounds rule fails to
apply. This leaves open the question as to how the Supreme Court
itself construes Marks as applied to past fractured rulings to which the
Marks premise does not hold. The simplest rule of construction is that
such cases establish a binding precedent on the overall case judgment
in lower courts but leave open the resolution of the controlling questions necessary to achieve that judgment. Lower courts will inevitably
struggle in absence of further guidance, but the relevant subset of
cases is extremely limited. Incompleteness is not unique to the Su-

334 Although this rule of construction likely rests upon an inevitable inference from how
the opinions in a fractured case relate, it can also be defended in terms of administrability. It is
generally sounder as a matter of judicial administration to engage in a set of assumptions that
lowers, rather than raises, the plausibility of ascribing multiple dimensions to a case. Barry Friedman and his coauthors, see FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 23, observe that “[m]ost accounts of
judicial decision-making assume—implicitly or explicitly—that the median-justice theory is correct.” Id. at 604. This insight is consistent with the proffered clarification of the narrowest
grounds rule.

Friedman and his coauthors further posit that challenges to what they term the medianjustice theory arise due to an overlooked tension in which Justices sometimes prioritize case
outcomes over agreement with rules articulated in published opinions. See id. (citing Cliff Carrubba, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin & Georg Vanberg, Who Controls the Content of
Supreme Court Opinions?, 56 AM J. POL. SCI. 400 (2012)). As this Article demonstrates, although divergences between outcomes and stated rules might forge a problem of dimensionality,
that is neither necessary nor inevitable. For example, McDonald implicates two dimensions
based on the differing rationales that Justice Alito, for a plurality, and Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, provide while agreeing to the case outcome. See supra Section I.C (describing McDonald). Likewise, a Justice who cares more about the outcome than rationale may
switch votes, subordinating the resolution of one dispositive issue to reach another that otherwise would be logically foreclosed. In doing so, the Justice produces a majority opinion in which
the opinions then implicate a single relevant dimension. See infra Section III.B (illustrating with
Justice White’s vote in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)).
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preme Court; it is inevitable in any system of collective decision
making.
3.

Summary

The preceding analysis demonstrates that in fractured cases in
which Marks’s underlying premise of a single dimension holds, there is
always a narrowest grounds opinion, whereas for the smaller subset of
fractured cases in which the Marks premise does not hold, there is
never a narrowest grounds opinion. As a general proposition, as
modeled by their behavior, Supreme Court Justices exhibit greater implicit understandings of the doctrine than when they seek to articulate
those understandings in opinions. This is especially true in the context
of fractured or potentially fractured single dimensional cases in which
judgments concerning whether to join or not join a majority have potentially significant doctrinal consequences. Despite expressing uncertainty regarding the scope of Marks, the Justices modeled behavior
demonstrates that the following represents the best reading of the narrowest grounds rule: (1) the rule applies even when a single Justice
expresses the holding on narrowest ground; (2) narrowest grounds
opinions bind lower courts, not the Supreme Court itself; and (3) narrowest grounds opinions may not overturn past majority decisions.335
In some respects, observing what the Justices do, rather than
what they say, is more informative as to how the narrowest grounds
rule is intended to function.336 In actual cases, members of the Court
pay for advancing their doctrinal understandings by forgoing alternative options. These include writing alone, expressing an ideal point, or
joining with a majority, thereby gaining the benefit of a presumptively
binding precedent on the Court itself. The preceding discussion pro335 This analysis implies that adherence to the narrowest grounds rule might be construed
as presenting a spectral rather than purely binary inquiry. Although this Article advocates strict
adherence to these propositions, it is important to acknowledge that generally construing Marks
consistently with these principles is preferable to routinely departing from them. As this Article
has shown, lower courts and even Supreme Court Justices will occasionally misapply Marks simply due to the narrowest grounds rule’s inevitable complexity or due to the complexity, or
unique circumstances, of the relevant cases to which the doctrine is being applied. Occasional
misreadings of the narrowest grounds rule should not be construed as permanent departures
from this important core set of understandings.
336 For a related analysis linking the value of legislative history to whether the signal was
“paid for” through various forms of bargaining and proposing that legislative history provides
greater insight when “the observer can learn whether the informed party bore some cost to
communicate the signal,” see McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory
in Statutory Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 1994, at 3, 8 (Professors
Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, writing collectively).
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vides examples of strategies comporting with each of these
understandings.
Along with legal scholars, members of the Court have done less
well in appreciating the different implications of the narrowest
grounds rule in cases implicating more than one dimension. This has
resulted in failing to recognize the very limited circumstances in which
Marks fails to apply. The dimensionality analysis demonstrates that
this problem is not unique to the judicial context; it pervades all collective decision making. Modeling when the narrowest grounds rule
can and cannot be applied helps to avoid overreaching claims of inapplicability, including in Apodaca and Ramos, with opinions aligning on
one dimension. This Article’s recasting of the narrowest grounds rule
captures the modeled behavior of justices and grounds it in
dimensionality.
III.

OPEN QUESTIONS

ON

NARROWEST GROUNDS

A major benefit of modeling narrowest grounds is narrowing the
scope of remaining policy questions. These include assessing: (1) various lower court formulations of the narrowest grounds rule and relating the analysis to holding versus dictum; (2) the implications of vote
switching; and (3) whether Marks is best understood as a predictive or
bargaining rule in cases where the choice affects attributing the holding. The discussion that follows takes up each of these questions.
A.

Least Impact, Logical Subset, Lowest Common Denominator, &
Matryoshka Dolls

Jurists and scholars construing fractured opinions have debated
the merits of various formulations of the narrowest grounds rule as
used to discern the holding in fractured Supreme Court cases.337 The
preceding analysis provides the basis for a reconciliation: all apply,
leading to the same outcome, when opinions align along a single relevant dimension; none apply when the opinions implicate more than
one relevant dimension. These verbal formulations—Least Impact,
Logical Subset, Lowest Common Denominator, and Matryoshka
Dolls—add little or nothing to the narrowest grounds inquiry. Each is
a metaphor intended to capture a singular insight. Because none has
the precision of a model, each has limited value.
Assuming the opinions in a fractured case align along a single
relevant dimension, the opinion consistent with the outcome that re337

See, e.g., Re, supra note 11; Williams, supra note 11.
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solves the case on narrowest grounds is a median, dominant second
choice, or Condorcet winner, each of which, once more, also expresses
the same insight.338 If either of the extremes prefers an opposite extreme to the median position, the opinions do not align on a single
dimension. When a given jurist prefers one extreme position to the
opposite extreme position to the median, for that jurist, the dimension
being applied fails to capture the stakes.339 If so, employing the term
median, which implies a common dimension, is mistaken.
Consider this simple illustration: Imagine a legislative body
choosing an adjournment date: Thanksgiving (T), Christmas (C), or
New Year’s Eve (N).340 An intuitive dimension that captures these options is time, early to late: TCN. Assume member 1 prefers TCN, and
member 2 prefers CNT or CTN. Now assume member 3 prefers NTC,
on the ground that because she does not celebrate Christmas, she prefers breaking on either remaining date. For her, the time-based dimension fails to capture the stakes because she would prefer to work
through Christmas, or break earlier on Thanksgiving, but not to suspend for a holiday she fails to observe.
When decision makers agree on a dimension, each extreme logically prefers the median to the opposite extreme. That follows directly
from how dimension is defined.341 Only when another dimension is
implicated does the assumption concerning such intuitive rankings
break down.
Now consider these alternative framings: Least Impact, Logical
Subset, Lowest Common Denominator, and Matryoshka Dolls.342
Each implies ranking options along a single dimension, although, as
shown below, Lowest Common Denominator succeeds less well. As
previously seen,343 Least Impact implies a greater impact, leading to
See supra Section II.B.
In social choice, this can be expressed either as one member holding multipeaked preferences cast along a single dimension or as the aggregate members each holding single peaked
preferences implicating more than one dimension. These two framings express an identical insight. For a more detailed analysis that explains the relationship between the two framings and
that provides helpful graphics, see STEARNS ET AL., supra note 191, at 571–74.
340 See id.
341 See supra Section II.B.
342 See, e.g., Re, supra note 11, at 1956–57 tbl.1 (collecting Supreme Court decisions most
often interpreted by federal circuit courts with an explicit citation to Marks); id. at 1980–84
(discussing Logical Subset framing); Williams, supra note 11, at 806–19 (discussing lower court
approaches to discerning precedential effect of U.S. Supreme Court plurality decisions, including
Logical Subset, Lowest Common Denominator, and nesting—Matryoshka Doll—framings);
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 191, at 45–48 (discussing nesting—Matryoshka Doll—framing).
343 See supra Section I.C (applying least impact analysis to McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742 (2010)).
338
339
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the same judgment, or an impact so small as to disallow the judgment
reached. Ranking based on degree of impact—greater to lesser—implies a single dimension along which options may be assessed and
compared. This is also true for each remaining categorization.
Logical Subset analysis implies a universe from which a set is
drawn.344 From the set, a subset is drawn. Assume the set defines the
conditions under which some believe a criminal conviction must be
overturned. The logical subset implies that for a smaller group, a more
stringent set of conditions is required before a conviction is overturned as compared with the larger set. The dissenters would deny
relief to the full set, and thus also to the subset. Those preferring to
grant relief to the full set (largest cohort) will prefer conferring relief
to those in the logical subset (smaller cohort) as compared with a
complete denial (smallest cohort). The dissenters, who prefer denying
relief across the board (smallest cohort) will prefer conferring relief in
the logical subset (smaller cohort) to conferring relief to the full set
(largest cohort). Logical Subset analysis corresponds to a single dimension: full set (broadest relief), logical subset (narrower relief), and
complete denial (narrowest and thus no relief).
Matryoshka Dolls are stackable, with smaller dolls fitting within
larger ones in succession until the penultimate doll fits in the largest of
all. This too implies one dimension, small to large, along which the
options can be assessed and compared, with a line drawn anywhere
separating those that correspond to a grant of relief, and the remaining dolls corresponding to a denial of relief.345
Finally, Lowest Common Denominator analysis conveys the same
idea, but in a less helpful manner.346 The intent is to capture fractions,
i.e., nonintegers, permitting rankings from large to small. But the denominator captures only part of the relative valuation. Absent full information, including numerators, the data are incomplete. Even so, it
is possible to show how this is intended to apply. Imagine a case with
several possible factors potentially correlating with a grant of relief
from a criminal conviction. The Justices embracing the broadest position consistent with the grant of relief would reverse the conviction if
two out of three factors they identify are satisfied. The narrowest
grounds concurrence would grant relief only after adding two additional factors and demanding that four out of the now five factors are
344 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying logical
subset analysis to conclude Freeman lacks a controlling opinion); Re, supra note 11, at 1980–84.
345 See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 191, at 45–47.
346 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 11, at 806–19.
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satisfied. The dissenters agree with the five factors but insist all five
must be satisfied. Although it is easy enough to rank ordinally 2/3, 4/5,
and 1, from small to large, we can also do so by finding the lowest
common denominator, 15, and then ranking based on the corresponding numerator values: 10/15 12/15, 15/15. Either approach ranks the
values from small to large, capturing broad to narrow bases for relief.
And again, each characterization corresponds to a single dimension
along which options can be assessed and compared.
These are metaphors each designed to capture the same essential
insight. They are not alternative tests. A proper model, grounded in
dimensionality, better expresses the point for which each metaphor is
used.347 With a proper model, these, or other, metaphors can be discarded because they are no longer necessary or helpful. The recast
statement of the narrowest grounds rule does all the work of these
metaphors, but it does so more comprehensively, capturing fully the
core analytical insight. Applied correctly, none of these framings take
us on “one less traveled by.”348 Instead, each leads us to the same
place.
The preceding analysis also helps unpack the sometimes-confused
relationship between narrowest grounds and holding versus dictum.349
This issue arose with respect to Justice Sotomayor’s narrowest
grounds concurrence in the judgment in Freeman v. United States,350 at
issue in Hughes v. United States.351
Two federal circuit courts had devised hypotheticals intended to
demonstrate that in some situations, Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion is narrower because whereas Justice Sotomayor would deny consideration for resentencing following a plea agreement, Justice
Kennedy would grant it.352 We need consider only one hypothetical to
understand the underlying analytical problem:
The sentencing court . . . might consider and reject the guideline range used by the parties, not because the court finds
that a different guidelines range (such as the career offender
range) applies, but because, having considered the applicable
See supra Section II.B.
See text accompanying supra note 48 (quoting Robert Frost).
349 Portions of this discussion are adapted from the author’s Hughes amicus brief. See
Hughes Amicus Brief, supra note 6.
350 See Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 534–44 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
the judgment).
351 See Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771–72 (2018).
352 See United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1022–24 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Epps, 707 F.3d 337, 351 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
347
348
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guidelines range, the court rejects it as a matter of policy and
selects its sentence without regard to it. If . . . the court decides for reasons unrelated to the guidelines range to impose
the sentence the parties agreed upon, under the plurality’s
analysis, the defendant would not be eligible even if the
guideline range is later reduced. Under Justice Sotomayor’s
analysis, however, the defendant would be eligible.353
This seemingly counterintuitive result follows from an anomaly in
the wording of Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in the judgment in
Freeman, which Chief Justice Roberts helpfully described:
In the first half of the [Sotomayor] opinion, the inquiry
properly looks to what the judge does: He is, after all, the
one who imposes the sentence. After approving the agreement, the judge considers only the fixed term in the agreement, so the sentence he actually imposes is not “based on”
the Guidelines.
In the second half of the opinion, however, the analysis
suddenly shifts, and focuses on the parties: Did they “use” or
“employ” the Guidelines in arriving at the term in their
agreement? But [the relevant statute] is concerned only with
whether a defendant “has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range.” . . . Only a court can
sentence a defendant, so there is no basis for examining why
the parties settled on a particular prison term.354
As applied to the petitioners in the Freeman and Hughes cases,
the concern that Chief Justice Roberts raised respecting the analytical
shift from lawyer to judge played no role. The facts in each case allowed for an application of Freeman to which the Hughes parties
agreed: whereas Kennedy’s analysis would have granted relief to both
Freeman and Hughes, Sotomayor’s opinion would have granted relief
to Freeman but not to Hughes.
Although the hypothetical plea agreement bases sentencing on
the guidelines, the judge instead imposes an identical sentence for alternative reasons independent of the guidelines. Sotomayor’s opinion
contained language suggesting an analytical shift implicating two separate bases for assessing the plea: that of the parties and that of the
judge. That shift was not implicated in either Freeman or Hughes.

353 Epps, 707 F.3d at 351 n.8 (first alteration in original) (quoting Reply Brief of Appellant
at 9–10, Epps, 707 F.3d 337 (No. 11-3002), 2012 WL 170534, at *9–10).
354 Freeman, 564 U.S. at 547 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).
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Sotomayor’s Freeman opinion could be construed to imply that
whereas Justice Kennedy, for the plurality, presumes a sentence following a plea flows from the plea agreement, which is based on the
guidelines, she demands objective evidence that the parties agreed on
the rationale, later shared by the judge, specifically linking the sentence to the guidelines. Her disjunctive inquiry, separating the judge’s
and lawyers’ reliance on the guidelines, gives rise to a potential—if
attenuated—hypothetical. The hypothetical involves lawyers intending a sentence based on the guidelines, when that understanding
as the basis for the sentence is not shared by the judge. By contrast,
Justice Kennedy presumes a judicial intent to rely on the guidelines
and leaves open the possibility that although the lawyers might intend
the sentence as based on the guidelines, a judge might expressly state
the sentence is not based on the guidelines.
Properly read, the hypothetical reveals language in the two opinions—Kennedy and Sotomayor—extending beyond what is necessary
to resolve Freeman and Hughes. The hypothetical’s attenuated nature
is not the problem. Rather, the problem is that any judicial opinion,
even if unanimous or for a majority, sometimes includes language inviting hypotheticals testing the outermost limits of its holding. When
this occurs, the extraneous assertions fall within the category of dictum, here defined to mean assertions unnecessary to the case resolution.355 Lower courts routinely confront challenges in sorting holding
and dictum, but that task is independent of the Marks inquiry. The
narrowest grounds rule designates the controlling opinion; it does not
inform how to construe the outermost limits of the selected opinion’s
internal logic.356 If the opinions align along one dimension, this implies
that extraneous language that could be deployed to construct hypotheticals potentially subverting such intuitive relationships is
dictum.357
355 Of course, defining dictum is more complex, but those nuances are not implicated here.
For a detailed analysis of the distinction between dictum and holding, see Abramowicz &
Stearns, supra note 214. For a discussion related to a recent split between the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, adopting the approach advocated in this Article on the holdingversus-dictum distinction as applied to narrowest grounds opinions, and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, taking a contrary view, see supra note 214 and cites
therein.
356 See supra Section II.A.1 (explaining that Justice Powell in Apodaca and Justice Kennedy
in Vieth expressed the holdings on narrowest grounds despite criticisms leveled against the merits of their analyses).
357 This analysis reveals the underlying analytical difficulties with proposals to abandon the
narrowest grounds rule, including those advanced in Professor Re’s and Professor Williams’s
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thoughtful consideration of Marks. See Re, supra note 11, at 1983–84; Williams, supra note 11, at
814–17.
Each of Professor Re’s examples designed to demonstrate the elusiveness of a median position situated between opposing extremes interjects an option that changes dimensionality,
thereby thwarting the premise on which median, middle ground, or any other proxy, is based.
Each of Professor Re’s examples fit the same pattern. Professor Re challenges logical subset
analysis, relying on Justice Alito’s hypothetical during the Hughes oral argument. See Re, supra
note 11, at 1983 n.205. Alito posited a group of friends choosing whether to watch a romantic
comedy or mystery, with a subset of those who preferred a romcom hoping to see a particular
French romcom. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 14–15. Alito and Re posit
that those preferring a romcom might not consider those preferring the French romcom a logical
subset. See id.; Hughes Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 34. Yes, of course! But that merely demonstrates that sorting preferences of movie type (romcom or mystery) and language (English or
French) forces a second dimension, just like sorting integers as odd/even and prime/nonprime.
The example does not refute claims that preferences aligned on a single dimension possess a
median, logical subset, or whichever other phrasing one prefers.
Professor Re’s other examples suffer the same difficulty, including his ascription of the “fallacy of division,” explaining that enjoying salt does not imply enjoying its components, sodium
and chloride, the latter of which is toxic. See Re, supra note 11, at 1983 n.206. Again, yes, of
course. It is commonplace that safe products include unsafe isolated components (consider lye in
soap), or become unsafe in excess quantities (consider, but please do not take, the cinnamon
challenge, see, e.g., David Kroll, 5 Reasons Not To Take The Cinnamon Challenge, FORBES (Apr.
23, 2013, 9:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkroll/2013/04/23/5-reasons-not-to-takethe-cinnamon-challenge/#611d7ce76405 [https://perma.cc/Y3CN-H5ZL]; see also Michael Herz,
Justice Byron White and the Argument that the Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV.
227, 243–49) (illustrating the fallacy of division with salt). None of this implies that persons
preferring either extreme, a lot of salt or cinnamon, or no salt or cinnamon, would nonetheless
prefer the opposite extreme, no salt or cinnamon or a lot of salt or cinnamon, respectively, to an
intermediate quantity of salt or cinnamon.
Professor Re’s claimed refutation of the plurality’s “utterly without redeeming social value”
test in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966), as expressing the holding on narrowest grounds also forces a second dimension beyond broad to narrow protection of allegedly obscene materials. The added dimension involves a concern of nonworkability or a preference for
bright-line rules (really the same thing). Contrary to Professor Re, who claims that presuming
preferences aligning on a single dimension yields a median or dominant second choice is “worrisomely speculative” or even “inefficient,” Re, supra note 11, at 1950, 1979, conceiving an additional dimension to thwart finding a narrowest grounds opinion absent any specific evidence
supporting an added dimension requires greater, not less, ambition in construing judicial
preferences.
Professor Ryan Williams offers two challenges that collapse into one. The resulting challenge aligns with those of Professor Re. See Williams, supra note 11. Williams posits a suit by a
foreign corporation, with the Supreme Court divided into three camps: one finding no personal
jurisdiction but not reaching subject matter jurisdiction; one finding no subject matter jurisdiction but not reaching personal jurisdiction; and one finding personal and subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 816. Williams separately maintains that the approach advanced in this author’s
earlier works and developed more fully here fails to identify a narrowest grounds opinion in
cases presenting the “voting paradox.” See id. at 815–16. The jurisdiction hypothetical is, or at
least is potentially, a voting paradox, meaning it too implicates two dimensions. See id.
Williams’s division into two arguments arises from assuming incomplete information for the
two camps denying jurisdiction, with each argument failing to reach the alternative jurisdictional
inquiry, as the first jurisdiction resolution renders the second unnecessary to the judgment each
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B. Vote Switching in the Shadow of Marks
We have seen the relationship between Justice Scalia’s Adarand
strategy and the narrowest grounds rule.358 In a critical respect, Justice
Scalia represented the exception proving a more general rule concerning judicial strategy. With the narrowest grounds rule in place, in cases
implicating a single relevant dimension, Supreme Court Justices are
generally motivated to align themselves along that dimension in a
manner corresponding to their preferred position, or what political
scientists refer to as their “ideal point.”359 More simply, Marks encourages sincere judicial behavior. To illustrate, consider the perspective of
those to the right or left of the Court’s median position, for the controlling issue or issues and for the case as a whole. Although these
jurists will not necessarily express the holding, since none is the median, by voting sincerely for their ideal point, they place the Justice
occupying the median closer to their ideal point.
TABLE 9. DISCRETE JUDICIAL PLACEMENTS ALONG SINGLE
DIMENSION
1
Liberal

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Conservative

To illustrate, consider Table 9, presenting a hypothetical Supreme
Court along a single dimension with 3 liberals, 3 moderates, and 3
conservatives, ranked from 1 on the far left to 9 on the far right. Imagine that within each three-Justice bloc, the members’ rankings are
camp reaches. This means that one must make assumptions to ascertain whether the case is best
understood as implicating one or more dimensions. Assuming the Justices declining jurisdiction
on either basis would, if forced to resolve the issue, also decline jurisdiction on the alternative
basis, then the Court would reach the same result, denying jurisdiction six to three. The dimensionality problem arises if, instead, we assume the Justices declining personal jurisdiction would
grant subject jurisdiction, and vice versa. This plausible, although not inevitable, set of assumptions turns the hypothetical case into a voting paradox, meaning a case with two dimensions.
Although two separate six-Justice majorities would find personal and subject matter jurisdiction,
another six-Justice majority dismisses the suit for want of jurisdiction.
Contrary to Professor Williams, observing that the approach advanced here does not identify a narrowest grounds opinion in such a case, which implicates two dimensions, is not a criticism of the thesis. It is the thesis. And yet, this Article does not leave lower courts at a loss for
guidance. As discussed below, the best approach in such a case is the most conservative. See infra
paragraph accompanying note 371. Assume that jurisdiction is lacking on like facts and seek
guidance elsewhere in the civil procedure canon if the underlying issues are separately
presented.
358 See supra Section II.A.2.
359 See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 191, at 833 (defining ideal point and relating term to
judicial decision making).
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more finely grained from left to right. For any member of the Court,
the incentive is to vote consistently with one’s ideal point because doing so situates the median closer to that ideal point. Along a single
dimension, voting contrary to one’s ideal point has the undesirable
effect of moving the Court’s median further from one’s preferred ideological position. If Justice 2 voted with the conservatives, position 6,
rather than 5, emerges the median. If Justice 8 voted with the liberals,
position 4, rather than 5, emerges the median. The observation that
voting contrary to one’s ideal point moves the median away from
one’s preferred resolution is generalizable in one dimension.
As a general matter, the same logic applies across two dimensions, with an important caveat captured in the restated narrowest
grounds rule.360 Consider two cases, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,361
and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,362 which overturned Union
Gas. Both cases involve questions related to the abrogation of state
sovereign immunity. Although the constitutional questions are complex, the nuances are less relevant here. There were two issues in
Union Gas: (1) Does the amended Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) of 1980363
allow a damages action in federal court against a state?; and (2) If so,
is abrogating state sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause364
permissible or prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment?365 The opinions, implicating two dimensions, are set out in Table 10.
TABLE 10. PENNSYLVANIA V. UNION GAS CO.
CERCLA Authorizes
Abrogation Falls Within
Commerce Clause Power

IN

TWO DIMENSIONS

CERCLA Does Not
Authorize

Brennan, Marshall,
[White moves left]
Blackmun, Stevens [White]

Abrogation Exceeds
Scalia
Commerce Clause Powers

Rehnquist, O’Connor,
Kennedy

Sustaining the suit against Pennsylvania requires that two conditions be met: (1) CERCLA must authorize the suit, and (2) abrogation of state sovereign immunity must fall within Congress’s
See supra Section II.B.
491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
362 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
363 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26,
33, and 42 U.S.C.).
364 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
365 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5.
360
361
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Commerce Clause powers, meaning it is not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. The absence of either congressional authorization or
constitutional authority is fatal to permitting the suit against Pennsylvania to proceed. As Table 10 demonstrates, but for a change in
Justice White’s vote, the Court was split on both issues in a manner
implicating two dimensions. Although separate majorities found that
CERCLA authorized the suit (the left quadrants, totaling five Justices), and that doing so fell within congressional Commerce Clause
powers (the top quadrants, totaling five Justices), only four justices
determined, as their ideal point, that both necessary conditions to permitting the suit were satisfied. Had Justice White stuck with his ideal
point, following outcome voting, Union Gas would have disallowed
the suit.
Justice White’s vote switch avoided that result. After observing
that his view on the statutory issue had not prevailed, he acquiesced in
the contrary majority resolution of that issue, thereby addressing the
question of constitutional permissibility.366 In doing so, he changed the
judgment, thereby allowing the suit to proceed. Although this voting
tactic is unusual, it is not unique,367 nor limited to the Supreme
Court.368
In Seminole Tribe, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority,
overturned Union Gas, stating:
In the five years since it was decided, Union Gas has proved
to be a solitary departure from established law. Reconsidering the decision in Union Gas, we conclude that none of the
policies underlying stare decisis require our continuing adherence to its holding. The decision has, since its issuance,
been of questionable precedential value, largely because a
majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale
of the plurality.369
There are three important points to make about these combined
cases. First, when opinions force two dimensions, there is a necessary
divergence between the resolution of controlling issues on one side
and the outcome resolution, based on each member’s judgment vote,
on the other. As shown in the discussion of McDonald v. City of Chi366 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 45 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
367 For a general discussion, see Stearns, supra note 328 (collecting and analyzing cases).
368 For an example of vote switching, including a judicial assessment of the judicial voting
literature, see Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 190–92 (3d
Cir. 2015); and id. at 204–10 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
369 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (citation omitted).
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cago, a careful analysis allows for constructing a singular proposition
concerning which all members of the deciding Court necessarily agree
respecting the case disposition.370 The same analysis applies in Union
Gas. Although the Justices disagreed on how the case should be
framed and resolved, all Justices necessarily agreed that for the suit to
proceed against Pennsylvania two conditions must be satisfied. First,
amended CERCLA must abrogate state sovereign immunity, and second, the abrogation must be a constitutionally permissible exercise of
Commerce Clause power. If either necessary condition to allowing the
suit to proceed were not met, the suit must be dismissed.
Whereas the McDonald framing was disjunctive (either due process or privileges or immunities could allow incorporation), the Union
Gas framing was conjunctive (both conditions must be met for the suit
to proceed). Despite that difference, votes aligned such that the separate disjunctive elements failed in McDonald when aggregated separately, and the separate conjunctive elements would have failed in
Union Gas when aggregated separately but for Justice White’s decision to acquiesce to a majority’s contrary resolution on the first issue,
construing the amended CERCLA as abrogating state sovereign immunity. A critical step in identifying those cases to which Marks cannot be applied involves reading across the opinions, identifying the
statement constituting common agreement respecting controlling issues, and then relating the resolution of those issues to the Court’s
judgment.
Second, when any of the articulated doctrinal formulations—
Least Impact, Logical Subset, Lowest Common Denominator, Matryoshka Dolls, and also Dominant Second Choice, Median, or Condorcet winner—are properly applied, the Marks rule, coupled with
outcome voting, encourages sincere voting with respect to issues along
a single dimension. Likewise, outcome voting generally encourages
sincere voting on controlling issues with more than one dimension in
two ways.371 It encourages Justices to devise the most persuasive analysis that will attract others to join the opinion with the hope of forming and retaining a successful majority coalition, and it avoids voting
on issues based on strategic, rather than sincere, assessments as to
how the separate resolutions of issues might affect the ultimate path
toward the case resolution.
See supra Section II.B.1 (setting forth McDonald proposition).
See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 60 (illustrating with a variation on Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam)).
370
371
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The rule of law is intricately linked to providing meaningful guidance, allowing persons and institutions to rely on today’s decisions in
planning their future conduct. When jurists acquiesce in a contrary
resolution respecting an issue, they compromise such reliance. A strategic vote, by definition, is not predicated upon Justices’ sincere resolutions of the issue for which they defer to other Justices.
Third, although Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision to afford diminished precedential status to Union Gas is not itself precedential, it
is informative in much the same way that judicial modeling of Marks
is informative. His decision effectively signals an expectation of sincere voting, letting the chips fall where they may. This aligns with
Marks properly construed.
Although Justices certainly have the power to engage in the sort
of vote-switching behavior observed in Union Gas, doing so is rare.372
This too is informative. This exception proves the general rule:
Assume a single dimension unless and until a Justice gives a
reason not to. And when opinions align along one dimension, do not construct an imaginary or hypothetical dimension. Assume those embracing opposing resolutions of issues
leading to opposing judgments prefer a partially favorable
opinion to one coming out the opposite way.373
This analysis also supports this limited rule of construction in
cases implicating more than one dimension:
When opinions force two relevant dimensions, assume the
case stands for its judgment, no more, but no less. This is
evident when separate opinions expressing opposite resolutions of controlling issues yield the Court’s judgment, and
when a dissenting opinion, expressing a favorable resolution
of a single controlling issue from the perspective of each of
those opinions consistent with the judgment, yields the opposite result. Do not assume such a case creates a binding precedent on either alternative rationale necessary for achieving
that judgment.
Although there are exceptions, sometimes that is all that is needed.
McDonald establishes that the Heller right is incorporated; for more
on the doctrinal underpinnings of incorporation, look elsewhere in the
canon.
See Stearns, supra note 328 (reviewing cases).
As previously observed, see supra note 334, although this rule of construction derives
from social choice insights respecting dimensionality, it is also independently grounded in sound
principles of judicial administration.
372
373
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This implicates a tiny subset of cases, a fraction (cases for which
binary guidance is inadequate) of a fraction (cases thwarting one dimension) of a fraction (cases that fail to produce a majority opinion).
As social choice demonstrates, no collective decision-making rule can
solve all problems. But failing to recognize the problems existing rules
already solve risks making matters worse, not better. Had a $20 bill
been lying in the street, it might have been picked up by now. And if
we are going to change the rules, we should acknowledge the risk that
we might not enjoy the new game we will be playing.
C.

Is Marks a Prediction or Bargaining Rule?

Consider two majority opinion cases aligned on a single dimension: Washington v. Glucksberg374 and Schlup v. Delo.375 In each case,
Justice O’Connor, who joined the majority coalition, also issued a simple concurrence expressing her views on narrower grounds.376 This
raises the question whether the narrowest grounds rule is strictly limited to when the Supreme Court fails to issue a majority opinion, as
Marks states, or applies more generally, capturing the position of the
median Justice on the deciding Court. The practical consequences
matter in each case. The answer turns on the resolution of yet another
question: Is Marks purely a means of predicting the Supreme Court’s
median position, or is it a bargaining rule between or among separate
blocs in a given case? The question is unresolved. For two reasons, the
better construction treats Marks as a bargaining rule.
First, the bargaining construction requires Justices to trade off the
price of strictly adhering to their ideal point on one side versus gaining
the benefit of a majority precedent on the other. Overall, this reading
is more consistent with Marks, which anticipates paying the price of
foregoing a majority precedent to express the holding on narrowest
grounds.377 Otherwise, the narrowest grounds rule would not be ex521 U.S. 702 (1997).
513 U.S. 298 (1995).
376 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
377 This observation provides a theoretical basis for a convergent insight from the political
science literature on Supreme Court bargaining. In an article written by Cliff Carrubba, Barry
Friedman, Andrew D. Martin, and Georg Vanberg, the authors demonstrate that the median
member of a majority coalition holds special bargaining prominence even as compared with the
median member of the deciding Court. See Carrubba et al., supra note 334, at 407 (“Consistent
with our theory’s prediction, the median of the majority coalition (where that median differs
from the median of the Court) concurs less often than the median of the Court. Further, concurrences generally increase as one moves away from the median of the coalition.”). This empirical
observation is consistent with the analysis in the text, demonstrating that the median Justice for
374
375
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pressly limited in its wording to nonmajority cases. More importantly,
were the rule otherwise, in the common single-dimension cases, there
would never be an incentive to issue a narrowest grounds concurrence
in the judgment. The wiser tactic for the median Justice would invariably be to join the majority opinion and then rewrite that opinion more
narrowly in a simple concurrence, thereby claiming the benefit of a
personally recrafted majority ruling. This is the judicial equivalent of
having the cake you just enjoyed eating.378
Second, the bargaining rule construction of Marks provides an
important, if partial, antidote to a widely accepted premise among Attitudinal judicial scholars.379 Such scholars rightly claim that, in large
numbers, the lineup of the Court’s members, coupled with the ideological position of the Court’s median jurist, proves robust in predicting case outcomes.380 And yet, the model has two notable limitations.
First, it falsely presumes that all cases align on a single dimension,
which proves false both in individual cases and across bodies of
caselaw.381 Second, the model presumes that the median judicial position on any natural Supreme Court is the fait accompli outcome. In
this analysis, Supreme Court Justices are passive participants in a process concerning which they have limited agency.
A better understanding conceives the Justices as members of discrete coalitions, less granular than discrete positions one through nine,
from left to right.382 Coalition members actively strategize along that
dimension, bargaining over how far left or right to settle between two
blocs whose members face tradeoffs that matter. These include rigidly
insisting upon an ideal point versus making accommodations to forge
a majority precedent.383 If the median position always prevails, holdthe Court as a whole and those Justices forming coalitions on either side negotiate to determine
where the doctrinal position settles, with accommodations that reflect necessary tradeoffs to
ensure that the resulting opinion has the support, and stature, of a majority.
378 For a discussion of Professor Re’s contrary claim concerning the strategies available to
the median Justice under Marks, and why it has proved contrary to available empirical evidence,
see infra note 383.
379 For a general introduction to the Attitudinal model, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD
J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
380 See, e.g., id. at 86–114.
381 For an analysis demonstrating dimensionality across bodies of caselaw that include
standing, the Commerce Clause, separation of powers, equal protection, and the First Amendment, see Maxwell L. Stearns, Constitutional Law’s Conflicting Premises, 96 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 447 (2020); and Stearns, supra note 26 (reviewing special problem of dimensionality in
race-based equal protection jurisprudence).
382 See supra Table 8.
383 This explains away a troubling datum for judicial politics and legal scholars who mistakenly predict that the “narrowest grounds rule” encourages fractured opinions. See, e.g.,
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ing the status of a majority precedent, we gain little information concerning how such negotiations are resolved. No matter the outcome,
the median controls. Conversely, if we treat Marks as a bargaining
rule, we gain greater insight into which aspects of legal doctrine matter most to the deciding Justices. Specifically, we can infer what Justices were willing to sacrifice, revealed in past opinions they wrote or
joined, as the price of effectuating a majority precedent. Justices are
forward-thinking strategic actors, and a model giving them agency is
certain to ensure a more robust understanding of their bargaining dynamics. With that, we gain a greater insight into the rule of law.
Glucksberg and Delo illustrate these points. Glucksberg differs
from other cases we have considered in two respects. First, it is a majority decision, and second, although there were no dissents, it includes various simple concurrences and concurrences in the
judgment.384 Glucksberg presented a facial challenge to Washington
State’s statutory ban on physician-assisted suicide.385 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, for a majority, sustained the ban against a facial challenge
resting on a line of cases implicating the right of privacy.386 Justice
Berkolow, Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 352 (2008) (observing
that positive political theory predicts a greater number of separate opinions under Marks); Frank
B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 549 (1998) (reviewing LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)) (suggesting that Marks encourages Justices who
would express a narrowest grounds holding to avoid compromise as needed to form a majority);
Re, supra note 11, at 1972 (positing that Marks discourages compromise by letting the median
justice “hav[e] her cake and eat[] it too”). Professors James F. Spriggs and David R. Stras have
shown that despite their own contrary predictions such claims are not supported empirically,
with no statistical differences in the formation of fractured versus majority opinions before and
after Marks. See James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO.
L.J. 515, 548 (2011) (“The data do not support our hypothesis that plurality decisions are more
likely to result after Marks, as there is virtually no difference in the rate of plurality decisions
before and after Marks.”). The preceding analysis explains the difficulty. The predictions fail to
consider the tradeoff between sticking with an ideal point versus gaining a majority precedent
that presumptively binds the Supreme Court. Whereas Berkolow (Professors Melissa M. Berry,
Donald J. Kochan, and Matthew Parlow, writing collectively) attributes this result to the unpredictability of Marks, Berkolow, supra, at 331–32, Professor Re surprisingly proposes that a danger of clarifying Marks might be to encourage more gamesmanship than is presently observed,
Re, supra note 11, at 1974 n.170. The dimensionality analysis in this Article explains why Marks
does not encourage fractured decisions, refuting Professor Re’s dire prediction, already in tension with available empirical evidence.
384 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 70 (1997); id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments); id. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgments); id. at 789 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments).
385

See id. at 705–07 (majority opinion).

386

See id. at 719–20.
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O’Connor, one of five Justices comprising the majority, also produced
a simple concurrence stating that nothing in the Court’s opinion
should be construed to affect the relevant standard of medical care for
treating terminally ill patients in considerable pain. Under that standard of care, physicians assisting such patients prescribe pain-relieving
medications that relieve suffering, often with the secondary effect of
hastening death.387 This is known as the double-effects doctrine,
meaning that high doses of palliative medicines, such as morphine, can
have two consequences—improving comfort and hastening death—
and be permitted for the former without regard to the latter.388
As a matter of legal policy, Justice O’Connor’s position is overwhelmingly compelling. Those concurring in the judgment would have
gone further, expressing the view that although the facial challenge
fails, an applied challenge might recognize a right to engage physicians
in more active ways to hasten death, even beyond the double-effects
doctrine.389
The Glucksberg opinions easily align on a single dimension, with
the most restrictive understanding of due process embraced by the
majority, the most expansive view embraced by those concurring in
the judgment, and Justice O’Connor taking the median position. The
unanswered question is whether her position, however compelling, expresses the holding in Glucksberg notwithstanding that she joined the
majority opinion.390
The same issue arose in Delo, a more complex case involving successive petitions for habeas corpus relief, for which there is a longstanding policy based on a federal statute that presumes strongly
against judicial discretion—let alone obligation—to entertain such petitions.391 The case produced three opinions. Writing for a majority of
five that included Justice O’Connor, Justice Stevens remanded a case
that dismissed a successive habeas petition, holding that the proceduSee id. at 736–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Dec. 24,
2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ [https://perma.cc/ZP99-TH8J].
389 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 738, 750–52 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments); id. at
789–92 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments).
390 Notably, Justice Ginsburg issued a concurrence in the judgment stating she had done so
for the reasons expressed in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, possibly implying that she regarded
treating Justice O’Connor’s separate opinion as controlling in tension with O’Connor’s having
also joined the majority. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the
judgments).
391 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 301 (1995). The statutory and caselaw history is
nuanced and what follows is necessarily simplified, but it does not undermine the essential insight as it relates to Marks.
387
388
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ral bar in entertaining such a petition based on cause and prejudice
should not apply to a claim involving new evidence of innocence when
failing to hear the petition risks a fundamental miscarriage of justice.392 Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia chided the majority for relying
upon equitable principles and caselaw in place of the relevant governing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2244.393 He construed the statute to preclude hearing a successive petition unless it is clear the petitioner has
not withheld the new basis for the claim and the successive petition is
not otherwise abusive.394 Justice Scalia found no statutory basis for
allowing a claim to proceed based on factual innocence or to avoid a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.395 Justice O’Connor, despite joining the majority, produced a simple concurrence expressing the view
that although the district court applied an incorrect standard in dismissing the petition, she did not read the majority to remove discretion as to whether to entertain such successive petitions.396
In a footnote to his opinion, Justice Scalia stated the following:
The claim that “the Court does not, and need not, decide
whether the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is a
discretionary remedy,” is not in my view an accurate description of what the Court’s opinion says. Of course the concurrence’s merely making the claim causes it to be an accurate
description of what the Court today holds, since the narrower ground taken by one of the Justices comprising a fiveJustice majority becomes the law.397
As a doctrinal matter, whether Justice Scalia is correct is unresolved. If we view the Marks doctrine as one piece in a larger, more
intricate, puzzle, his reading seems problematic. The other pieces fit
less well together, perhaps not at all, if there is no difference in the
price paid by a median member of the Court in joining or not joining a
majority opinion. We also gain less information from deciding Justices
concerning which doctrinal differences mattered most, as we cannot
observe what Justices might have willingly relinquished to advance a
preferred ruling.
Treating Marks as a bargaining rule avoids these problems by recognizing that Justices are active participants—with agency—in a comSee id. at 316, 332.
See id. at 342–45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
394 See id. at 344.
395 See id. at 342–51.
396 See id. at 332–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
397 Id. at 344 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 333 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
392
393
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plex bargaining process. This more robust image of the Court as a
whole leaves other aspects of the larger, complex puzzle intact, even
as part of that very completeness involves acknowledging inevitable
incompleteness as an endemic feature of Supreme Court decision
making.
CONCLUSION
This Article advances a counterintuitive observation: sitting
members of the Supreme Court better reveal their understanding of
the narrowest grounds rule through modeled behaviors than in their
written opinions. This claim becomes more intuitive when we recognize that at its core, the narrowest grounds rule represents a partial
solution to a more complex problem associated with group decision
making. Because some aspects of that larger problem prove intractable—impossible to resolve without creating other, potentially greater,
difficulties—it might be less surprising that when their voting behaviors affect the designated holding, the Justices make more nuanced
assessments than when considering the narrowest grounds rule in the
abstract.
The narrowest grounds rule is an essential part of a nuanced system of Supreme Court decision making, also including outcome voting, strategic bargaining, precedent, holding versus dictum, and, on
occasion, vote switching. Removing one piece risks making the others
fit less well or not at all. Modeling narrowest grounds requires exploring the role of dimensionality in fractured Supreme Court cases. The
implications are simpler when opinions align on a single dimension;
problems arise when opinions implicate multiple dimensions. Failing
to recognize this distinction, including by relying on imperfect metaphors rather than a model, encourages misguided claims of inapplicability, even in cases in which the narrowest grounds rule
straightforwardly applies.
This Article provided a clarifying statement of the narrowest
grounds rule that avoids these challenges and that forthrightly acknowledges the inherent limitations of even a perfectly crafted doctrine. Along the way, the Article offered insights into Supreme Court
bargaining dynamics, related Marks to other doctrines, and offered a
partial antidote to a premise respecting a dominant school of political
science. A better understanding of the narrowest grounds doctrine
promises to benefit lawyers, legal scholars, and perhaps most of all,
judges and Justices, off or on the Supreme Court.
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APPENDIX A: STATE COURT APPLICATIONS OF NARROWEST
GROUNDS RULE TO STATE HIGHEST COURTS398
States

Relevant Authorities
Ex parte Ball, No.
1190842, 2020 WL
5742599, at *1 (Ala.
Sept. 25, 2020)
(Parker, C.J.,
concurring specially).

Quotes/Descriptions
Y N U
“[I]f, in the prior case, a particular rationale
supporting the result was agreed with by majority of
judges, even in separate opinions, the zone of their
agreement constitutes binding precedent and thus a
‘prior decision.’ . . . Conceptually, that cobbledmajority effect is no different from what would have
occurred if the old tradition of seriatim opinions had
continued.”
“[A]s this court noted in K.W. v. J.G., . . . Y.M. was
J.A.H. v. Calhoun
Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. a plurality opinion.” (citations omitted) (citing K.W.
Res., 865 So. 2d 1228, v. J.G., 856 So. 2d 859 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003); and
1232 (Ala. Civ. App. then citing Y.M. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep’t of Hum.
Res., 890 So. 2d 103 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)).
2003).

Id. at 1233 (Crawley,
Ala. J., concurring in the
(elect.) result).

E.W. v. Jefferson
Cnty. Dep’t of Hum.
Res., 872 So. 2d 167,
170 (Ala. Civ. App.
2003) (per curiam)

“I disagree with the statements in the [majority]
opinion indicating that the holding in Y.M. . . . is
somewhat less than authoritative because Y.M. was
a plurality opinion. See my opinion concurring
specially in E.W. v. Jefferson County Department of
Human Resources, . . . which explains my opinion
that the legal principle . . . was agreed with by a
majority of this court.” (citations omitted) (citing
Y.M., 890 So. 2d 103; and then citing E.W. v.
Jefferson Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 872 So. 2d 167,
173 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (Crawley, J., concurring
specially)).
“In Y.M., two members of this court concurred in an
opinion that concluded that certain DHR court
reports contained hearsay that was inadmissible in a
hearing on a petition to terminate a parent’s
parental rights. The parties in Y.M. did not argue or

398 This Appendix provides data for all fifty states on whether the lower courts within each
state apply the narrowest grounds rule to nonmajority decisions of the state highest court. State
courts are not bound by Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), to apply the narrowest
grounds rule to state highest court rulings. Each listing is coded based upon whether the state
judiciary is elected (elect.) or appointed (appt.). For each state, the table provides citations to
relevant authorities and, as appropriate, case excerpts or synopses. For some states, the table
provides helpful secondary authorities that inform how members of the bar have understood
relevant aspects of state practice. At the end of each state listing appears a final classification
coded as Y (yes), N (no), or U (unresolved), responding to the question: Do lower courts within
the state apply the narrowest grounds rule to the state highest court’s nonmajority decisions?
Each entry is preceded by an explanation, including the basis for inevitable judgment calls for
some states. The end of the table provides summary data as to how many states fall within each
category and further subdivides based upon whether the state judiciaries are appointed or
elected.
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present evidence to support a conclusion that the
reports at issue might be admissible under an
exception to the hearsay rule, and the main opinion
did not address that possibility. As Judge Crawley
points out, in his special concurrence [in E.W.], the
holding reached by the main opinion in Y.M. ‘“may
be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgements on the narrowest
grounds.’” However, the fact that three members of
this court concurred in the result reached by the
main opinion in Y.M. may also be viewed as
indicating that under the narrow facts of that case,
and based on the limited arguments presented to
this court in that case, the judgment was due to be
reversed. The vote line in Y.M. reveals that every
judge on this court agreed to reverse the trial court’s
judgment because the court reports constituted
inadmissible hearsay under the fact of that case; the
vote line does not necessarily indicate that every
judge on this court agreed with the rationale for that
reversal. The fact that some judges concurred in the
result in Y.M. did not necessarily foreclose the
possibility that, under different facts or upon the
presentation of other legal theories, those judges
might reach a different result than they reached in
Y.M. Rather, it is possible to interpret Y.M. as
concluding that the trial court erred in admitting the
court reports—in that case. We reiterate the
conclusion of the Supreme Court of Alabama that
‘[t]he precedential value of the reasoning in a
plurality
opinion
is
questionable
at
best.’ . . . Therefore, this court’s plurality opinion in
Y.M. does not definitively support the mother’s
hearsay argument.
However, we need not reach that issue because we
conclude that any error the trial court might have
committed in admitting [the evidence] . . . was
harmless [under ALA. R. APP. P. 45].” (second
alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first
quoting E.W., 872 So. 2d. at 173 (Crawley, J.,
concurring specially); and then quoting Ex Parte
Discount Foods, Inc., 789 So. 2d 842, 845 (Ala.
2001)) (citing Y.M., 890 So. 2d 103).

Id. at 173 (Crawley,
J., concurring
specially) (for 1
justice).

“Although the Y.M. opinion may have been that of
a plurality of the court, the result (and therefore the
holding, because there was only one issue raised and
addressed) was unanimous . . . . The principle of law
resulting from a plurality opinion is the narrowest
holding agreed to by a majority of the court. The
United States Supreme Court has explained: ‘When
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
[a majority], [the narrowest grounds rule
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applies].’ . . . [However,] [i]n Y.M., there was a
single rationale (the erroneous admission of
hearsay) for the result (a reversal). Thus, while all
members of this court may not have agreed with the
discussion of the disputed issue in Y.M., all
members agreed with the holding (that the case
should be reversed based on the evidentiary error of
improperly admitting hearsay). To attempt to
characterize that holding as something less than
authoritative is misleading.” (citations omitted)
(quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188
(1977)) (citing Y.M., 890 So. 2d 103).
Id. at 174 (Murdock,
J., concurring in the
result) (for 2
justices).

Ex parte Discount
Foods, Inc., 789 So.
2d 842, 845 (Ala.
2001).

Comments:

“While two members of this Court concurred in the
plurality opinion in Y.M. . . . , I and two other
members of this Court chose to concur only in the
result reached in that case. While I cannot speak for
the other two members of this Court who voted
only to concur in the result in Y.M., I can say that I
agreed with essential aspects of the analysis of the
main opinion. More importantly, however, I note
that the result reached in Y.M. was the reversal of
the trial court's judgment and the remand of the
cause for ‘proceedings consistent with the principles
expressed in this opinion.’ . . . The ‘principle[]
expressed’ in Y.M. that provided the basis for
reversal was the principle that hearsay that is not
otherwise admissible under our rules of evidence is
not ‘competent evidence’ with respect to the issue
whether to terminate parental rights. Therefore, I
would not have concurred in the result reached in
Y.M. without agreeing (1) that, under the facts of
that case, the court reports at issue contained
inadmissible hearsay evidence and, most notably for
purposes of the present discussion, (2) that hearsay
evidence that is otherwise inadmissible under our
rules of evidence is not competent evidence with
respect to the issue of whether to terminate parental
rights.” (third alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Y.M., 890 So. 2d at 114).
“We note again that this Court’s opinion in
Discount Foods I was a plurality opinion. The
precedential value of the reasoning in a plurality
opinion is questionable at best.”
Although a plurality of the Civil
Court of Appeals in Alabama in
E.W. discusses the narrowest grounds
rule,
that
opinion
ultimately
acknowledges the Alabama Supreme
U
Court has determined nonmajority
opinions are of limited precedential
value. The plurality also mentions it
is unnecessary to resolve the
application of the narrowest grounds
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rule to resolve the case. Separate
concurring justices in that case seek
to apply the narrowest ground rule.
Although one might, based on the
quoted language from the Alabama
Supreme Court, classify this as N,
due to the reliance among some
lower court judges, we place this as a
U.
Alaska Dep’t of Fish “In McDowell, [the court] held that the portion of
& Game v. Manning, the 1986 subsistence statute limiting subsistence
161 P.3d 1215, 1220– fishing and hunting activities to rural residents
21 (Alaska 2007).
violated the [equal protection clauses] of the Alaska
Constitution. . . . But while [the court] held that an
equal protection analysis was proper[,] . . . [the
court] did not reach a majority consensus as to the
proper level of scrutiny to apply. [The plurality
determined that “demanding scrutiny” was the
appropriate test. But, Justice Moore, in a concurring
opinion, articulated a less demanding “close
scrutiny” test.] As [the court has] previously noted,
‘[w]hen a fragmented court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of [the majority], the holding of the court
may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgment on the
narrowest grounds.’ In McDowell, it was Justice
Moore who concurred on the narrowest grounds
and his position would therefore ordinarily be
considered the court’s holding. However, Justice
Moore’s concurrence expressly refused to rule out
Alaska
the possibility that a more stringent test was merited
(appt.)
and our subsequent case law has, in fact, repeatedly
articulated—although never actually applied—the
plurality opinion’s stringent demanding scrutiny
test. Ultimately then, it is not entirely clear which
equal protection test carries precedential weight.”
(last two alterations in original) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting In re Adoption of Erin G., 140 P.3d 886,
890 (Alaska 2006)) (citing McDowell v. State, 785
P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989)).
In re Adoption of
An earlier case, In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d
Erin G., 140 P.3d 886, 973 (Alaska 1989) (plurality opinion), involves a
890 (Alaska 2006).
custody challenge by the non-Indian biological
mother of an Indian child to an adoption involving
the
biological
father
(through
artificial
insemination) who is Indian and not her spouse and
the biological mother’s sister. See id. at 974. The
question is whether the biological mother may
challenge an adoption proceeding under a federal
statute, § 1914 of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1914, or whether she is
foreclosed from doing so based on any of three
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alternative theories: (1) the incorporation into
ICWA of the Alaska statute of limitations absent
duress or fraud, (2) a judicially crafted Indian-family
exception to disallowing such challenges recognized
in New Jersey, as a basis for denying standing, or
(3) the concurrence’s newly crafted non-Indian
mother of an Indian child exception as an
alternative basis for denying standing. See id. at
974–77. The case is complicated by three factors:
(1) the plurality comprises two Justices, and the
concurrence and partial dissent are each on behalf
of a single Justice; (2) because the concurrence finds
no standing, it does not address the statute of
limitations issue; and (3) the partial dissent does not
address the concurrence’s novel standing analysis.
All four Justices reject the New Jersey theory
involving the non-Indian family exception, and
logically, all Justices would agree that for the
adoption challenge to succeed, all three bases for
disallowing the challenge must be rejected. Any
single theory is sufficient to disallow the adoption
challenge. Because all reject theory two, only the
statute of limitations and the non-Indian mother of
an Indian child standing theory are relevant. The
plurality (for two) disallows the challenge based on
statute of limitations; the concurrence (for one)
disallows the challenge based on the novel standing
theory. The partial dissent rejects the statute of
limitations theory without addressing the novel
standing theory. If we assume that had the
concurrence addressed it, it would reject the statute
of limitations theory, and that had the dissent
addressed it, it would accept the concurrence’s
novel standing theory, that would imply two justices
out of four reject each of the two relevant theories
advanced to bar the adoption challenge. The
conclusion in In re Adoption of Erin G. that the
narrowest grounds rule cannot be applied to In re
Adoption of T.N.F is therefore valid because, based
on reasonable assumptions, the case implicates
more than a single dimension, meaning the Marks
premise of a single dimension fails to hold.
The opinion states:
“We agree with David’s conclusion that T.N.F. does
not have stare decisis effect. . . . The United States
Supreme Court has held that ‘[w]hen a fragmented
court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds.’ But one federal court has noted that this
principle is inapplicable if there is no obvious
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‘narrower’ opinion or ‘common denominator of the
Court's reasoning.’ T.N.F. contains no ‘narrower’
reasoning agreed upon by all three affirming
justices.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)
(first quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193; and then
quoting Anker Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal
Co., 177 F.3d 161, 169–70 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Alaska has embraced language that
suggests considering the application
of Marks to its state highest court
decisions, but the Manning court
circumvents applying the reasoning
from the opinion it identifies as
narrower through
a doctrinal
exception, and the Erin G. court
U
Comments:
correctly
recognizes
that
the
doctrine’s premise does not apply in
the earlier T.N.F. case. Although
based on these cases one might
categorize Alaska as Y, given these
two uncertain applications, we take
the more cautious approach of
categorizing it as a U.
It does not appear that the Arizona Supreme Court
has considered Marks as applied to their own
fractured opinions; the databases show twelve cites
N/A
to Marks only to discern the narrowest holding in
Ariz.
U.S. Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., State v. Bush,
(appt.)
423 P.3d 370, 387 (Ariz. 2018); State v. Medina, 306
P.3d 48, 63 (Ariz. 2013).
Arizona has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
Byrd v. State, 879
In Byrd v. State, involving a criminal conviction for
S.W.2d 435, 438 (Ark. a misdemeanor by a six-person jury, Justice Brown
1994).
discusses the Minnesota Supreme Court case, State
v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988). Justice
Brown explains that the Minnesota Constitution is
similar to that of Arkansas in that both constitutions
“provide[] that the right to a jury trial [is] ‘inviolate’
but d[o] not state the number of jurors.” Byrd, 879
S.W.2d at 438. After explaining Justice Yetka’s
opinion, the Byrd majority describes Justice
Ark.
Kelley’s concurring opinion as being “on narrower
(elect.)
grounds.” Id. Whereas the Minnesota plurality
treats the twelve-person jury as inviolate, Justice
Kelley considers the permissibility of modifying it,
albeit only by state constitutional amendment. See
Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 387. Further, the Byrd
majority appears to accept Justice Kelley’s opinion,
stating “We agree and are reluctant to erode the
fundamental right of trial by jury under our system
of state government without a vote of the people,
particularly in light of Amendment 16 which
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installed nine-juror verdicts in civil cases and was a
clear recognition by the people of this State that
twelve-member juries was the standard.”
Byrd may shed light on how lower
courts should interpret plurality
decisions by the Arkansas Supreme
Court. The databases, however, do
not show Arkansas cases expressly
adopting the Marks rule for
Arkansas plurality decisions, as
U
Comments:
opposed to using the doctrine to
construe a nonmajority decision by
the Minnesota Supreme Court; the
case does not express a firm
commitment to applying the rule to
its own state highest court decisions.
People v.
Applying Marks to People v. Rodriguez, 290 P.3d
Villalpando, No.
1143 (Cal. 2012), and concluding that Justice
G045028, 2013 WL
Baxter’s “concurring opinion represents the
2366207, at *21–22
Rodriguez holding” because “Justice Baxter
(Cal. Ct. App. May
concurred in the Rodriguez judgment on the
30, 2013).
narrowest grounds”
People v. Rodriguez, “Because Justice Baxter concurred in the Rodriguez
No. G049977, 2015
judgment on the narrowest grounds, his concurring
WL 5231992, at *12
opinion represents the Rodriguez holding. When a
n.7 (Cal. Ct. App.
fragmented court decides a case and no single
Sept. 8, 2015).
rationale explaining the result enjoys a majority
assent, the court's holding may be viewed as the
position concurring in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.”
California appears to apply the
Comments:
Marks rule to its own nonmajority Y
opinions.
“Breckenridge’s reliance on Justice Coat’s plurality
Town of
decision in Expedia II is misplaced. ‘When a
Breckenridge v.
fragmented [c]ourt decides a case and no single
Egencia, LLC, 2018
COA 8, ¶ 38.
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent’ of a
majority of justices, ‘the holding of the [c]ourt may
be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.’ Accordingly, Justice Hood's concurrence
[on the narrowest grounds] in Expedia II is
instructive.” (first and second alterations in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193)
(citing City & Cnty. of Denver v. Expedia, Inc.
(Expedia II), 2017 CO 32).
Colorado appears to apply the Marks
Y
Comments:
rule to its own nonmajority opinions.
Conn. Coal. for Just. “[B]ecause Justice Palmer’s concurring opinion
provided the narrowest grounds of agreement, it
in Educ. Funding,
Inc. v. Rell, 176 A.3d was controlling.” (referring to the split opinion in
28, 36 (Conn. 2018). Conn. Coal. for Jus. in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell,
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990 A.2d 206 (Conn. 2010)).
Applying Marks to Luurtsema v. Comm’r of Corr.
(“Luurstema II”), 12 A.3d 817 (Conn. 2011), and
concluding “that the only parts of the plurality
opinion in Luurtsema II that have any precedential
value are the court’s affirmative answers to the
reserved questions of whether Salamon applies
retroactively in habeas corpus proceedings and to
Luurtsema’s case in particular. Those answers are
the narrowest grounds on which a majority of the
panel clearly agreed.” (citations omitted) (citing
State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008)).
Connecticut applies Marks to its state
Y
Comments:
court opinions.
The Delaware Supreme Court has five members
and generally hears cases in panels of three. See
DEL. SUP. CT. R. 2(a). The Delaware Supreme
Court hears cases en banc if the panel is unable to
reach a unanimous decision. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 4.
Accordingly, plurality decisions are rare, and it does
not appear that the Delaware courts have addressed
how to determine the holding of such fragmented
N/A
decisions. The Rules of the Supreme Court of
Del.
Delaware also do not address this question. See
(appt.)
DEL. SUP. CT. R. 2; DEL. SUP. CT. R. 4; The Supreme
Court of Delaware: Oral Arguments, DEL. CTS.,
https://courts.delaware.gov/help/proceedings/
supreme.aspx [https://perma.cc/BF49-CRV6]. Most
notable is Rule 4(d), Panel assignments and the
Court en Banc: Rehearing by Court.
Delaware has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
Cannon v. State, 206 “With a fragmented decision like [the Florida
So. 3d 831, 834 n.3
Supreme Court’s fractured Steinhorst v. State, 636
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1994) opinion], we are bound by the
Fla. 2016).
narrowest grounds on which a majority of the
(appt.)
justices agreed.”
Florida appears to apply the Marks
Y
Comments:
rule to its own nonmajority opinions.
Nuci Phillips Mem’l Under the section titled “The Implication of This
Case,” Justice Nahmias, writing a special
Found., Inc. v.
Athens-Clarke Cnty. concurrence, observes that the plurality opinion is
Bd. of Tax Assessors, narrower than his separate opinion and that the
703 S.E.2d 648, 653– plurality opinion will be precedent in future cases.
Justice Nahmias does not cite to Marks.
61 (Ga. 2010)
Ga. (Nahmias, J.,
(elect.) concurring specially).
This could be categorized as Y or U.
Although this only appears in a
U
Comments:
special concurrence, it is against the
interest of Justice Nahmias, who
asserts that the plurality opinion, not
Little v. Comm’r of
Corr., 172 A.3d 325,
339 (Conn. App. Ct.
2017).
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his own, controls as precedent. Even
so, we regard this an insufficient
datum to conclude definitively that
Georgia is applying the narrowest
grounds rule to its own fractured
state highest court opinions.
State v. Kikuta, 253
The Kikuta court declined to apply the narrowest
P.3d 639, 658 n.14
grounds doctrine to State v. Stenger, 226 P.3d 441
(Haw. 2011).
(Haw. 2010), stating: “[U]nder the doctrine set forth
in Marks v. United States, also known as the
‘narrowest grounds’ doctrine, . . . the holding of a
plurality opinion ‘may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.’ However,
that doctrine has been discredited. More
importantly, the doctrine has been applied very
rarely and inconsistently by the Supreme Court.”
(citations omitted) (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
The Court relied upon Justice Alito’s opinion in
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46
(1994), criticizing Marks as more easily stated than
applied.
The Hawaii Supreme Court declined
to apply the Marks rule to its own
N
Comments:
opinions regarding the doctrine as
“discredited.”
It does not appear that Idaho courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The research databases
reveal five cites to Marks by Idaho courts to either
discern the narrowest holding for U.S. Supreme
Court plurality opinions or on the separate issue of
N/A
retroactive application of laws. See, e.g., State v.
Wass, 396 P.3d 1243, 1248–49 (Idaho 2017); State v.
Stanfield, 347 P.3d 175, 184–85 (Idaho 2015); State
v. Shackelford, 247 P.3d 582, 601 n.8 (Idaho 2010).
The databases show no Idaho cases using the
narrowest grounds or similar language on their own
nonmajority opinions.
Idaho has not addressed or resolved
U
Comments:
this issue.
People v. Gutman,
Declining to apply Marks to a U.S. Supreme Court
2011 IL 110338, ¶ 25. opinion, by adopting Justice Alito’s dissenting
opinion in United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507
(2008), instead of Justice Stevens’s narrowest
grounds concurrence, stating “[u]nlike the federal
courts, we are not required to discern the meaning
of Justice Stevens’s concurrence and attempt to
apply it.”
This case is notable for two reasons.
U
Comments:
First, it addresses a U.S. Supreme
Court decision and appears to
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mistakenly claim that the narrowest
grounds rule binds only lower federal
courts with respect to such
nonmajority cases, rather than all
lower courts. Second, although it
does not definitively resolve the
matter, by rejecting the application of
Marks in a context in which it should
be applied, the Illinois Supreme
Court strongly implies that it would
decline to extend the doctrine to its
own case law. Although this could be
classified as N or U, because it does
not
specifically
address
the
application to state highest court
decisions, we classify this as U.
Harvey v. State, 719 “This court is obliged to follow precedents
N.E.2d 406, 410 n.4
established by the Indiana Supreme Court.
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999). However, no precedent for us to follow can be
drawn from Emery as it was affirmed by an equally
divided court in two separate opinions. Ordinarily,
following the procedure used to extract a rule of law
from a fragmented United States Supreme Court,
we would look for the ‘least common denominator’
among the justices and find ‘the position taken by
the [j]ustices who based their acquiescence in the
Ind.
decision on the narrowest grounds.’” (alteration in
(appt.)
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Frame v.
State, 587 N.E.2d 173, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992))
(citing Emery v. State, 717 N.E.2d 111 (Ind. 1999))
By “following the [same] procedure
used to extract a rule of law from a
fragmented United States Supreme
Y
Comments:
Court,” id., Indiana appears to apply
the Marks rule to its own
nonmajority opinions.
It does not appear that Iowa courts have considered
Marks as applied to their own highest court plurality
opinions. The research databases show four cites to
Marks by Iowa courts to discern the narrowest
holding for U.S. Supreme Court plurality opinions.
N/A
Iowa
See, e.g., Book v. Voma Tire Corp., 860 N.W.2d 576,
(appt.)
592 (Iowa 2015). The databases show no Iowa cases
using the narrowest grounds or similar language on
their own nonmajority opinions.
Iowa has not addressed or resolved
U
Comments:
this issue.
State v. Hoffman, 196 “The Kansas Supreme Court considered a case that
P.3d 939, 940–41
is factually similar to [the appellee’s] in State v.
Kan. (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). Fisher. A three-member plurality was joined by
(appt.)
another justice in concluding that the district court
properly suppressed evidence collected in a trash
pull from a rural residence. The plurality opinion

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-3\GWN301.txt

2021]

Seq: 101

MODELING NARROWEST GROUNDS

Comments:

Bailey v. Bertram,
No. 2009–SC–
000210–MR, 2010
WL 1641115, at *4
(Ky. Apr. 22, 2010).

Ky.
(elect.)

unknown

14-MAY-21

9:08

561

applied a two-part test. First, the court must
determine whether the trash was located within the
curtilage of the residence. . . . Second, if the trash is
located within the curtilage, the court must
determine ‘“whether the person manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in the trash
container and whether that expectation of privacy in
the garbage is objectively reasonable.’” . . . While
the view we’ve noted from Fisher was adopted by
only a plurality of three justices, it is consistent with
the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in
[California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)]. Thus,
the Fisher plurality’s conclusion seems to us equally
applicable to [the appellee’s] case.” (citations
omitted) (quoting State v. Fisher, 154 P.3d 455
(Kan. 2007)).
This case is of limited value because the quoted
language can be read either to imply general
reliance on the plurality in a nonmajority case or
specific reliance on the plurality because it accords
with a U.S. Supreme Court case’s reasoning.
There is insufficient data from which
to determine whether Kansas courts
rely on the plurality opinion in a
U
nonmajority case or have failed to
consider the application of the
narrowest grounds rule.
In Bailey, appellee, the marital father of a child in a
custody dispute, relied on the Kentucky Supreme
Court’s decision in J.N.R. v. O'Reilly, 264 S.W.3d
587 (Ky. 2008), to obtain a writ of prohibition that
disallowed mandated paternity testing, claiming
state statutes denied subject matter jurisdiction to
any court to determine paternity of a child where
there was no evidence or allegation that the marital
relationship ceased ten months prior to the child’s
birth. Bailey, 2010 WL 164115, at *2.
The Bailey court noted that in J.N.R., two justices
joined the main opinion, two justices separately
concurred in the result, and three justices dissented.
See id. at *4. The Court explained that “[w]hen a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
[four] Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds . . . .” Id. (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193). The
Bailey court further determined that under the
relevant caselaw, a nonmajority decision may not
overturn a past state highest court decision. Id. In
this instance, the relevant proposition on which
appellee relied was not expressed in the
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concurrence of four justices, comprising a majority.
The court ultimately determined this did not end
the matter, and it decided to allow required
paternity, rejecting a claim of equitable estoppel. Id.
The Kentucky Supreme Court states
that the narrowest grounds rule
controls its fractured decisions,
although as applied to the specific
case under review, this is dictum
because the application would
require
a
majority
decision
overturning a prior state highest
Y
court ruling. Even so, there is no
contrary evidence suggesting that in a
proper case the narrowest grounds
rule would fail to apply. Therefore,
although one might justifiably classify
as a U, given the absence of contrary
evidence, we are comfortable
classifying as a Y.
“A plurality opinion (consisting of less than four
votes at the Louisiana Supreme Court) ‘lack[s]
precedential authority.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Warren v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 20070492 (La. 12/2/08); 21 So. 3d 186, 210 (Knoll, J.,
concurring in the result)).

“In finding this to be an enforceable agreement, the
plurality opinion, in my view, ignores what could be
a chilling effect on pre-trial discussions between
district attorneys and defense attorneys, which
would be to the detriment of all parties in the
criminal justice system. Fortunately, as a plurality
decision, its holding is on the more narrow grounds
of the concurring justice.” (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at
La.
193).
(elect.)
“[W]hile I concur in the result reached by the
Warren v. La. Med.
majority dismissing plaintiffs’ [medical malpractice]
Mut. Ins. Co., 20070492 (La. 12/2/08); 21 suit, I disagree with the majority’s reliance upon the
plurality opinion in Borel v. Young, on rehearing,
So. 3d 186, 210
(Knoll, J., concurring which has no precedential authority to support the
in the result).
holding that the three-year provision in [the
Louisiana statute] is prescriptive, and its
reaffirmation of Hebert v. Doctors Memorial
Hospital. . . . I find plaintiffs’ action is perempted
[sic] by the clear language of the [Louisiana statute],
and write separately to reiterate my position on the
issue of the peremptive [sic] nature of [the statute’s]
three-year provision, which issue remained
unresolved in our jurisprudence in light of the lack
of precedential authority of the plurality opinion on
rehearing in Borel.” (citations omitted) (first citing
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Borel v. Young, 2007-0419 (La. 11/27/07); 989 So. 2d
42; and then citing Hebert v. Drs. Mem’l Hosp., 486
So. 2d 717 (La. 1986)).
In a footnote, Justice Knoll added: “Prior to the
majority’s reliance on Borel as authority, this
reaffirmation [of Hebert] had no precedential value
as Borel on rehearing was a plurality opinion.” See
id. at 210 n.1.
Although the Karey dissent appears
to support applying Marks to a
Louisiana
Supreme
Court
nonmajority opinion, the separate
Thompson and Warren opinions
U
suggest that such nonmajority
opinions lack precedential value.
Given the limited and seemingly
inconsistent authorities, Louisiana is
categorized as a U.
“[W]e had not precisely articulated the standard by
which petitions for de facto parental rights must be
evaluated until our recent opinion in Pitts v. Moore.
The plurality opinion in Pitts stated [that what] ‘[a]n
individual seeking parental rights as a de facto
parent must . . . show [according to a two-part
test].’ . . . Because we clarified the concepts
necessary for a determination of de facto
parenthood after the court denied [appellant’s]
petition for de facto parental rights, we remand the
case . . . in light of our opinion in Pitts.” (fourth
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 27, 90 A.3d 1169,
1179 (plurality opinion)) (citing Pitts, 2014 ME 59,
90 A.3d 1169).
The Pitts plurality is also the narrowest grounds
opinion. The plurality announced a two-part test for
determining de facto parenthood: (1) that the
person has undertaken a permanent, unequivocal,
committed, and responsible parental role in the
child's life, and (2) that there are exceptional
circumstances, which occur only when the
nonparent can show that harm to the child will
occur if he or she is not acknowledged as a de facto
parent. See Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 27, 90 A.3d 1169.
The concurrence determined that the state has a
compelling interest to intervene when a person has
shown the first factor above and that a showing of
harm to the child is not required. See id. ¶¶ 49–53
(Jabar, J., concurring). Finally, the dissent agreed
with the two-part test (caretaking parental role and
harm) but believed that the plurality reformulated
or added to these standards, thus lowering the bar.
See id. ¶¶ 66–72 (Levy, J., dissenting). The dissent is
therefore more demanding. Although this is

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-3\GWN301.txt

564

unknown

Seq: 104

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

14-MAY-21

9:08

[Vol. 89:461

narrowest, the Eaton court does not indicate that as
the basis for relying on the plurality decision.
Wood v. Wood, 407
“In the Pendexter case, what appeared to be the
A.2d 282, 284 n.2
opinion of the [Supreme Judicial Court of Maine]
(Me. 1979).
was signed by only one Justice. The opinion
denominated a concurring opinion was joined in by
three Justices. Thus, the principles enunciated in
this latter opinion are controlling because only four
Justices participated in the decision.” (citations
omitted) (citing Pendexter v. Pendexter, 363 A.2d
743, 745, 747–50 (Me. 1976))
Although the Eaton case relies on a
narrowest plurality opinion, it does
not state it is doing so on the basis of
U
Comments:
a Marks analysis; the substantially
earlier Wood case is likewise
unhelpful in resolving the question.
State v. Falcon, 152
Applying Marks to Schisler v. State, 907 A.2d 175
A.3d 687, 701, 707–08 (Md. 2006), and concluding that “careful
(Md. 2017).
examination of the opinion reveals that, in Schisler,
all seven of the judges of this Court agreed that the
General Assembly can end early the terms of
incumbent members of a commission, regardless of
who they are appointed by.”
“As to plurality opinions, this Court has applied the
[Marks] test for determining the precedential value
of a case that lacks a majority opinion by the
Supreme Court . . . . This approach is known as the
‘Marks approach,’ after Marks v. United States . . . .”
(citation omitted).
In re Nick H., 123
“Because Doe I is a plurality decision, we employ
A.3d 229, 238–39
the Marks Rule to determine the Court’s
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. holding . . . . Thus the Marks Rule requires us to
2015).
determine the common thread running through the
Md.
plurality and concurring opinions of Doe I.” (citing
(appt.)
Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. (Doe I),
62 A.3d 123 (Md. 2013)).
“Because the Marks Rule directs us to the
narrowest ground common to the plurality and the
concurrence, Judge McDonald’s interpretations of
Article 17 [of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights] . . . represents the ‘position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgment on the
narrowest grounds.’” (quoting Wilkerson v. State,
24 A.3d 703, 715 (Md. 2011)) (citing MARYLAND
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVII).
“[B]ecause the ‘disadvantage’ standard used by the
Quispe del Pino v.
plurality in applying Article 17 [of the Maryland
Md. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety & Corr. Servs., Declaration of Rights] ‘did not command not
command a majority of the Court, the holding of
112 A.3d 522, 530
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Doe [I] must be viewed as the narrower position
2015).
taken by Judges McDonald and Adkins.’” (third
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alteration in original) (citing MARYLAND
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVII).
Applying Marks to Miller v. State, 77 A.3d 1030
(Md. 2013), which had no majority opinion, and
concluding the Judge Battaglia’s plurality opinion in
that case represented the narrowest holding.
Analyzing what the Maryland Courts termed a
“fractured” opinion and adopting the reasoning of
Judge Wilner’s dissent in Brown v. State, 817 A.2d
241, 255 (Md. 2003) (Wilner, J., dissenting), which
constituted the narrowest grounds, and held that
“[f]or purposes of stare decisis, we note this is a
proposition that garnered the support of the four
Judges in Brown.”
Applying a Marks-like rule to Prout v. State, 535
A.2d 445, 450–51 (Md. 1998), in which “the three
judge plurality believed that the issue of whether a
particular crime bears on credibility should be
viewed as a matter of trial court discretion. But the
two concurring judges and two dissenting judges
[i.e., four judges] each thought that the question was
a matter of law.” (The Giddens court cited Prout as
precedent for holding that this issue was a matter of
law but did not cite to Marks.)
Maryland applies Marks to discern
the narrowest holding in its state
court opinion. The chart does not
include
several
additional
Y
unpublished opinions expressing this
point. See, e.g., Feaster v. State, No.
1967, 2015 WL 9590659, at *5 n.3
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 30, 2015).
“The Cote-Whitacre decision consists of five
different opinions . . . . The court thus [did] not
present a majority opinion as to the rule of law to be
applied in determining whether same-sex marriage
is prohibited in another state [within the meaning of
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 11, 12 (repealed
2008)]. In Marks v. United States, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that when a divided Court provides no
majority rationale for its decision, ‘“the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds . . . .’ On the issue of
statutory construction, Chief Justice Marshall’s
concurring opinion in Cote-Whitacre articulates the
narrowest grounds for the judgment of the
court. . . . Chief
Justice
Marshall’s
statutory
construction, as the position of the court concurring
in the judgment on the narrowest grounds, thus
represents the holding of the court on that issue.”
(fourth alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193) (citing Cote-
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Whitacre v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623
(Mass. 2006)).
Medina v. Hochberg, Applying Marks to Coombes v. Florio, 877 N.E.2d
987 N.E.2d 1206,
567 (Mass. 2007), and concluding that the holding
1211 n.11 (Mass.
“represents the narrowest position of the court,
2013).
where Justice Ireland (joined by Justices Spina and
Cowin) issued a concurring opinion, and Justice
Greaney issued an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.”
Massachusetts applies Marks to
discern the narrowest holding in its Y
Comments:
state court opinions.
Liquia v. Antler Bar In a personal injury action arising from hitting an
obstruction arising from the ground at night,
Amusements, LLC,
No. 348087, 2020 WL defendant argued that the open and obvious
4381870, at *4 (Mich. doctrine absolved it of any duty to the plaintiff. See
Liquia, 2020 WL 4381870, at *2. In support of this
Ct. App. July 30,
2020).
argument, the defendant relied on a plurality
opinion from the Michigan Supreme Court,
Singerman v. Municipal Service Bureau, 565 N.W.2d
383 (Mich. 1997). Id. at *5. However, the Michigan
Court of Appeals noted that it is not bound by
plurality decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court.
Id.
Auto Club Grp. Ins. Auto Club involved an action for a declaratory
Co. v. Booth, 797
judgment by an insurance company arguing that the
N.W.2d 695 (Mich.
defendant’s homeowner’s policy did not cover the
Ct. App. 2010).
defendant’s actions in an accidental shooting at his
home. See Auto Club, 797 N.W.2d at 696–976.
Defendant relied on Allstate Insurance Co. v.
McCarn, 645 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. 2002), in arguing
that he was entitled to coverage based on a twoMich.
prong test devised by the Michigan Supreme Court.
(elect.)
Auto Club, 797 N.W.2d at 976. But in Auto Club,
the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that there was
no majority in McCarn and that plurality opinions in
which no majority of the participating justices agree
with respect to the reasoning are not considered
authoritative interpretations binding under the
doctrine of stare decisis. Id. at 699.
Negri v. Slotkin, 244 “[The Court of Appeals’s] reliance [on People v.
N.W.2d 98, 99–100
Jackson, 212 N.W.2d 918 (Mich. 1973)] was
(Mich. 1976).
misplaced. In Jackson we considered the impact on
this Court of a case in which a majority of the
justices sitting failed to concur in the reasoning for
the decisions. . . . Plurality decisions in which no
majority of the justices participating agree as to the
reasoning are not an authoritative interpretation
binding on this Court under the doctrine of stare
decisis.” (footnote omitted).
People v. Jackson,
“Since neither [the plurality or dissenting] opinion
212 N.W.2d 918, 921 [in People v. Thomas, 197 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 1972)]

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-3\GWN301.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 107

MODELING NARROWEST GROUNDS

(Mich. 1973).

14-MAY-21

9:08

567

obtained four signatures, neither is binding under
the doctrine of stare decisis.”
People v. Anderson, “The clear rule in Michigan is that a majority of the
205 N.W.2d 461, 467 Court must agree on a ground for decision in order
(Mich. 1973).
to make that binding precedent for future cases. If
there is merely a majority for a particular result,
then the parties to the case are bound by the
judgment but the case is not authority beyond the
immediate parties.”
It does not appear that Michigan
applies Marks to its state court
opinions. Also, lower courts are not
N
Comments:
bound by plurality decisions more
generally.
State v. Andersen,
“Recently, in State v. Stein, we addressed the
784 N.W.2d 320, 329– standard of review in circumstantial evidence cases.
30 (Minn. 2010).
In a three-justice plurality opinion, we said that
when reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence, ‘our first task is to identify the
circumstances proved.’ . . . Our second step is to
‘examine independently the reasonableness of all
inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved.’ . . . We conclude that [the
plurality] is the proper approach . . . .” (citation
omitted) (first quoting State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d
709, 718 (Minn. 2010) (plurality opinion); and then
quoting id. at 716) (citing Stein, 776 N.W.2d at 714).
Although the court applies the plurality, this
Minn.
appears to be based on persuasiveness, not based on
(elect.)
a rejection of the narrowest grounds rule, which
isn’t discussed.
It does not appear that Minnesota
courts have considered Marks as
applied to nonmajority opinions by
the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Rather, the courts seem to simply
U
rely on the plurality’s opinion
Comments:
without expressly rejecting the
application of the narrowest grounds
rule in this context. Given the limited
information, we classify Minnesota
with a U.
Puckett v. State,
Rejecting reliance on the plurality opinion in
2000-DR-01077-SCT Booker v. State, 699 So. 2d 132 (Miss. 1997)
(¶ 9) (Miss. 2002).
(plurality opinion), as it “is not binding authority
and has no precedential value as a plurality
opinion.”
Miss.
(elect.) Buffington v. State,
Rejecting reliance on Wolfe v. State, 98-KA-000472001-KA-00325-SCT SCT (Miss. 1999), because “a majority of all sitting
(¶ 15) (Miss. 2002).
judges is required to create precedent, and
therefore, it follows that a plurality vote [in Wolfe]
does ‘not create a binding result.’” (quoting
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Churchill, 619 So. 2d 900, 904 (Miss. 1993) (en
banc)).
Churchill v. Pearl
“[I]t is a logical conclusion for this Court to
River Basin Dev.
recognize that a plurality vote does not create a
Dist., 619 So. 2d 900, binding result. The narrowest holding in Presley, in
904 (Miss. 1993) (en which a majority of the sitting justices concurred,
banc).
was that Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-6 is
unconstitutional. As there is no majority vote for
Part II, we can only note that it has no precedential
value.” (first citing Presley v. Miss. State Highway
Comm’n, 608 So. 2d 1288 (Miss. 1992) (en banc);
and then citing MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-46-6 (1992)
(repealed 1992)).
Part of the substantive ruling in Churchill, holding
that a sovereign defendant is estopped from
asserting sovereign immunity if it purchases public
liability insurance, has been superseded by MISS.
CODE ANN. § 11-46-17(4) (2021). See L.W. v.
McComb Separate Mun. Sch. Dist., 97-CA-01465SCT (¶¶ 32–34) (Miss. 1999). This did not change
the court’s conclusion that a plurality opinion does
not create binding precedent.
Morgan v. City of
“In Presley, this Court held Section 11-46-6
Ruleville, 627 So. 2d unconstitutional. However, there is a question as to
275, 278 (Miss. 1993). whether this decision should be applied
retroactively or prospectively. . . . [In] Part II of the
decision in Presley, four justices agreed to apply it
prospectively, three justices wanted to apply it
retroactively,
and
two
justices
dissented
altogether. . . . [A]ssuming that Part II of Presley
received a plurality vote, it still cannot be used as
authority to apply Part I of Presley in the instant
case. . . . ‘[W]hen no single rationale commands a
majority, “the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those members who
concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds.”[’] . . . The narrowest holding in Presley is
simply that Miss.[ ]Code Ann. § 11-46-6 is
unconstitutional. This holding is the only point of
Presley which has precedential value.” (citation
omitted) (quoting Churchill, 619 So. 2d at 903) (first
citing Presley, 608 So. 2d 1288; and then citing MISS.
CODE. ANN. § 11-46-6).
The Morgan case, in 1993, relied on
the narrowest grounds rule, but the
more recent Puckett and Buffington
cases make plain that nonmajority
decisions do not hold precedential
N
Comments:
status. Professors Richard Re and
Saul Levmore have, in separate
works, treated this state as applying
the narrowest grounds rule based
upon their analyses of the 1993
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Morgan case. See Re, supra note 11,
at 1961 n.116; Saul Levmore, Ruling
Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities,
3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 87,
96 n.18 (2002). Based on the more
recent Mississippi cases presented in
the chart, we treat this state as
rejecting that rule, and thus
categorize as N.
May v. Greater Kan. “This point [that a nonviable fetus is not a person
City Dental Soc’y,
for purposes of a wrongful death action] is
863 S.W.2d 941, 948– controlled by Rambo v. Lawson, in which the court
49 (Mo. Ct. App.
held that the plaintiff could not state a claim for the
1993).
wrongful death of an unborn child. . . . ‘In Rambo, a
plurality of this Court ruled that the term person
does not include a nonviable fetus, and therefore, a
civil cause of action for the wrongful death of a
nonviable fetus will not lie.’ The Rambo decision
controls and decides this point against [the]
plaintiff . . . .” (citations omitted) (quoting State v.
Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345, 349 (Mo. 1992) (en banc))
(citing Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo.
1990) (en banc) (plurality opinion)).
The substantive ruling in Rambo is superseded by
statute such that a wrongful death action now
Mo.
includes the death of a nonviable fetus. See MO.
(appt.)
REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2020); Connor v. Monkem Co.,
898 S.W.2d 89, 92–93 (Mo. 1995) (en banc). This did
not affect reliance upon the plurality opinion in
construing a nonmajority case.
It does not appear that Missouri
courts have considered Marks as
applied to plurality opinions by the
Supreme Court of Missouri. Rather,
in this relatively early case from 1993,
U
the Missouri Court of Appeals
Comments:
seemed simply to rely on the
plurality’s opinion in a nonmajority
ruling but without directly addressing
the applicability of the narrowest
grounds rule.
It does not appear that Montana courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The research databases
only reveal two cites to Marks in cases involving the
separate issue of retroactive application of laws. See
N/A
State v. Goebel, 2001 MT 155, ¶¶ 18–23, 306 Mont.
Mont.
83, 31 P.3d 340; State v. Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000,
(elect.)
1012 (Mont. 1979). The databases show no Montana
cases using the narrowest grounds or similar
language.
Montana has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
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Nebraska courts appear not to have considered
Marks as applied to their own highest court plurality
opinions. The research databases reveals only one
cite to Marks, which declines to apply Marks to a
federal case. See State v. Dubray, 854 N.W.2d 584,
611 & n.80 (Neb. 2014) (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at
N/A
193) (declining to apply Marks to Montana v.
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), to adopt the reasoning
of Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion and
claiming that resolving Marks as applied to the
immediate case “is unnecessary to deciding this
appeal”).
Nebraska has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
It does not appear that Nevada courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own state
highest court plurality opinions. The research
databases reveal only three cites to Marks,
construing the narrowest holding in federal cases or
N/A
determining the unrelated question of retroactive
application of laws. See, e.g., Stevens v. Warden,
Nev. State Prison, 969 P.2d 945, 948 (Nev. 1998);
Marlow v. Baca, No. CR13-0660, 2017 Nev. Dist.
LEXIS 1921, at *11 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Dec. 26, 2017).
Nevada has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
It does not appear that New Hampshire courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The research databases
N/A
reveal only one cite to Marks dealing with the
retroactive application of laws. See State v. Hayes,
389 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.H. 1978).
New Hampshire has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
Tretina Printing, Inc. This complex case involves the Supreme Court of
New Jersey addressing its earlier ruling, Perini
v. Fitzpatrick &
Corp. v Great Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d
Assocs., Inc., 640
364 (N.J. 1992) (plurality opinion), governing the
A.2d 788, 796 (N.J.
terms under which an arbitration award may be
1994) (Clifford, J.,
concurring).
revisited on judicial review. Id. at 366. Relying on a
New Jersey statute, a Perini plurality found a basis
in law for the award of damages resulting from a
delay in contract performance, notwithstanding
substantial performance. See id. at 383. The dissent,
applying the same standard, did not find such a basis
in law, and would, instead, have sustained the lower
court decision modifying the arbitration award. Id.
at 403 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Chief Justice’s concurrence determined
that only in the event of egregious error is an
arbitration award subject to judicial modification.
Id. at 399 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring). The Supreme
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Court of New Jersey in Tretina v. Fitzpatrick &
Assocs., once more, fractured but a majority
coalesced on the Chief Justice’s view set out in
Perini. Trentina Printing, 640 A.2d at 792–93
(plurality opinion). The Tretina plurality opinion
did not cite to Marks, whereas Justice Clifford, who
changed his views to that of the Perini Chief Justice,
did. Id. at 797 (Clifford, J., concurring). In doing so,
Justice Clifford identified the Chief Justice’s Perini
concurrence as controlling, but read that opinion
narrowly, as restricting judicial review of arbitration
awards without necessarily setting out a clear
standard. Id.
Because this case involved a state
highest court revisiting its own earlier
decision, rather than a lower court
construing a fractured state highest
court decision, whether Marks
applies to the state highest court
U
Comments:
decisions
remains
formally
unresolved. Despite this, it appears
that a majority of the New Jersey
Supreme Court justices embrace the
logic of Marks as applied to that
court’s decisions. This is marked with
a U, but is leaning toward a Y.
It does not appear that New Mexico courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The research databases
show only two cites to Marks in cases applying
N/A
Marks to a federal case or the retroactive
N.M.
application of laws. See, e.g., State v. Norush, 642
(appt.)
P.2d 1119, 1121 (N.M. 1982); State v. Bullcoming,
226 P.3d 1, 8 (N.M. 2010).
New Mexico has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
“Following analogous precedent pertaining to
People v. Brown, 7
plurality opinions by the United States Supreme
N.Y.S.3d 19, 21–22
Court, we apply the narrower approach of Judge
(N.Y. App. Div.
2015).
Graffeo [in People v. Sibblies, 8 N.E.3d 852, 855
(N.Y. 2014)], which leaves intact the well-settled law
that a post-certificate assertion that the People are
not ready does not, by itself, vitiate the previously
filed certificate of readiness” (citing Marks, 430 U.S.
N.Y.
at 193).
(appt.)
People v. Joseph, 999 “Judge Statsinger [in People v. McLeod, 988
N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2014)] reasoned that
N.Y.S.2d 320, 323
in cases where a plurality opinion from an appellate
(N.Y. Crim. Ct.
2014).
court results in no clear ruling, the trial court must
follow the more narrow reasoning: ‘the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds.’” (quoting McLeod, 988
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N.Y.S.2d at 439).
“While the Court of Appeals has not adopted a
similar rule [as in Marks], it has expressly
recognized that this is indeed the appropriate means
of construing a fragmented decision of the United
States Supreme Court. It seems more than
reasonable, then, to assume that the Court of
Appeals would apply the same rule of construction
to its own decisions in the rare case where there is
no single rationale adopted by at least four judges.”
(citation omitted).
New York applies the Marks rule to
Y
Comments:
its state court opinions.
Grantham v.
“According to Justice Newby in his dissent [in
Crawford, 693 S.E.2d Crocker v. Roethling, 675 S.E.2d 625 (N.C. 2009)],
245, 250 n.1 (N.C. Ct. ‘Justice Martin’s opinion, having the narrower
App. 2010).
directive, is the controlling opinion . . . and requires
the trial court to conduct a voir dire examination of
the proffered expert witness.’” (quoting Crocker,
675 S.E.2d at 635 n.1 (Newby, J., dissenting)).
Crocker v. Roethling, “The separate opinions of Justice Martin and
675 S.E.2d 625, 635
Justice Hudson, when taken together, constitute a
n.1 (N.C. 2009)
majority of the Court in favor of reversing and
(Newby, J.,
remanding. Justice Martin’s opinion, having the
dissenting).
narrower directive, is the controlling opinion, and
requires the trial court to conduct a voir dire
examination of the proffered expert witness.
N.C.
References in this dissenting opinion to ‘the
majority’ denote matters as to which the opinions of
(elect.)
Justices Martin and Hudson seem to agree. When
responding to one of those opinions separately, this
dissenting opinion will refer to the authoring Justice
by name.” (citation omitted) (citing Marks, 430 U.S.
at 193).
North Carolina applies the Marks
rule to its state court opinions.
Notably, this is first demonstrated in
a dissenting opinion, but it then
forms the basis for a subsequent Y
Comments:
ruling in the North Carolina Court of
Appeals construing the relevant
North Carolina Supreme Court
opinion in which that dissent appears.
It does not appear that North Dakota courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The research databases
N/A
show one cite to Marks in a case applying Marks to
N.D.
a federal case. See State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 175
(elect.)
(N.D. 1985).
North Dakota has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
N/A
It does not appear that Ohio courts have considered
Ohio
People v. McLeod,
988 N.Y.S.2d 436, 439
(N.Y. Crim. Ct.
2014).
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Marks as applied to their own highest court plurality
opinions. The research databases reveal twentyseven cites to Marks in cases applying the narrowest
grounds rule to federal cases or related to the
retroactive application of laws. See, e.g., State v.
Adams, 144 Ohio St. 3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45
N.E.3d 127, 169, at ¶¶ 252–56.
Ohio has not addressed or resolved
U
Comments:
this issue.
It does not appear that Oklahoma courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The research databases
reveal seven cites to Marks in cases applying the
N/A
narrowest grounds rule to federal cases or related to
Okla.
the retroactive application of laws. See, e.g., In re
(appt.)
Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642,
838 P.2d 1, 5 n.8 (Okla. 1992).
Oklahoma has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
It does not appear that Oregon courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The research databases
reveal six cites to Marks in cases applying the
narrowest grounds rule to federal cases. See, e.g., In
N/A
re Validation Proc. to Determine the Regularity &
Or.
Legality of Multnomah Cnty. Home Rule Charter
(elect.)
Section 11.60 & Implementing Ordinance No. 1243
Regulating Campaign Fin. & Disclosure, 462 P.3d
706, 724 (Or. 2020) (en banc).
Oregon has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
Commonwealth v.
Applying Marks to Commonwealth ex rel.
McClelland, 233 A.3d Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1990),
717, 731–32 (Pa.
and concluding, “We have little difficulty in stating
2020).
with certainty that five Justices in Verbonitz agreed
a prima facie case cannot be established by hearsay
evidence alone, and the common rationale among
those Justices involved due process considerations.”
Commonwealth v.
“We begin our analysis by observing again that
Alexander, 243 A.3d Gary was not a majority decision but rather an
177, 197 (Pa. 2020).
opinion announcing the judgment of the court. See
Pa.
210 Pa. Code § 63.4(B)(3) (‘An opinion shall be
(elect.)
designated as the “Opinion Announcing the
Judgment of the Court” when it reflects only the
mandate, and not the rationale, of a majority of
Justices.’). . . . We apply the Marks Rule.” (citing
Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014)).
McNeil v. Jordan, 894 “Pursuant to the narrowest reasoning uniting a
A.2d 1260, 1279 (Pa. majority of the justices participating in this case, and
2006).
the opinion of Mr. Justice Saylor, given the facts of
this case the trial court is directed to assess whether
Henry Jr. can establish probable cause that his
(elect.)
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requested discovery will permit the filing of a
complaint capable of surviving a demurrer in the
instant litigation and to rule accordingly.”
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
“Applying this [Marks] analysis to the present case,
Hardy v. Southland
Corp., 645 A.2d 839, it would seem that we would be obligated to apply
the modified assumption of the risk doctrine as set
842 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994).
forth in the lead Howell opinion.” (citing Howell v.
Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107 (Pa. 1993)).
Pennsylvania applies Marks to
construe the narrowest holding in
Y
Comments:
their
state
court
nonmajority
opinions.
It does not appear that Rhode Island courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The databases reveal two
cases applying the narrowest grounds doctrine to
N/A
federal cases. See State v. Nordstrom, 529 A.2d 107,
111 n.1 (R.I. 1987); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104,
1108 (R.I. 1987).
Rhode Island has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
It does not appear that South Carolina courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The research databases
reveal two cites to Marks by South Carolina courts
N/A
applying the narrowest grounds rule to federal
cases. See State v. Harrison, 741 S.E.2d 727, 732
(S.C. 2013); State v. Key, 848 S.E.2d 315, 319–20,
319 n.2 (S.C. 2020).
South Carolina has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
State v. Guthrie, 2001 “As there is no majority opinion regarding the
rationale for adjudication of this issue, resolution of
SD 61, ¶ 96, 627
the conflicting theories set forth in the various
N.W.2d 401, 434
writings of this case await a future decision of this
(Gilbertson, J.,
Court.” As indicated by Justice Gilberston’s
concurring in part
concurring opinion, South Dakota has not yet
and concurring in
result in part).
resolved how to construe its nonmajority opinions.
Other than Guthrie, the databases reveal only one
additional case citing Marks and applying the
narrowest grounds rule to a federal case. See State
v. Plastow, 2015 SD 100, ¶ 22 n.9, 873 N.W.2d 222,
230 n.9.
South Dakota has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
It does not appear that Tennessee courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The research databases
N/A
reveal sixteen cites to Marks by Tennessee courts
applying the narrowest grounds rule to federal cases
and to assess the retroactive application of laws. See,
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e.g., State v. Feaster, 466 S.W.3d 80, 85 (Tenn.
2015).
Tennessee has not addressed or
U
resolved this issue.
“But a fractured decision may constitute binding
authority if, and to the extent that, a majority
holding can be ascertained from the various
opinions in the case. Even if the rationales seem
disparate, if a majority of the judges agree on a
particular narrow ground for or rule of decision,
then that ground or rule may be viewed as the
holding of the court. With respect to Blue, it is not
possible to ascertain a majority holding or the
narrowest ground or rule that commands a majority
of the court.” (footnote omitted) (citing Blue v.
State, 41 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en
banc)).
In Blue v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas reversed and remanded a conviction
following a trial judge’s informing the jury of a
possible prior plea deal, which the defendant
rejected, and implying that trying a criminal
defendant suggests guilt. See Blue, 41 S.W.3d at
130–32 (plurality opinion). The Blue court fractured
with four separate opinions, three of which are
relevant to the narrowest grounds analysis. The
opinion issuing the judgment comprised of four
votes, and the dissent comprised of three votes. See
id. at 129. Two judges concurred in the judgment,
and one member joining the opinion issuing the
judgment separately concurred, seeking to narrow
the reach of the plurality ruling. See id. at 133
(Meyers, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
(Mansfield, J., concurring); id. at 135 (Keasler, J.,
concurring in the judgment). (This implicated issues
related to Washington v. Glucksburg and Shlup v.
Delo.) This case, which is two dimensional, can be
simplified as turning on two controlling issues: (1) Is
the Texas court able to reverse and remand, despite
the defendant’s failure to object to the trial judge’s
comments, based on fundamental error without
evaluating the case under Texas evidentiary rules?;
(2) Applying the Texas evidentiary rules, does the
defendant’s failure to object preclude review on
appeal only if the claimed basis for error involves an
evidentiary ruling? See id. at 130–31 (plurality
opinion). The plurality rested on a combination of
federal and state cases finding foundational error
without applying the Texas evidentiary rules. See id.
at 132–33. The concurrence in the judgment
determined that it must apply the state evidentiary
rules but reasoned that those rules—intended to
capture, not change, prior state law—permitted a
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reversal even when the identified error is not
evidentiary. See id. at 136–137 (Keasler, J.,
concurring in the judgment). The dissent rejected
the first theory, claiming that the reversal may not
rest on general state or federal precedents but must
be assessed based upon state evidentiary rules.
Also, the dissent rejected the concurrence in the
judgment, claiming that raising the challenge was
procedurally foreclosed by state evidentiary rules.
See id. at 142–43 (Keller, J., dissenting). All judges
agreed that to reverse and remand, the court must
either apply a general fundamental error analysis or
determine that the state evidentiary rules do not
procedurally foreclose the appeal. See id. at 131
(plurality opinion); id. at 134 (Mansfield, J.,
concurring); id. at 136–37 (Keasler, J., concurring in
the judgment); id. at 142–44 (Keller, J., dissenting).
If those joining the opinion issuing the judgment
would agree that when applying those rules the
claim is procedurally foreclosed, and if those
concurring in the judgment would agree that there is
no independent basis beyond state evidentiary rules
for the appeal, then separate majorities would reject
each claimed basis for relief, supporting the
inference that the case is two dimensional and thus,
the premise of Marks fails to apply.
Ervin v. State, 331
“When an appellate court decides a case without
S.W.3d 49, 53 (Tex.
issuing a majority opinion providing a single
App. 2010).
rationale explaining the result, the majority holding
is the position taken by those members who
concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds.”
Haynes v. State, 273 “[W]e do not agree with the State that Collier
S.W.3d 183, 187 (Tex. contains no majority holding. Judge Keasler’s
Crim. App. 2008)
concurring opinion in Collier sets out a majority
(plurality opinion).
holding, because this opinion does contain the
narrowest ground upon which five of the judges
concurring in the judgment in Collier agreed.”
(citing Collier v. State, 999 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999)).
Texas applies Marks to their state
court opinions to discern the
Y
Comments:
narrowest holding for precedential
value.
It does not appear that Utah courts have considered
Marks as applied to their own highest court plurality
opinions. The research databases reveal two cites to
Utah
Marks by Utah courts applying the narrowest
N/A
grounds rule to federal cases. See, e.g., Midvale City
(appt.)
Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, 73 P.3d 334; State v.
Anderson, 2020 UT App 135, 475 P.3d 967 (Utah
Ct. App. 2020).
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Utah has not addressed or resolved
U
this issue.
It does not appear that Vermont courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The research databases
reveal three cites to Marks by Vermont courts
applying the narrowest grounds rule to federal cases
N/A
or related to the separate issue of the retroactive
application of laws. See, e.g., State v. Fleurie, 2008
VT 118, 185 Vt. 29, 968 A.2d 326; State v. Porter,
671 A.2d 1280 (Vt. 1996); State v. Lafountain, 628
A.2d 1243 (Vt. 1993).
Vermont has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
It does not appear that Virginia courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The research databases
reveal eleven cites to Marks by Virginia courts
N/A
applying the narrowest grounds rule to federal cases
or related to the separate issue of the retroactive
application of laws. See, e.g., Secret v.
Commonwealth, 819 S.E.2d 234 (Va. 2018).
Virginia has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
“In Washington, ‘[w]hen there is no majority
State v. Ruem, 313
P.3d 1156, 1170 & n.7 opinion, the holding is the narrowest ground upon
which a majority agreed.’ Therefore, when the
(Wash. 2013) (en
rationale for a dissent more closely aligns with the
banc) (Johnson, J.,
lead opinion on a certain issue, that rationale forms
concurring in part
the court’s holding as to that issue.” (alteration in
and dissenting in
part).
original) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Francis,
242 P.3d 866 (Wash. 2010)).
In a footnote, Justice Johnson adds:
“I see no reason for this court to follow th[e]
[Marks] rule because of the significant differences
between this court and our federal counterpart. We
are elected directly by the people rather than
appointed. . . . Just because my conscience will not
allow me to sign an opinion that reverses Ruem’s
conviction does not invalidate my opinion that
Justice Stephens’ Ferrier holding correctly states the
law in Washington.”
“The State’s reliance on Shale is also misguided
In re Francis, 242
because there was no majority opinion in Shale; the
P.3d 866, 873 n.7
portion of the lead opinion upon which the State
(Wash. 2010) (en
banc).
relies has no precedential value. The four-justice
lead opinion and four-justice concurrence agreed
only in the result . . . . When there is no majority
opinion, the holding is the narrowest ground upon
which a majority agreed.” (citing In re Shale, 158
P.3d 588 (Wash. 2007) (en banc)).
Davidson v. Henson, “When there is no majority agreement as to the
Comments:

Vt.
(appt.)
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rationale for a decision, the holding of the court is
the position taken by those concurring on the
narrowest grounds.” (citing State v. Zakel, 812 P.2d
512 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)).
Washington courts appear to follow
the Marks rule although there is a
recent separate opinion by Justice
Johnson, writing separately and
calling into question whether state
courts should follow their “federal Y
Comments:
counterpart.” This appears to be a
minority position and contrary to
practice in the state. The overall
weight of authority appears to
support a Y.
“Inasmuch as I concur in the result only as it
Constellium Rolled
Prods. Ravenswood, pertains to punitive damages and do not concur in
LLC v. Griffith, 775 the rationale advanced by the author, the analysis as
S.E.2d 90, 104 n.1 (W. to punitive damages does not ‘enjoy[ ] the assent’ of
Va. 2015) (Loughry, three Justices and is therefore, as to that aspect, a
J., concurring, in part plurality opinion.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
and dissenting, in
W. Va. part).
(elect.)
Other than Justice Loughry’s
opinion, which refers to Marks in
explaining that he concurs only in the
result, not the rationale, it does not
Comments:
U
appear that West Virginia courts
have considered Marks as applied to
their nonmajority opinions.
State v. Weber, 2016 “I use the term ‘lead’ opinion for two reasons. First,
WI 961, ¶ 83 n.1, 372 I am concerned that without this cue, the reader
Wis. 2d 202, 887
may mistakenly believe that the lead opinion has
N.W.2d 554 (Bradley, any precedential value. Although four justices join
J., dissenting).
in the mandate of the opinion to reverse the court of
appeals (Zeigler, J., joined by Roggensack, C.J.,
Gableman, J.[,] and Kelly, J.), it represents the
reasoning of only three justices . . . . Second, I use
the term ‘lead’ opinion because although it is
undefined in our Internal Operating Procedures, its
use here is consistent with past description. We have
Wis.
said ‘that a lead opinion is one that states (and
(elect.)
agrees with) the mandate of a majority of justices,
but represents the reasoning of less than a majority
of the participating justices.’” (quoting State v.
Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 143, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885
N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson & Bradley, JJ., concurring
in part, dissenting in part)).
State v. Lynch, 2016 Declining to discern a narrowest holding from State
WI 66, ¶ 7 n.9, 371
v. Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), as
Wis. 2d 1, 885
modified by State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d
N.W.2d 89.
356, 646 N.W.2d 298, concluding, “[W]hile five
Justices would reverse the decision of the court of
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appeals—in whole or in part—no more than three
Justices can agree on the same rationale or result.
As a result, the law remains as the court of appeals
has articulated it.”
State v. Deadwiller,
“This court has followed Marks in applying plurality
2013 WI 75, ¶ 55, 834 opinions of the United States Supreme Court and in
applying plurality decisions of this court.”
N.W.2d 362
(Abrahamson, C.J.,
concurring).
DeBruin v. St.
“There is no majority opinion of this
Patrick
court. . . . Accordingly, because no opinion has
Congregation, 2012
garnered the vote of four justices, nothing set forth
in any of the opinions has precedential value.”
WI 94, ¶ 98, 816
N.W.2d 878 (Bradley,
J., dissenting).
Town of Madison v. “The lead opinion, coupled with the concurrence’s
Cnty. of Dane, 2008 vote to reverse the court of appeals, decides the
WI 83, ¶ 48 n.5, 752
outcome in this dispute between the Town of
N.W.2d 260
Madison and Dane County. The lead opinion has no
(Roggensack, J.,
precedential value because the concurrence does
dissenting).
not join the lead opinion’s statutory interpretation.”
Wisconsin employs “lead opinions”
when there is no majority; opinions
bearing that designation do not
necessarily express the holding on
the narrowest grounds. Two Justices
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court
define lead opinion as “one that
states (and agrees with) the mandate
of a majority of justices, but
represents the reasoning of less than
a majority of the participating
justices.” Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 143
(Abrahamson & Bradley, JJ.,
concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
U
Comments:
Among practitioners, there has been
a recognized push for Wisconsin
courts to resolve how to construe
nonmajority opinions. See, e.g., Alan
Ball, A Spike in Fractured Decisions,
SCOWstats (May 30, 2017), http://
www.scowstats.com/2017/05/30/aspike-in-fractured-decisions/ [https://
perma.cc/V8BD-HA72] (providing a
statistical overview of fractured
opinions in Wisconsin and arguing
for a need for clarity respecting how
to construe such opinions); Philip C.
Babler, The Need for a Marks Rule in
Wisconsin, Foley & Lardner LLP:
Wis. App. L. (Nov. 14, 2018),

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-3\GWN301.txt

580

unknown

Seq: 120

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

14-MAY-21

9:08

[Vol. 89:461

https://www.foley.com/en/insights/
publications/2018/11/need-for-marksrule-in-wisconsin [https://perma.cc/
TL7A-LFL7] (blog post from a
senior attorney at the law firm of
Foley & Lardner LLP, showing how
practitioners in Wisconsin appear to
construe state plurality opinions).
However, Wisconsin has not yet
resolved whether to apply the
narrowest grounds rule to its state
highest court opinions.
It does not appear that Wyoming courts have
considered Marks as applied to their own highest
court plurality opinions. The research databases
reveal two cites to Marks by Wyoming courts,
N/A
applying the narrowest grounds rule to federal cases
Wyo.
or related to the separate question involving the
(appt.)
retroactive application of laws. See, e.g., Anderson
v. State, 2014 WY 13, 317 P.3d 1108 (Wyo. 2014);
Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1986).
Wyoming has not addressed or
U
Comments:
resolved this issue.
Prelim tally: 13 3 34
Judicial Selection Breakdown Y N U
Summary:
Elected—partisan, nonpartisan,
5
2 14
legislative
1 20
Appointed—gubernatorial, assisted 8
Method: This Table is based on searches of Westlaw and Lexis. Case citing
references to Marks v. United States were filtered by state. Filtered cases were
reviewed to determine if the state court cited Marks for narrowest grounds
purposes, if the state court was using Marks to decipher a U.S. Supreme Court
decision, and if the court was applying Marks to state cases. Additionally, if a case
cited to a second case not on the filtered list and the second case appeared to also
discuss Marks or narrowest grounds, that second case was also reviewed. State cases
were also searched using Westlaw and Lexis. State cases were narrowed by date
range (1977–Present) and terms, such as: “narrow,” “narrowest,” “plurality,”
“narrowest grounds,” “fractured,” “nonmajority,” and “split opinion.” Secondary
sources were also examined for references to Marks and the narrowest grounds rule
as applied to state cases. Searches for secondary sources were conducted on
Westlaw, Lexis, HeinOnline, and Google Scholar.
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APPENDIX B: LOWER COURT AND SCHOLARLY TREATMENT
FULLILOVE V. KLUTZNICK FROM 1980–1990
Supreme Court
Cases
Quote(s)
(reverse
chronological
order)
Metro Broad., Inc. “A majority of the Court in Fullilove did
v. FCC, 497 U.S.
not apply strict scrutiny to the race-based
547, 564 (1990).
classification at issue. Three Members
inquired ‘whether the objectives of th[e]
legislation are within the power of
Congress’ and ‘whether the limited use of
racial and ethnic criteria . . . is a
constitutionally permissible means for
achieving the congressional objectives.’
Three other Members would have upheld
benign racial classifications that ‘serve
important governmental objectives and are
substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.’ We apply that standard
today.” (alterations in original) (internal
citations omitted) (first quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 472, 473 (1979)
(plurality opinion); and then quoting id. at
519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
Id. at 608
(O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).

“Although the Court correctly observes
that a majority did not apply strict scrutiny,
six Members of the Court rejected
intermediate scrutiny in favor of some
more stringent form of review. Three
Members of the Court applied strict
scrutiny. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion,
joined by Justice White and Justice Powell,
declined to adopt a particular standard of
review but indicated that the Court must
conduct ‘a most searching examination.’”
(internal citations omitted) (quoting
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491 (plurality
opinion)).
City of Richmond “The principal opinion in Fullilove, written
v. J.A. Croson Co., by Chief Justice Burger, did not employ
488 U.S. 469, 487
‘strict scrutiny’ or any other traditional
(1989).
standard of equal protection review.”

9:08

OF

Notes

This Supreme
Court majority,
which opted for
the Marshall test,
implicitly rejected
treating Powell as
controlling.

Justice O’Connor
concedes Powell
doesn’t control but
notes that
Marshall also did
not control. She
suggested Burger
was controlling.

It is notable that
the Supreme Court
itself deemed the
Burger opinion,
capturing the
median as
controlling.
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Supreme Court
Cases
(reverse
chronological
order)
Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 302
(1986) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).

Lower Court
Cases
(reverse
chronological
order)
Harrison &
Burrowes Bridge
Constructors, Inc.
v. Cuomo, 981
F.2d 50, 56–57 (2d
Cir. 1992).

Harrison &
Burrowes Bridge
Constructors, Inc.
v. Cuomo, 743 F.
Supp. 977, 990 n.14
(N.D.N.Y. 1990).
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Quote(s)

Notes

“Despite the Court’s inability to agree on a
route, we have reached a common
destination in sustaining affirmative action
against constitutional attack. . . . [I]n
Fullilove, the Court upheld a congressional
preference for minority contractors
because the measure was legitimately
designed to ameliorate the present effects
of past discrimination.”

Although Justice
Marshall’s dissent
regards the Burger
opinion as
controlling, this
allowed him to
support a closer
doctrinal position
to his own than
that of Justice
Powell.

Quote(s)

Notes

“Fullilove had upheld the federal minority The Second
enterprises program . . . . In a splintering of Circuit gravitated
toward Burger.
opinions reasoning that ‘Congress had
abundant evidence from which it could
conclude that minority businesses have
been denied effective participation in
public contracting opportunities,’ . . . a
majority of the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the federal set-aside
program.” (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 477
(plurality opinion)).
“No judicial opinion obtained a majority in
Fullilove. The plurality decision of Chief
Justice Burger and the concurrence of
Justice Powell, however, followed a middle
path between the divergent opinions of a
fragmented Court. Therefore, pursuant to
Marks v. United States, this court is bound
to follow the opinions of Justices Burger
and Powell.”

The District Court
claimed to apply
both Powell and
Burger
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Lower Court
Cases
(reverse
chronological
order)
Tenn. Asphalt Co.
v. Farris, 942 F.2d
969, 973 (6th Cir.
1991).

unknown

Seq: 123

14-MAY-21

MODELING NARROWEST GROUNDS

Quote(s)

9:08

583

Notes

“Chief Justice Burger, in an opinion for
himself, Justice White and Justice Powell,
emphasized [in Fullilove] the broad
authority of Congress under the Spending
Power provisions and the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution to provide a
safeguard against federal funds being used
to perpetuate the effects of prior
discrimination that had largely excluded
minority businesses from public contracts.”
Shurberg Broad. of “In his plurality opinion [in Fullilove],
Chief Justice Burger stressed Congress’
Hartford, Inc. v.
FCC, 876 F.2d 902, special constitutional authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact measures
911 (D.C. Cir.
to remedy past discrimination. Justice
1989).
Powell's concurrence also stressed that
Congress had made the finding of past
discrimination and that Congress had
selected the particular remedy.” (internal
citations omitted).

The Sixth Circuit
gravitated toward
Burger.

“The application of Fullilove to this case is
complicated by the fact that in Fullilove—
as in Bakke and Wygant—no opinion
commanded a majority of the Court. I rely
principally on Chief Justice Burger’s
opinion, joined by Justices Powell and
White.”
Winter Park
Concurrence in part: “Both Chief Justice
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Burger’s plurality opinion and Justice
FCC, 873 F.2d 347, Powell’s concurrence [in Fullilove] stressed
365–66 (D.C. Cir. Congress’s unique role in ensuring equal
1989) (Williams, J., protection under the Fourteenth
concurring).
Amendment. Both opinions, however, left
obscure the extent to which Congress’s
special role left it free to mandate racial
preferences solely on the basis of general
societal discrimination.” (internal citations
omitted)

The dissent relied
solely on Burger.

Id. at 939 n.12
(Wald, J.
dissenting).

The D.C. Circuit
seeks to reconcile
Burger and Powell.

The D.C. Circuit
seeks to reconcile
Burger and Powell.
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Lower Court
Cases
(reverse
chronological
order)
Associated Gen.
Contractors of
Cal., Inc. v. City &
Cnty. of San
Francisco, 813 F.2d
922, 928 (9th Cir.
1987).
Associated Gen.
Contractors of
Cal., Inc. v. City &
Cnty. of San
Francisco, 619 F.
Supp. 334, 339
(N.D. Cal. 1985).

Hammon v. Barry,
813 F.2d 412, 423–
24 (D.C. Cir.
1987).

Quote(s)
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Notes

“[A]ppellants overlook that the Fullilove
plurality relied on section 5 as authority
only for the federal government’s
imposition of affirmative action on state
and local governments.”

The Ninth Circuit
relied upon
Burger.

“Although no one approach commanded a
majority of the Fullilove Court, lower
courts, drawing from the above analysis,
and other opinions rendered in the case,
have distilled a three-part test to measure
the constitutionality of affirmative action
legislation.”

The District Court
devised a threepart test, which it
claimed reconciled
the major concerns
expressed in all
three opinions, and
states this is closest
to Burger.
The D.C. Circuit
relied upon
Burger.

“Likewise, the various opinions in
Fullilove emphasized that the 10 percent
government contract set-aside program at
issue there was remedial in nature,
specifically designed to reduce past racial
and ethnic discrimination. In his plurality
opinion, Chief Justice Burger dwelt on the
fact that Congress created the set-aside
program only in the wake of long
experience with government contracts and
after determining that a variety of
impediments to equal opportunity existed
in that arena.”
S.J. Groves & Sons “Three of the six majority justices in
Co. v. Fulton
Fullilove repeatedly emphasized that their
Cnty., 696 F. Supp. decision to uphold the PWEA was based in
1480, 1490 (N.D.
large part on two considerations: first, ‘the
Ga. 1987).
legislative authority of Congress’
specifically delegated by the Constitution,
particularly section five of the fourteenth
amendment; and second, the electoral
accountability of Congress as a ‘politically
responsive branch[ ] of Government.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 480, 490 (plurality opinion)).

The District
Court’s articulated
test appears to
reconcile the three
opinions rather
than to select one
as controlling.
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Lower Court
Cases
(reverse
chronological
order)
Britton v. S. Bend
Cmty. Sch. Corp.,
775 F.2d 794, 809,
811 (7th Cir. 1985).

Paradise v.
Prescott, 767 F.2d
1514, 1531 (11th
Cir. 1985).
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Quote(s)

“In neither case [Bakke nor Fullilove] did
any opinion command the assent of a
majority of the Court. Thus the Court’s
opinions do not provide the kind of
guidance in the constitutional area that its
decision in Weber does in analyzing Title
VII challenges.”
“In the period since the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Bakke and Fullilove a number
of circuits have developed principles,
based on the underlying concerns of the
various Justices’ opinions, for determining
whether the challenged voluntary
affirmative action plan is sufficiently
related to the governmental objective of
remedying past discrimination.”
“We recognized the absence of a definitive
Supreme Court standard for judging the
constitutionality of affirmative action.
After examining the various opinions
found in Bakke and Fullilove, we
concluded that the appropriate standard of
review should account for the concerns
common to the various views expressed in
those two fragmented decisions. Using this
approach, we concluded that legislation
employing benign racial classifications
generally will be upheld if: (1) the
governmental authority has authority to
pass such legislation; (2) adequate findings
have been made to ensure that the
legislation is remedying the present effects
of past discrimination; and (3) the use of
the classifications extends no further than
the demonstrated need of remedying the
present effects of the past discrimination.”
(citations omitted)

9:08
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Notes

The Seventh
Circuit cites most
heavily to Burger
but generally seeks
to reconcile and
synthesize the
opinions.

The Eleventh
Circuit distilled
and attempted to
reconcile the
various opinions in
Fullilove and
Bakke.
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Lower Court
Cases
(reverse
chronological
order)
Dotson v. City of
Indianola, 739 F.2d
1022, 1027 (5th
Cir. 1984)
(Wisdom, J.,
concurring in the
result).

Kromnick v. Sch.
Dist. of Phila., 739
F.2d 894, 901 (3d
Cir. 1984).

Quote(s)

“In Fullilove Justices Powell and Stewart
indicate that the interests of ‘innocent’
whites may be taken into account in
fashioning a remedial plan, but Chief
Justice Burger’s plurality opinion, citing
UJO, states, ‘When effectuating a limited
and properly tailored remedy to cure the
effects of prior discrimination, . . . ‘a
sharing of the burden’ by innocent parties
is not impermissible.’” (citation omitted)
(quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480, 484
(plurality opinion))

“The absence of an Opinion of the Court
in either Bakke or Fullilove and the
concomitant failure of the Court to
articulate an analytic framework
supporting the judgments makes the
position of the lower federal courts
considering the constitutionality of
affirmative action programs somewhat
vulnerable.”
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Notes

Although the
majority opinion
cites to all
Fullilove opinions,
it does not provide
analysis as to
which is
controlling.
Judge Wisdom,
concurring, seeks
to synthesize and
reconcile the
Burger and Powell
opinions.
The Third Circuit
implies that the
choice is
speculative.
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Lower Court
Cases
(reverse
chronological
order)
S. Fla. Chapter of
Associated Gen.
Contractors of
Am., Inc. v. Metro.
Dade Cnty., Fla.,
723 F.2d 846, 850
& n.7 (11th Cir.
1984).

S. Fla. Chapter of
Associated Gen.
Contractors of
Am., Inc. v. Metro.
Dade Cnty., Fla.,
552 F. Supp. 909,
931 (S.D. Fla.
1982).
Uzzell v. Friday,
592 F. Supp. 1502,
1517 n.29
(M.D.N.C. 1984).
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Notes

The Eleventh
Circuit notes that
the District Court
had observed
neither Marshall
“The district court referred to the Chief
nor Burger, at
Justice’s opinion as the ‘plurality opinion’
three Justices each,
in Fullilove. Two justices also concurred in
can claim special
Justice Marshall’s opinion, however,
status as plurality.
meaning that neither the Chief Justice nor
Justice Marshall’s opinion garnered the
support of a plurality. Thus, to the extent
that the term ‘plurality opinion’ connotes
that an opinion commands more support
than other opinions in the case, neither
Chief Justice Burger nor Justice Marshall’s
opinion qualifies.” (internal citation
omitted).
“As in Bakke, the Court in Fullilove did
not produce a majority opinion, with three
different views emerging from those
Justices voting to uphold the statute.”

“While the plurality opinion did not
explicitly state what standard of review
should be applied to benign racial or ethnic
classifications, Justice Powell wrote a
concurring opinion in which he repeated
his belief, first expressed in Bakke, that the
strict scrutiny standard should be applied.”
(footnote omitted)
“Chief Justice Burger wrote an opinion
announcing the judgment of the Court [in
Fullilove] in which Justices White and
Powell joined. Justice Powell also filed a
concurring opinion applying the test set
forth in his opinion in Bakke.”

The District Court
appears to rely
upon Powell’s
Fullilove analysis,
combined with his
Bakke analysis, to
discern the
evolving standard.
The District Court
appears to rely
upon Powell’s
Fullilove analysis,
combined with his
Bakke analysis, to
discern the
evolving standard.
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Lower Court
Cases
(reverse
chronological
order)
Williams v. City of
New Orleans, 729
F.2d 1554, 1568
(5th Cir. 1984)
(Higginbotham, J.,
specially
concurring).

Williams v. City of
New Orleans, 543
F. Supp. 662, 679
(E.D. La. 1982)
Bratton v. City of
Detroit, 704 F.2d
878, 885 (6th Cir.
1983).
Ohio Contractors
Ass’n v. Keip, 713
F.2d 167, 170 (6th
Cir. 1983).
Mich. Rd. Builders
Ass’n, Inc. v.
Milliken, 571 F.
Supp. 173, 175
(E.D. Mich. 1983).
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Quote(s)

Notes

“Chief Justice Burger’s plurality opinion in
Fullilove, joined by Justices Powell and
White, notes that ‘[a]ny preference based
on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily
receive a most searching examination to
make sure that it does not conflict with
constitutional guarantees.’ Justice Powell
wrote a concurring opinion adhering to his
endorsement in Bakke of a strict scrutiny
standard of review for all racially-based
plans.” (internal citations omitted)
(alteration in original) (quoting Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 491 (plurality opinion)).

The Fifth Circuit
appears to
synthesize the
Burger and Powell
positions, along
with Weber and
other Fifth Circuit
cases.

“The case [Fullilove] produced no majority The District Court
offers no guidance.
opinion, and a wide range of possible
approaches.”
“Fullilove is a plurality decision with little
precedential value.”

“Neither Fullilove nor Bakke produced a
majority opinion from the Supreme Court
and we depend on the several plurality
opinions for guidance.”
“Interestingly, each party relies upon
Fullilove v. Klutznick in support of their
respective positions. . . . In a plurality
decision, the Court determined that the
MBE was constitutional notwithstanding
its mandate that ‘at least 10% of [any grant
for local public works projects] shall be
expended for minority businesses.’ In its
ruling, it is clear that the Fullilove Court
adhered to its earlier stance that ‘racial
classifications are not per se invalid under
[the Equal Protection Clause of] the
Fourteenth Amendment.’” (internal
citation omitted) (alteration in original)
(first quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 454
(plurality opinion); and then quoting id. at
517 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment)).

The Sixth Circuit
implies Burger
controls but
questions the
precedential value.
The Sixth Circuit
seeks to reconcile
all the opinions.
The District Court
seems to rest on
the Burger
opinion.
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Lower Court
Cases
(reverse
chronological
order)
Sw. Wash.
Chapter, Nat’l
Elec. Contractors
Ass’n v. Pierce
Cnty., 667 P.2d
1092, 1097 (Wash.
1983) (en banc).

M.C. West, Inc. v.
Lewis, 522 F.
Supp. 338, 342
(M.D. Tenn. 1981).

Article (alpha by
author)
Jesse H. Choper,
The
Constitutionality of
Affirmative Action:
Views from the
Supreme Court, 70
KY. L.J. 1, 5–6
(1981–1982).
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Quote(s)

Notes

“The concurring opinion of Justice Powell
provides some guidance in interpreting
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion, since
Justice Powell did sign it, but is not
controlling because Justice Powell was not
a necessary member of the majority.”

The Washington
Supreme Court
most clearly
articulates that the
controlling opinion
is Burger, not
Powell, because
Powell was not
necessary to the
majority, or
median.
The District Court
implies reliance on
Burger.

“Again, no one opinion [in Fullilove]
spoke for a majority of the Court. A clear
plurality of the Court, however, would
require precise findings of discrimination
before allowing an affirmative action
program to stand.”

Quote(s)

Notes

“As has become increasingly true,
especially when the issue is controversial,
there was no opinion for the Court.
Rather, there were two principal opinions[,
Marshall and Burger,] in Fullilove, written
on behalf of a majority of the Court with
three Justices subscribing to each.”

Author suggests
Burger and Powell
were essential to
raising supporting
votes to six.

“Of great significance were the votes of
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell to
uphold the MBE provision since their
positions in Fullilove raise to six the
number of Justices committed to the view
that the Constitution does not prohibit all
race-conscious affirmative action.”
Author seeks to
Paul N. Cox, The “The point of the Burger and Powell
Question of
opinions [in Fullilove] is that there will be reconcile Burger
“Voluntary” Racial judicial deference to congressional policy and Powell.
Employment
making, and that policy making authority
Quotas and Some seems clearly to include the right to define
Thoughts on
the evil sought to be remedied so long as
Judicial Role, 23
the purpose is proper.”
ARIZ. L. REV. 87,
167 (1981).
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Article (alpha by
Quote(s)
author)
Drew S. Days, III, “Justice Powell, who joined in the Burger
Fullilove, 96 YALE opinion, wrote separately to restate his
L.J. 453, 466, 467, view on the proper standard of review.”
474 (1987).

Purely descriptive.

Author argued for
the U.S.
Government in
Fullilove.

This quote and the
next seem to
center on the
Burger analysis.

Deborah L.
Jacobs, Justice Out
of Balance:
Voluntary RaceConscious
Affirmative Action
in State and Local
Government, 17
URB. LAW. 1, 5
(1985).

“The efforts to delineate the appropriate
test for evaluating the constitutionality of
racial classifications ran from Justice
Powell’s ‘strict scrutiny’ to Chief Justice
Burger’s ‘most searching examination’ to
Justice Marshall’s ‘substantially related to
an important governmental objective.’ The
truth is, however, that all the members of
the majority applied a standard that fell
below any of the ones upon which they
claimed to rely.”
“[T]he fact was not lost upon states and
localities that only Chief Justice Burger,
and perhaps Justice White, thought it
dispositive that the set-aside emanated
from Congress.”
“In an opinion by Justice Burger which
relied heavily on the plenary powers of
Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment to redress past societal
discrimination, the Court in Fullilove
upheld against a constitutional and
statutory challenge a ‘minority business
enterprise’ provision of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977.” (footnote
omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2)
(1982))
“Fullilove, consisting of five separate
opinions, none of which attracted more
than three votes, resulted in the remaining
four Justices [in Bakke] expressing their
view and one possibly making a change.”

Peter G. Kilgore,
Racial Preferences
in the Federal
Grant Programs: Is
there a Basis for
Challenge after
“The uncertainty left by these opinions [of
Fullilove v.
Burger and Powell] has been reflected in
Klutznick, LAB.
L.J., May 1981, at lower court decisions.”
306, 308, 313.
Author was cocounsel for
petitioners in
Fullilove.

Notes

This centers on
Burger.

This mentions
lower court
uncertainty
without deciding.
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Article (alpha by
author)
Larry M. Lavinsky,
The Affirmative
Action Trilogy and
Benign Racial
Classifications—
Evolving Law in
Need of Standards,
27 WAYNE L. REV.
1, 16 (1980).
Michael J. Phillips,
Neutrality and
Purposiveness in
the Application of
Strict Scrutiny to
Racial
Classifications, 55
TEMP. L.Q. 317,
333–34 (1982).
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Notes

This does not
“All of the Justices comprising the
choose.
majority concluded that the set- aside
provision was enacted to remedy the
effects of past racial discrimination.
Unable to agree on a single legal approach,
they wrote three separate opinions.”
(footnote omitted).

“While upholding [the MBE provision] by
a 6-3 vote, the Court, in its various
opinions, managed to enunciate at least
four distinct positions on the constitutional
treatment of congressionally-mandated
reverse racial preferences. . . . The first
position, marking a considerable departure
from the framework of analysis previously
used in equal protection cases involving
race, was contained in Chief Justice
Burger’s opinion announcing the judgment
of the Court.” (footnotes omitted)
John E. Richards, “Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices
Equal Protection
White and Powell, wrote the lead
and Racial Quotas: opinion.”
Where Does
“Although Justice Powell joined the Chief
Fullilove v.
Justice’s opinion, he wrote separately to
Klutznick Leave
Us?, 33 BAYLOR L. apply his Baake [sic] analysis to Fullilove.”
REV. 601, 604, 606
(1981).
Mark B.
“The Supreme Court, speaking through
Robinette,
Chief Justice Burger, focused its analysis
on whether the MBE objectives were
Comment,
within the power of Congress and, if so,
Fullilove v.
Klutznick: An
whether the means used for achieving the
Initial Victory for objectives were permissible.”
Congressional
Affirmative Action, “The decision also leaves undecided the
appropriate level of equal protection
8 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 377, 379, 387 scrutiny that should be applied to
congressional affirmative action, inasmuch
(1981).
as the Burger opinion refused to define the
level of scrutiny that it applied.”

Seems to rely upon
Burger.

Merely describes
the relationship
between Burger
and Powell.

This quote notes
that Burger
declined to join the
Powell articulation
of the governing
standard.
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Method: These data are derived from searches of Westlaw, for cases, and
HeinOnline, for law review and journal articles. Case citing references to Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), were filtered by date range (1980–1990), depth of
treatment (highest and second highest level), and searches within cases for
“Burger,” “Powell,” “Marks,” and “narrowest grounds.” Additionally, if a case cited
to a second case not on the filtered list, that second case was also examined. A
similar search was completed using LexisNexis to check for database variations. For
law reviews and journals search terms included: “Fullilove v. Klutznick”;
“Fullilove”; “Klutznick”; “narrowest grounds”; “Burger”; “Powell”; and “Marks.”
Articles were filtered by date range (1980–1990). Additionally, if an article cited to
another article not on the filtered lists that was of note, the article was also
reviewed. A similar search was completed using Google Scholar. Although no lower
court treats the Powell Fullilove opinion as controlling on narrowest grounds, as
Appendix A shows, two federal district court judges do rely upon the Powell
opinion in Fullilove, combined with the controlling Powell opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978), to derive an emerging
Supreme Court consensus position respecting benign race-based accommodations
more generally.
Supreme
Court

Lower
Courts

Law Review/
Journal

Burger:

3

9

3

Powell:

0

2

0

Summary: Seeks to Reconcile Burger and
Powell:

0

5

2

Seeks to Reconcile Burger,
Powell, and Marshall:

0

5

0

Not Applicable

0

3

4

